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Sum Ma ry 
Critical reviews of the literatures on self-fulfilling 
prophecies and self-confirming hypotheses uncovered several 
weaknesses in key works on those topics. In particular two 
important flaws were revealed. Hypotheses and expectations 
were confused and confounded and the most important aspect of 
these effects in person perception, changes in the perceiý-- 
er's representation of the target, were ignored. Instead 
these works either made inferences about the perceivers' 
judgments from other individuals with different perspectives, 
or claimed to have demonstrated the effect of manipulating 
the hypothesis whereas their results were probably attribut- 
able to manipulating expectancies instead. It was argued 
that both of these types of inferences are invalid, and re- 
analyses of data from empirical works showed that the claims 
were not justified. 
A series of experiments was conducted in an attempt to 
find un&wvocal evidence of self-confirming hypotheses. 
Numerous reasons were found as to why the phenomenon was 
highly unlikely to occur in social interaction. For 
instance, the asking of biased questions was found not to 
occur when perceivers generated their own questions to ask 
instead of selecting from a list given to them. In addition, 
subjects modified the questions they asked during the course 
of social interactions in such a way as to eliminate any 
possible bias in information search. Even when questions 
searching for confirmatory evidence were asked there was 
little evidence that interviewers' judgements %, ere biised in 
favour of confirming their hypotheses. 
By contrast strong evidence was found for self- 
confirming hypotheses when subjects used information from 
their own memories to test hypotheses about aquaintances. 
These findings were discussed in the light of other 
paradigms within social psychology. Reasons ., by social 
cognition has, at times, so underestimated human rationality 
were considered and several conclusions were made including 
the need for greater caution in attempting to emulate and 
understand social processes in a laboratory setting. 
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Introduction. 
The phenomenon named the self-fulfilling prophecy 
has been the subject of a considerable amount of 
research in the social sciences and, in particular, in 
social psychology. This chapter will provide a review 
of the social psychological literature on self- 
fulfilling prophecies. Three empirical studies of 
different self-fulfilling prophecies will be described 
in depth. Using these examples to illustrate the 
arguments, new criteria for evaluating self-fulfilling 
prophecies will be proposed, paying particular attention 
to the empirical studies in person perception that claim 
to have demonstrated the self-fulfilling prophecy 
phenomenon. It will be argued that the essential 
features of a self-fulfilling prophecy are different in 
the study of person perception than in other areas of 
the social sciences. Whereas in other applications of 
self-fulfilling prophecies the primary interest has been 
in the target of the prophecy, in person perception it 
should be on the perceiver's representation of the 
target of the prophecy. The experiments purporting to 
show self- fulfilling prophecies in person perception 
have failed to take this into account. 
The framework for analysing self-fulfilling 
prophecies in person perception developed in this 
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chapter will then form the basis of the analysis of the 
closely related phenomenon, the self-confirming 
hypothesis, which will be the primary focus for the 
theoretical and empirical work presented in the rest of 
this thesis. 
The discussion of self-fulfilling prophecies will 
start, however, outside of social psychology with the 
work which introduced the concept of the self-fulfilling 
prophecy into the social sciences. Merton's classic 
paper called "The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy", published 
in 1948 (and reprinted as a chapter in his 1957 book), 
continues to be cited widely and includes the definition 
of the self-fulfilling prophecy that is still the most 
commonly used today. 
Merton's original conceptualisation of the 
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy. 
Robert Merton was the first writer to explicitly 
define and use the concept of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Although he was himself a sociologist, his 
most memorable and most quoted example of a self- 
fulfilling prophecy is taken from an actual instance of 
a real economic incident that occured in the year 1932. 
The Last National Bank was a thriving institution, 
and was doing at least as well as most American banks. 
Then, for no apparent reason, the manager noticed that 
they were doing a very brisk trade one particular 
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Wednesday, usually a quiet day. Two dozen men from the 
local factory were all queuing up to withdraw their 
money. Instead of subsiding to a normal level, the 
queues grew all day as the men became more anxious to 
withdraw their money. The next day saw even longer 
queues, and the bank was eventually unable to meet the 
demands of its creditors -- it was suddenly bankrupt. 
This was due to what Merton calls the "Thionmas 
Theorem". Thomas (an influential sociologist in the 
earlier half of this century) stated that "If men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences" 
(1928). The investors had defined the pending closure 
of the bank, and it was this definition alone that 
caused the reality -- the closure of the bank. This 
shows a very stark contrast between the social world and 
the physical world. Prophecies, rumours or predictions 
could not make the slightest difference to physical 
realities such as the boiling point of a liquid or the 
appearance of Halley's comet in 1986. The exact 
opposite is true of phenomena in the social world -- 
whether at the level of the individual deciding to 
ignore a person they suspect of disliking them or at 
the level of the government launching an attack because 
of a perceived threat or a stockmarket crashing 
because of speculations about falling prices. These 
situations all have one thing in common -- the reality 
of the situation has changed because of the way in which 
an individual or a group has defined that situation or 
prophecied a particular future for it. 
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'-Ierton defined self-fulfilling prophecies thus: - 
"The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, 
a false definition of the situation evoking a new 
behaviour which makes the originally false 
conception come true. .... The specious validity 
of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign 
of error. For the prophet will cite the actual 
course of events as proof that he was right from 
the very beginning. Such are the perversities of 
social logic. " 
(1957, p. 477, emphasis in original). 
Merton goes on to explain how this effect may be 
behind many of the ills of society and the cause of the 
persistence of some processes and beliefs. For 
instance, the Negroes were excluded from early trade 
unions in North America because, it was reasoned, they 
are not used to the traditions of organised labour and 
would thus be poor union members and undercut accepted 
rates. Because of this discrimination the Negroes were 
forced to take jobs at low rates of pay, undercutting 
the unions. This gave the Whites hard evidence that the 
Negroes were, indeed, unworthy of trade unionism and 
that the decision to exclude them was justified all 
along. The white citizens did not realise that it was 
their own actions that created these facts rather than 
the inherent nature of the black workers. 
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The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in Social Psychology. 
Many studies paralleling these findings have been 
translated into fields that are of direct relevance to 
social psychology such as (for example) person 
perception (Kelley, 1950), self-perception (Sc: ann & 
Hill, 1982), racial prejudice (Word, Zanna & Cooper, 
1974), sex stereotyping (Zanna & Pack, 1975), social 
stereotypes (Snyder Tanke & Berscheid, 19<<), attitude 
change (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979), competitive and 
cooperative styles of interaction (Kelly & Stahelski, 
1968; Snyder & Swann, 1978b), educational attainment 
(Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968, Swann & Snyder, 1980) and 
even experimenter effects (Rosenthal, 1976). To form 
the basis of the arguments that are to follow later in 
this chapter, three of these experiments will now be 
described in detail. 
The Pygmalion Studies: Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
in the classroom. 
This very influential study, conducted in an 
educational setting, was reported by Rosenthal & 
Jacobson (1968). They set out to demonstrate experi- 
mentally the mechanisms by which teachers' expectations 
of their pupils' future performance (their prophecies) 
could fulfil those expectations. Although aspects of 
the methodology of this work were criticised initially, 
it has stood the test of replication several times over 
(See, for instance Crano & Mellon, 1978; Seaver, 1973 or 
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Sutherland & Goldschmid, 197-1), and it is typical of the 
many programmes of research that followed it. 
Rosenthal and Jacobson were investigating the 
reasons why children from disadvantaged ethnic 
minorities perform so poorly in the education system. 
Several obvious reasons have been put forward for this: 
the disadvantaged home backgrounds; language problems; 
motivational problems and so forth. Rosenthal and 
Jacobson started looking at the problem from the other 
point of view -- maybe it is the teachers' behaviour 
towards the children that cause the children to fail 
rather than some feature of the children themselves. It 
would be very difficult to manipulate teachers' expect- 
ations of pupils from ethnic minorities within the 
confines of a controlled experiment so instead the 
teachers were lead to believe that some of their pupils 
(in fact a random sample) were likely to shot: a marked 
improvement over the next year. Would this (bogus) 
expectation for some pupils effect their actual 
performance? 
The teachers were told that their class as to help 
in the validation of a new, test designed to predict 
academic "bloom" or intellecteal gain 
in children. The 
test papers were bound in impressive-looking 
folders, 
and bore the title "Test of Inflected _4quisi 
Lion ". 
They were, in fact, no more than a novel 
type of 
intelligence test that the teachers were unlikely to 
have been familiar with. Soon after this test was 
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administered the teachers were told in a casual "By the 
way, in case you're interested ....... way which of 
their pupils were likely to "spurt" in the next 12 
months. In fact, these "spurters" were five pupils 
picked at random from each class. 
All of the children were given several follow-up 
I. Q. tests over the following year and a half. These 
tests revealed that those children in the experimental 
condition had shown considerably greater gains over that 
time than the pupils in the control groups. The 
teachers' expectations and nothing else had caused those 
gains in intelligence. It is all the more impressive 
that the gains were detected by objective measuring 
devices, not just in the eyes of the teachers. 
The mechanisms for these increased gains in I. Q. 
are interesting. They were not simply caused by the 
teachers devoting more time and effort to those pupils. 
If this were the case then one would expect those 
children to have gained most on the verbal component of 
the test; in fact the experimental group showed a 
greater differential improvement on the reasoning tasks. 
It seems as if the communication of the expectations 
took place unwittingly using subtle non-verbal channels. 
It was not only the possibility of this effect that made 
this study so influential 
in education, but also its 
magnitude. The differences 
between the experimental and 
control groups were 
larger than had been achieved from 
even successful (but costly) 
interventions to boost 
ge 7 
educational attainment. 
To summarise, what began as deliberately bogus 
information from the experimenters was transformed into 
expectations on the part of the teachers, and it was 
these expectations alone that caused the initially false 
information to become true. ' 
S 
1/ It is of interest to note that the exact opposite of a self-fulfilling prophecy 
can also occur -- Merton calls this a suicidal prophecy. For instance, environmental 
scares that prompt quick action by governments may succ4in solving the problem before 
it develops, leaving the government open to the charge that the action was unnecessary. 
A neat laboratory demonstration of a suicidal prophecy was conducted by Swann A Snyder 
in 1980. Instructors who were told to devote more time to teaching allegedly low 
ability pupils caused those pupils to outperform the allegedly high ability pupils. 
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Example 2: Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in 
Inter-Racial Job Interviews. 
Word, Zanna & Cooper (1974) investigated the 
presentation of black and white job applicants to white 
interviewers. Their review of the literature comparing 
communication with members of stigmatised groups (for 
instance the physically handicapped) and with communi- 
cation with other "normal" individuals. They found that 
people adopted more distant and less immediate nonverbal 
behaviours in talking to the stigmatised groups (Kleck, 
1968). They also found evidence that interactants 
reciprocate the nonverbal styles of their partners 
(Rosenfeld, 1967). Putting these two findings together, 
Word, Zanna and Cooper proposed that the same two 
phenomena may occur when a white job interviewer inter- 
acts with a black applicant. They used two separate 
experiments to test two hypotheses. Firstly, they 
hypothesised that white interviewers would display less 
immediate nonverbal behaviour when interviewing black 
rather than white job applicants. Secondly, they 
proposed that anyone faced with this style of inter- 
action would be induced into a less immediate style 
themselves, which would in turn cause them to be 
perceived as less desirable individuals and less 
suitable for employment. 
The subjects in the first experiment were 14 white 
male undergraduates. Through a series of experimental 
manipulations they were led to 
believe that they were to 
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perform a task in teams of four. They were intro(3uced 
to two other "subjects" (in fact confederates of the 
experimenter) to be in their problem-solving team. The 
subject were then told that their first task was to 
interview four high school pupils to select one more 
member of the team. The instructions, plus promises of 
financial rewards for sucessful teams, ensured that the 
"interviewer-subjects" took their task seriously and 
made a real effort to select the applicant who was, in 
their own eyes, most able. They then interviewed three 
pupils before they were debriefed. The first interview 
was discounted, leaving two interviews for experimental 
analysis; one of these interviews was always with a 
white pupil and one with a black pupil. 
The high school school pupils were chosen from a 
group of five -- three white and two black. The 
interviewers were given a list of 15 questions to ask. 
Prior to the experiment the school pupils had all been 
trained to answer these questions so as to appear 
equally competent and their nonverbal communication was 
also standardised as far as was possible. 
The dependent variable for this experiment was the 
immediacy of the interviewers' nonverbal communication. 
This was measured in several ways such as the 
interviewers' eye-contact and their seating position. 
These indices were added together using standardised 
weightings to give an overall measure of 
immediacy. 
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Analysis of the data showed that the interviewers 
were behaving in a less immediate way with the black 
interviewees than with the white interviec. ees. In 
addition the interviews lasted 25% longer with the white 
interviewees; the interviewers also made fewer speech 
errors per minute -- a further sign of a less formal 
and more friendly approach with the whites. 
Thus the first hypothesis was confirmed. The 
second hypothesis could then be tested. What differ- 
ences would these two styles of nonverbal communication 
have on the behaviour of interviewees and the way that 
behaviour would be interpreted? 
To answer this question a second experiment was 
conducted. Two white confederates were trained to act as 
interviewers, both acting in both the immediate and 
non-immediate conditions. These conditions here 
designed to be as similar as possible to the averages of 
the interviewers' nonverbal behaviour in the "white 
interviewee" and "black interviewee" conditions from the 
first experiment. Thirty subjects were to act as 
interviewees and were told to pretend they were job 
applicants. Again there were financial incentives to 
induce the subjects into taking their task seriously. 
These interviews were video-recorded and played 
back to a panel of two rater-judges at a later date. 
These video tapes (of just the interviewee, not the 
interviewers) were rated on several scales to indicate 
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the interviewees' perceived performance and aptitude. 
Two other measures were taken -- a standardised 
aggregate of nonverbal immediacy and the interviewees' 
mood and their opinion of the interviewer after the 
interview. 
All three of these categories of measures showed 
support for the hypothesis. The interviewees in the 
less immediate condition were rated by the judges to be 
less adequate for the job and were also rated as less 
calm and composed. Analysis of the interviewees' 
nonverbal behaviours showed that they were reciprocating 
the interviewers' nonverbal cues, returning less 
immediacy in the less immediate condition. Finally the 
interviewees liked the interviewers significantly less 
and rated them as significantly less adequate in the 
"non-immediate" condition, but their lower mood was not 
significantly different from the "immediate" condition. 
Word, Zanna & Cooper argue that the complex 
mechanisms that operate to perpetuate the disadvantage 
of stigmatised racial or ethnic minorities can now be 
better understood. White interviewers may, even if they 
want to give black job applicants a fair assessment, 
unintentionally behave in a more formal and careful 
manner with them. This will, in turn, make the black 
job applicants perceive the interviewers as less 
friendly, and they will respond in a similar formal 
manner. This will endear them less to the interviewer, 
who is more likely to favour the white applicants. The 
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interviewer will come away satisfied that he has given 
all the applicants a fair chance, but the black 
applicants simply do not present themselves so well -- 
after all, he saw it for himself with his own eyes! 
The authors also say that it is now possible to 
account for persistent discrimination in the labour 
market without recourse to motivational expla nations 
involving bigotry, ethnocentricity, ego-defence or 
projection; it is simply a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
The white interviewers' beliefs that black job 
applicants may be less skilled than their white peers 
has created a world in which this has actually happened. 
Word, Zanna & Cooper go on to argue that, unlike 
0 
many other errors in person perception, this one is 
unlikely to be self-correcting. With every interview 
with a white applicant who in induced into performing 
well, and with every interview with a black applicant 
who is encouraged to perform badly, the interviewers' 
expectations are likely to become stronger than before 
and even more likely to perpetuate the effect in the 
next interview. This undesirable phenomenon is not 
necessarily caused by any malicious intent on the part 
of the discriminator, nor necessarily by any deficiency 
on the part of the discriminated, but can arise through 
the complex process of interaction between the two 
parties. 
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Example 3. Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
Confirming the Attractiveness Stereotype 
Another study to investigate the mediation of 
social stereotypes was conducted by Snyder, Tanke 
Berscheid in 1977. They were looking at the very 
widespread stereotype that "What is beautiful is good". 
Both empirical findings (eg. Dion, 1972 and Dion, 
Berscheid & Walster, 1972) as well as folklore (eg. 
Cinderella and the ugly sisters) suggest that more 
attractive individuals are perceived to be better people 
on a diverse variety of traits from romantic love to 
intelligence. It seems clear to psychologists that even 
if there were to be a kernel of truth in any of these 
beliefs (and empirical evidence by Goldman & Lewis in 
1977 supports the view that there is), in reality the 
difference between attractive and unattractive indivvid- 
uals is much smaller than the stereotype suggests. Why 
then does the stereotype persist so consistently over 
the life-time of the individual and between generations? 
Why don't we ever learn? 
Snyder et al proposed that the answer to this 
question lies in the fundamental difference between 
physical knowledge and socially aquired knowledge. Most 
of the current research into person perception focuses 
on the way individuals process information that is given 
to them by the experimenter. This is particularly true 
of attribution theory research. Snyder, Tanke & 
Berscheid point out, however, that this information must 
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be obtained by the individual before processing can take 
place. Furthermore the gathering of information can be 
as difficult a task and thus as likely to cause error 
and bias as the processing of that information. 
Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid's experiment set out 
explicitly to look at how styles of interaction may 
effect the types of information we elicit from others, 
in turn effecting the attributions we make about them. 
If, for instance, we are pleasant, warm and animated 
towards someone, they will probably reciprocate in a 
positive manner, and we may well conclude that they were 
genuinely a nice person. Conversely, if we held 
negative expectations about others, we may act 
negatively towards them, to which they will respond 
negatively which will in turn be taken as evidence that 
the initial negative expectations were indeed right all 
along. Snyder et al (1977) used the attractive/ 
unattractive dimension to explore the way in which our 
perception of others can lead eventually to thine 
behaving in a manner consistent with that perception, 
even if our initial perception was entirely false. 
Two subjects took part in each interaction in the 
experiment, a male "perceiver" and a female "target". 
They were told that they were to take part in an 
experiment that looked at the role of nonverbal 
communications when people get to know each other, and 
they had been selected to take part in the telephone 
type of conversation. They they were also told to come 
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to different rooms on separate corridors for the 
experiment. This ensured that the two conversants did 
not see each other at any point before or during the 
experiment, which was essential for the manipulation of 
perceived attractiveness. 
The two participants were then told that to help 
the conversation flow more naturally they would be given 
the opportunity to find out a bit about each other. 
Both the male and the female were then given a biograph- 
ical inventory to complete by giving details of their 
education, hobbies and so forth. The males were then 
told that it helped if one knew what the other person 
looked like, because this would allow one to picture 
them more easily. A Polaroid instant photograph was 
then taken of them. When the males received the 
female's biographical inventory, it also had a Polaroid 
photograph attatched to it. 
This was not, however, a photograph of the female 
subject. It was one of a number of photographs of a 
female that had been prepared previously depicting 
either a woman that was considered to be very attractive 
or of a woman that was considered to be very unattract- 
ive by a panel of rater-judges. The female subjects in 
this experiment were not actually photographed, and no 
mention was made to them of photographs. 
In order to check that this manipulation had 
produced the desired effect on the males, both subjects 
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were asked to rate their partners on a total of 34 
bipolar adjective scales, using the biographical 
details. As expected the addition of the attractive 
rather than the unattractive photograph made the males 
rate the females more positively on a number of scale,,. 
To monitor the interactions in detail a stereo tape 
recorder was used so that the male and female subjects 
could be recorded on separate channels. The female 
channels of the recordings were then rated separately by 
a group of 12 rater-judges, naive as to the hypothesis 
being tested in the experiment or the condition of any 
particular dyad. Similarly, a group of nine rater- 
judges listened to just the male track of the tapes. 
The rater-judges scored each interactant on a total of 
44 bipolar scales, which included the 34 scales that 
the conversants used to rate each other. 
The analysis of the results showed quite clearl5- 
that the allegedly attractive females were judged to be 
reliably more socially desirable than the females in the 
"unattractive photograph" condition on a wide variety of 
scales. 
Beyond this, a more detailed analysis of the 
results becomes difficult because of the 
large number of 
dependent -variables (in excess of 50 at times). 
However, from a post-hoc test Snyder et al conclude that 
the attractive females were only more likely- to show 
more positive behaviours on those scales where 
the 
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stereotyped views of the males had predicted a differ- 
ence. The calculations that lead to these conclusions 
were as follows. Earlier in the data analysis a 
discriminant analysis had been employed on the 34 
adjective bipolar scales the rater-judges used to rate 
the females' behaviour. Twenty-one of these scales t: ere 
identified as high discriminators by virtue of having a 
difference of 1.4 or more standard deviations between 
the means on that scale for the attractive verses the 
unattractive conditions, the other 13 were rejected as 
low or non-discriminators (see, for example, Tatsuoka, 
1971). Looking back to the males' intial stereotyped 
impressions of the females from the bigraphical details 
and the photographs, 17 of the 21 high discriminators 
were in the predicted direction, but only eight out of 
the 13 low discriminators were in the "attractive is 
positive" direction. Since binomial tests show the 
first proportion as highly unlikely to have occured by 
chance (p=0.003), and the second as very likely to have 
occured by chance (p=0.29), Snyder et al claim that the 
males only found what they were looking for; what 
occured was not an all-embracing halo effect. In other 
words, the males were likely to make the allegedly 
attractive females behave in a more sociable way because 
they expected them to be more sociable, but because the 
males did not expect them to be more intelligent or 
sensitive, they were not seen as more intelligent or 
sensitive by the rater-judges. 
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The next analysis to be performed in unravelling 
the complex process attempted to find out how the males 
mediated the behavioural confirmation. Again, the fact 
that there were more dependent variables (50) than the 
number of subjects (male perceivers, n=38), made a 
straight forward multivariate analysis of variance 
inappropriate so Snyder et al settled for fifty separate 
univariate analyses of variance. Ti%enty-one of these 
proved significant at or above the 0.05 level. From an 
inspection of those 21 scales it was concluded that the 
males were generally more positive in their irrt eractive 
styles when they were lead to believe that their ff-male 
partners were more attracti`-e. 
After the conversation the female partners i,, (-re 
asked how they thought the males had perceived thiem. 
the attractive photograph condition, the females 
reported that the males had treated then in a manner 
more typical of the way in which they were normally 
treated. The females also believed that the males had 
perceived them more accurately when their male 
In 
interaction partners had been under the impression that 
the woman was physically attractive. 
Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid claim to have identified 
another case in which a perception of a situation 
has 
left its mark on the situation. They claim that the 
males' erroneous expectations of the 
females have made 
the females act exactly in accordance with those 
expectations. 
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A follow-up experiment goes further in exploring 
this expectancy-confirming phenomenon. In case it miht 
be claimed that Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid simply 
demonstrated the strength of sexist beliefs of males, 
Andersen & Bem (1981) enlarged the paradigm to include 
female perceivers talking with allegedly attractive and 
unattractive males, and both male and female same-sex 
pairs. The effect was just as strong in all conditions. 
The only individuals for which the effect was not 
replicated in an identical way were the ones classified 
as androgynous, individuals who do not encode and 
organise information so readily in terms of sex-linked 
associations. Androgynous females were found to be 
unlikely to find confirmation of the "what is beautiful 
is good" stereotype, but apart from that the effect 
proved itself equally powerful across all conditions. 
In their discussion of these findings, Snyder et al 
argue that the same type of effect may account for 
several phenomena of both theoretical and practical 
importance. For instance, one disturbing finding from 
the psychology of the physically handicapped is that 
even very able individuals soon fit in with the cultural 
stereotype that expects them to be highly dependenL. 
Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid point out that their results 
suggest that this may be caused by people acting towards 
the disabled as if they were dependent (in the same way 
as the males were acting as if the "attractive" 
females 
were more socially warm), and the handicapped 
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individuals would eventually find themselves behaving in 
a manner consistent with those expectations. 
Another example will show the potential theoretical 
contribution of this experiment. One of the most 
pervasive findings in attribution theory research is 
that individuals attribute the behaviour of others to 
their dispositions very readily, at the expense of 
making situational or external attributions. So 
pervasive is this attributional bias that it has been 
named the "Fundamental Attribution Error" (Ross, 197 1). 
All previous explanations of this error2 leave one 
question unanswered; why didn't people learn to correct 
this error after being proved continually wrong by the 
lack of cross-situational consistency in behaviour? 
If, however, the people we interact with really do 
come to behave in accordance with our expectations, then 
it is not surprising that ýN-e see them as being so 
consistent. What we would not realise is that this 
consistency is caused by the way we act towards them, 
and they may appear very differently to others who have 
different expectations of them. We have very little 
chance to find this out, however, since we rarely have 
the opportunity to observe individuals we know 
interacting with others. Even when itie hear other people 
reporting that they think a particular other 
is, say, 
very friendly when we have found them to be unfriendly, 
we can dismiss this by saying that others are not such a 
good judge of character as ourselves! 
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It should be apparent from these three examples of 
social psychological self-fulfilling prophecies that the 
phenomenon is not just an interesting curiosity or an 
eloquent example of what can happen in social 
interaction. It is a phenomenon that would seem to 
account for much of the error in social perception in 
everyday life and, most of all, for the perpetuation of 
erroneous beliefs once formed. 
An Attempt at a taxonomy of Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecies. 
Darley and Fazio published a review article in 1980 
in an attempt to unite and make sense of the growing 
volume of reaearch into self-fulfilling prophecies in 
social psychology. A simple model of social interaction 
was proposed in order to catalogue expectancy 
confirmation processes and highlight gaps in current 
knowledge. 
2/ For instance, the saliance of indivi uals cc.. pared 
siýýation_, o the 
representativeness of of people as opposed ýo situations as causes of 
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Darley and Fazio's model of social interaction 
identifies six crucial stages that are useful in 
understanding how self-fulfilling propheces ma. -, - occur. 
They immediately point out how the model has two main 
weaknesses. First, most social interactions do not have 
discrete beginnings and ends; the information and 
impressions from one interaction shape the next 
interaction, so it is maybe better seen as a cyclic 
rather than a linear process. Second, the labelling of 
one participant as the perceiver and the other as target 
is oversimplistic since more normally both participants 
are simultaneously attempting to form a better 
impression of the other while monitoring the impression 
the other is forming of them. These criticisms aside, 
the six stages of their model of social interaction are 
as follows: - 
A/ The perceiver forms an expectancy about the 
target 
B/ The perceiver acts in a manner congruent with 
this expectancy 
C/ The target interprets this behaviour 
D/ The target responds 
E/ The perceiver interprets the target's response 
and finally, 
F/ The target interprets his or her own response. 
Darley and Fazio (1980) use this model as a 
framework to describe each of these phases in detail and 
demonstrate how biases may occur at each of these steps. 
ýýýtar 1_ nage 23 
This chronicling of the stages does not, in itself, 
shed much light on different types of self-fulfilling 
prophecy. It will be argued here that a more detailed 
understanding of self-fulfilling prophecies is needed, 
and that this will reveal that some of the claimed 
demonstrations of self-fulfilling prophecies fall short 
of a more useful definition of the phenomenon. 
The one distinction that Darley and Fazio do make 
is between, (a) situations in which the behaviour of the 
target person is not actually altered by the perceiver 
but is misinterpreted by the perceiver as confirming the 
expectation and, (b), situations in which she perceiv- 
ers' expectations have a direct bearing on the target 
and actually alter the target's behaviour to bring about 
the expected behaviours. An example of one of each of 
these two types of self-fulfilling prophecy will clarify 
this distinction. 
A good example of individuals perceiving what they 
expect to perceive was demonstrated by 
Kelley in 1950. 
Students were given a description of a visiting 
lecturer, for half of the students the description 
contained the word warm, the other 
half of the students 
received the same description 
but with the word cold 
substituted. After attending 
the visitin lecturer's 
class, the subjects in the 
"warm" condition actually 
came to rate the lecturer as 
being warmer and also as 
being more positive on a variety of measures. It seemed 
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as if the two classes had interpreted the same actions 
as being evidence of different dispositions.. 
Snyder, Tanke and Berscheid (1977) went to great 
lengths in an attempt to prove that this bias in 
interpretation did not account for the confirmation of 
the expectancy in their experiments. The naive 
rater-, judges were employed to demonstrate that the 
females' behaviour was different in the attractive and 
unattractive conditions, in a way that would confirm the 
initial expectation. Thus they claimed to have 
demonstrated an actual difference in the targets' 
behaviour caused by the perceivers' actions. 
Apart from Darley & Fazio's paper, the only other 
recent work that attempts to bring together and 
integrate the literature on self-fulfilling prophecies 
was Jones' 1977 book entitled "Self-Fulfilling 
Prophecies: Social, Psychological and Physiological 
effects of Expectancies". The book draws upon a very 
wide range of applications of self-fulfilling proph- 
ecies, such as medical evidence, placebo effects, 
labeling theory, academic performance and achievements 
of goals. The book attempts to integrate much of the 
diverse anecdotal and empirical evidence under a unified 
model of goal setting and allocation of effort in the 
pursuit of that goal. This analysis can explain and 
lead to a greater understanding of some of the self- 
fulfilling prophecies reported, but contributes little 
to most social-psychological applications. In fact, 
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apart from general discussion of the social psycho- 
logical literature on topics such as implicit 
personality theories and the origins of expectancies, no 
real attempt is made to argue whether and under what 
circumstances self-fulfilling prophecies hill occur. 
is not even apparent that there was any benefit in 
integrating such a diverse mixture of material in one 
book if a framework cannot be found to link it. 
Change in the Target or the Perceiver's 
Representation of the Target? 
The first distinction that will be made between 
self-fulfilling prophecies concerns the nature of the 
matter that has been confirmed. In the "Pygmalion in 
It 
the classroom" experiment the expectation of the teacher 
(the perceiver) caused a change in the aptitude of the 
pupils (the targets) as measured outside of the direct 
influence of the teachers. This change is thus both 
objectively observable and enduring. Contrastingly, the 
changes brought about in the targets in the other 
two 
examples discussed here were presumed to 
last only as 
long as the interaction. While the targets were 
observed to behave differently 
depending upon the 
expectations of the perceivers, the 
focus of interest 
was the way in which the perceivers and other 
observers 
interpreted that behaviour. These two types of self- 
fulfilling prophecy can thus be called categorised 
into 
what will be called 
"enduring change in target" and 
"temporary change in target" types. While enduring 
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changes in the target may seem to be of greater 
importance, they are probably less likely to occur in 
the brief encounters observable in laboratory experi- 
ments. The impressions other people form of the target 
are also very important to their destiny though. Take, 
for example, the plight of the black job applicants 
emulated in Word, Zanna & Cooper's experiment. The 
failure to be offered employment could have serious 
long-term effects for them. 
It is, of course, possible for an interaction to 
have both an enduring effect on the target and on the 
perceiver's impression of the target. Swann & Hill 
(1982) demonstrated that even a fairly brief laboratory 
interview could effect a target's self image as measured 
several days later. Nevertheless, all of the experi- 
ments that have investigated self-fulfilling prophecies 
can be classified according to whether the prima r- focus 
of interest was an enduring change in some character- 
istic of the target, or a change in another person's 
representation of the target. The latter of these two 
types is the primary interest of self-fulfilling 
prophecies in the study of person perception. 
Perceivers and Naive Observers 
This type of self-fulfilling prophecy in which the 
primary interest is on the inferences made from the 
target's behaviour while influenced by the perceiver's 
expectations can be further sub-divided depending on who 
ý1; 
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is experiencing the self-fulfilling prophecy. The two 
person perception experiments that were described both 
measured not the perceiver's representation of the 
target, but the representations of the "observers" c: ho 
rated the target after hearing or seeing the target 
during the interaction with the perceiver. 
The main reason for employing these observers was 
presumably to illuminate the actual mechanism of the 
self-fulfilling prophecy. More specifically, the 
primary contribution of the observers (or rater-judges) 
was to be able to differentiate between Darley & Fazio's 
two types of self-fulfilling prophecies, the "actual 
confirmatory behaviour" type verses the "perceived 
confirmatory behaviour" type discussed earlier. Beyond 
an interest in the technicalities of self-fulfilling 
prophecies, though, the perceptions of the interactor 
are of far greater practical importance as far as 
self-fulfilling prophecies impinge on our everyday 
lives. If we need to get to know a person it is much 
more likely that we would talk to them ourselves rather 
than passively observing a third party conversing with 
them. There are clear exceptions to this; for instance 
a large part of our impressions of television 
personalities and politicians comes from hearing them 
being interviewed by others. 
It is worth noting in passing that in both of the 
experiments discussed here the observers 
did not share 
the perceivers' representation of the target. It is 
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also much more likely that, in a given real-life 
situation that two individuals would share, at least to 
some extent, the same representation of the target. 
This would, of course, have an important but unexplored 
effect on the representation that the observer gains of 
the target. As Moscovici (1981) has pointed out, 
psychologists have often ignored this great consensus 
between individuals from the same cultural background in 
their attitudes and stereotypes. 
In the next section it will be argued that the 
position of the perceiver who holds the expectancy and 
the observer, naive to the expectancy, are completely 
different. Because the information available to the 
observers in the two experiments was controlled in an 
artificial way, the experiments actually tell us little 
or nothing about the "observer experienced" self- 
fulfilling prophecies. Furthermore, because of a 
failure to consider fully the information available to 
the perceivers in these interactions, it will also be 
argued that what has actually been experienced by the 
perceiver falls short of any useful definition of self- 
fulfilling prophecies in person perception. 
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Conceptual and Methodological Criticisms of the 
Self-fulfilling prophecy experiments. 
A. 
prophecy 
The "Observer experienced" Self-fulfilling 
The two demonstrations of self-fulfilling 
prophecies in person perception arising from social 
interactions described above (Word, Zanna & Cooper, 1974 
and Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid, 1977) both used rater- 
judges to observe the targets in the interactions. The 
video cameras used by Word et al were positioned to show 
just the interviewee and not the confederate- 
interviewer. Similarly Snyder et al allowed the 
rater-judges to listen only to the females' voices in 
the conversation, not the voices of the males who were 
eliciting their more or less sociable behaviour. The 
logic in this was, presumably, to ensure that the 
expectancy was not mediated directly from perceiver to 
rater-judge, but only through the behaviour elicited 
from the target. Far from providing a stronger proof of 
the power of the expectation on the target's behaviour, 
this manipulation has instead made the observer's role 
so artificial as to take away any usefulness of their 
role in the experiments. 
Consider the following (albeit symplistic) example 
as an illustration of a situation in which a perceiver 
may generate evidence from a target that would appear 
in 
one way to a naive observer who could not observe the 
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perceiver's side of a conversation but in a very 
different way from the point of view of the perceiver. 
A female student (the perceiver) cants to impress 
her male lecturer (the target). She does this by paying 
him many compliments and adopting an immediate nonverbal 
manner. From the discussion so far it would come as no 
surprise if the lecturer reciprocated by also adopting a 
friendly manner. To a naive observer observing only the 
lecturer this would be taken as evidence of a friendly 
disposition on his part. However, an observer looking 
at both the interactants, or the student herself, may 
arrive at quite different conclusions from the 
lecturer's behaviour -- they could both marvel at her 
powers of influence, and be fully aware that most people 
who were complimented would adopt a pleasant manner 
(there is, in fact, well documented evidence (Singer, 
1964) that more attractive females and Machivellian 
males do knowingly manipulate others using exactly these 
mechanisms). 
To put this into the terms used by attribution 
theorists, the student has recognised that it was the 
situational forces acting on the lecturer and not his 
personal dispositions that were responsible for 
his 
behaviour. On the other hand, an observer who had not 
observed the situational forces acting on the 
lecturer 
would have little option but to make a 
dispositional 
attribution and put the lecturer's 
freindliness down to 
his good nature. It is logically possible that 
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Snyder et al's male perceivers made the same 
attributions as the imaginary student -- "Of course she 
sounds interested and sociable, I was being as friendly 
as I could to chat her up", or "She sounded a bit 
bored, but that was probably because I wasn't bothered 
myself". 
The words logically possible are used because 
previous attribution research literature has shown that 
individuals are very prone to ignoring even blatant 
situational forces and still make dispositional 
attributions (eg. Ross, Amabile and Steinmetz, 1977). 
It is clear, however, that any attribution that is made 
after observing only one side of a conversation is 
highly likely to produce an even more dispositionally 
biased set of attributions. It cannot be readily 
inferred from this, though, that those attributions 
would have been the same if the observer had been able 
to observe both sides of a conversation. Since it is 
such a highly unusual situation to observe just one side 
of a conversation (say when one overhears a person on 
the telephone) it is a phenomenon of little interest. 
And clearly from the senario given above, it is 
impossible to make inferences from one situation to the 
other. 
Would the rater-judges still have thought that the 
females in the attractive photograph condition were more 
likable if they knew that the males were being so much 
nicer to them? Would the rater-judges still 
have rated 
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the interviewees in Word, Zanna & Cooper's ''non- 
immediate" condition as less suitable for the job if 
they knew that the interviewers had given them such a 
hard time? Neither of these two experiments allows us 
to answer these important questions. 
B: The Perceiver-Experienced Self-fulfilling 
Prophecy. 
A close examination of the information available to 
the perceiver is also needed in order to specify under 
exactly which circumstances a self-fulfilling prophecy 
has occurred. In this section Merton's definition of 
self-fulfilling prophecies will be shown to be 
inadequate for self-fulfilling prophecies in person 
perception. A new definition will be proposed that is 
more suitable, and the examples will be evaluated in the 
light of this new definition. 
The problem with Merton's definition is that it is 
primarily concerned with the type of self-fulfilling 
prophecy that results in an enduring change 
in the 
target of the prophecy or expectation (eg. the bank that 
goes broke or the child whose education accelerates). 
However in person perception, where the primary 
interest 
is in changes in the perceiver's representation of the 
target, phrases like "false definition" and 
"come true" 
are less useful. 
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Consider the types of prophecies or expectancies 
held in the the experiments described here. The 
expectancies could be phrased in two ways, in terms of 
behaviours or dispositions. In Snyder et al's case this 
would be the difference between expecting the allegedly 
attractive females to behave in a friendlier way, or 
expecting them to be nicer people. While this may 
seem to be a trivial distinction it is crucial to 
Merton's definition. If the male perceivers initially 
expected and then concluded that the attractive females 
were nicer people, then they were clearly wrong in their 
conclusion since there was no difference in the stable 
dispositions of the females in the two randomly 
allocated groups. If, however, the male perceivers 
expected and concluded that the attractive females would 
behave in a nicer manner, then they were correct (even 
if for the wrong reasons). It can be inferred from the 
theoretical basis of attribution theory that individuals 
are much more likely to think of others in terms of 
their dispositions (or the causes of their behaviour) 
rather than the raw behaviour itself (Nisbett, 
1975), 
but this is perhaps more of an assumption than a fact, 
and debatable. 
This point may seem clearer with the 
following 
consideration of Merton's example. 
If the depositors of 
the Last National Bank thought that the 
bank was about 
to collapse, (a prediction about 
the future actions of 
the bank) they were correct and 
later they were proven 
to be correct. If, however, they were claiming 
that the 
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bank was, before the collapse, weaker than the other 
banks (a "disposition" of the bank), then that statement 
was false, and remains false even though the bank 
collapsed. 
These difficulties can be overcome by adopting a 
new definition of a self-fulfilling prophecy, that does 
away with this problem by addressing itself to the 
primary focus of interest, the perceiver's 
representation. 
A self-fulfilling prophecy has occurred when: 
1. A perceiver holds an expectation about a target 
2. The perceiver interacts with the target 
and 
3. As a result of this interaction the perceiver 
holds the expectancy to be more certain than before. 
This definition disregards the confusing terms 
"false definition" and "come true. ". Instead, it 
focuses on the crucial aspect of expectancy confirmation 
as far as person perception is concerned -- the way that 
expectations come to be held with more rather than less 
certainty. In other words, it captures the essence of 
the self-fulfilling prophecy, the way in which beliefs, 
rather than gradually coming into line with reality, can 
become self-perpetuating. 
It is worth noting at this point that it is very 
difficult to prove that a particular interaction 
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constituted a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead one 
usually has to rely on the experimental designs usually 
used in experiments on human rationality. Perceivers are 
typically divided into two groups and a different 
expectancy is given to those two groups. They are then 
given a chance to interact with the targets of those 
expectancies. If the average expectancies of the groups 
is larger after the interaction rather than before the 
interaction, then a tendency for self-fulfilling 
prophecies to occur has been demonstrated. 
How do the conclusions drawn from the two social 
psychological experiments reviewed so far change when 
considered in the light of this new definition? 
By its very nature, the crucial question about the 
direction of change of the perceiver's expectation 
cannot be answered in Word, Zanna & Cooper's (1914) 
experiment. Because the interviewers used in their 
second investigation were confederates, their opinions 
of the interviewees were not measured. It would 
be 
possible, though, for a white interviewer who started 
out by having very different expectations of 
black and 
white job applicants to conclude that the 
black 
applicants (even if they underperformed 
for the reasons 
explored in the experiments) were not as 
terrible as he 
had expected, and thus to moderate his negative opinions 
of them. It would only be 
if he were even more certain 
after the experiment that the 
black interviewees were 
inferior that a self-fulfilling prophecy would 
have 
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taken place. 
The data from Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid's 
i 
experiment, by contrast, should provide a perfect 
testing ground for this new way of looking at expectancy 
confirmation. Did the male perceivers strengthen their 
(possibly tentative) guesses that the attractive females 
would be more sociable? 
The crucial test is to see whether the males' 
ratings of the females in the attractive and 
unattractive conditions on the Impression Formation 
Questionnaires were more or less divergent after the 
conversations compared to before them. This would show 
as an interaction between time of testing (before verses 
after) and attractive verses unattractive conditions, if 
a two-way analysis of variance was computed. It is not 
enough to simply find that, after the conversations the 
males in the two conditions still rated the females 
differently. This could simply mean that they had not 
yet learned enough about the females, but that in time 
the two groups would have completely overcome their 
initial misperceptions. 
Surprisingly and without any justification there is 
no mention of the males' post-interaction scores 
in the 
results section, even though it is clearly stated 
in the 
method section that the measures were taken 
both before 
and after! Personal correspondence with 
Mark Snyder 
(1985) revealed that an earlier draft of the paper did 
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report that there were still differences between the 
males' perceptions of the females on some of the scales 
after the interaction. In the attractive target 
condition the females were seen as more exciting, 
whereas the females in the unattractive target condition 
were seen as more altruistic and more kind (ps all 
<0.05, two tailed). Unfortunately there is no repeated 
measures analysis to compare the pre-and post- 
interaction perceptions directly, but a simple count of 
the number of variables showing significant differences 
after rather than before the interaction shows that 
before the interview there were four variables 
significant at the 0.025 level (the level of signif- 
icance quoted in the original report) before the 
interview, and only two afterwards. It seems as if the 
males' perceptions of the females in the two conditions 
were converging, not polarising. 
Evidence from other studies of self-fulfilling 
prophecies also fails to 
derýýýý5t"Ate- that the 
expectancies have a self-perpetuating nature. In a very 
similar experiment Andersen & Bem (1981) reported some 
measures taken after the interviews, although they 
were different measures and analysed seperately 
from 
the scores taken at the beginning of the experiment. 
A casual inspection of the results does reveal, 
however that the attractiveness stereotype was 
probably diminishing over time. 
Before the interaction 
there was a highly significant main effect 
for 
attractiveness (p<0.00001), but after 
the interaction 
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therewar no main effect for liking, just a non- 
significant trend for a three. -way interaction (p<0.06) 
showing that all perceivers except androgynous females 
ended the interviews liking the allegedly attractive 
targets slightly more than the allegedl`- unattractive 
ones. While bearing in mind the dangers of comparing 
two different dependent variables directly, it seems as 
if the attractiveness stereotype soon diminishes rather 
than perpetuates itself. 
Other evidence, albeit indirect, also supports this 
position. Thomas & Malone (1979) used Snyder, Tanke & 
Berscheid's data (among several others) for a completely 
different purpose -- to investigate the closeness of fit 
of various discrete-state probabilistic models to social 
interactions of different sorts. Although the main 
content of their findings are of no direct relevance to 
the arguments presented here, there is one incidental 
finding of great interest. 
Thomas & Malone employed their own rater-judges to 
rate each utterance from Snyder et al's subjects over 
the first four minutes of the conversation. They used a 
six point scale of animation from 1, very flat and 
expressionless, to 6, full of energy and excitement. 
If 
the males were becoming slowly more convinced that the 
attractive females really did live up to their stereo- 
types, then one would predict that the males and females 
from the two conditions would start the conversation at 
the same level of animation and slowly diverge, the 
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males and females in the attractive condition slowly 
becoming more animated compared to the males and females 
in the unattractive condition. 
The results show exactly the opposite. The males 
in the attractive condition were already more animated 
in their first utterance, and this difference between 
the groups remained fairly constant over the rest of the 
four minutes analysed. The females had already 
responded to this differential treatment by their second 
utterance, and the difference between the two groups 
showed, if anything, a slight decline from there onwards 
throughout the conversation (see Thomas & Malone, Figure 
1, p. 347). 
When analysed in this way, far from looking like 
self-fulfilling prophecies, these effects now appear to 
be more similar to another effect known to social 
psychologists. An experiment conducted by Argyle & 
McHenry in 1971 investigated the phenomenon whereby the 
wearing of spectacles makes an individual appear more 
intelligent to others. They found that while the effect 
works well when the stimuli are presented only as 
photographs, any longer exposure using video-recordings 
caused the effect to disappear completely. 
The evidence 
from the self-fulfilling prophecy literature, 
in as much 
as it can provide evidence to these answers at 
all, 
seems to suggest that expectations, 
beliefs and 
prophecies are moderated by, not enhanced 
by, social 
interaction. What has been proved in the two experi- 
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ments is that individuals change their style of inter- 
action depending on their expectations about the person 
they are interacting with, and that this can in turn 
effect the behaviour of that person. Unfortunately, 
none of the other experiments concerning self-fulfillin 
prophecies in person perception have demonstrated this 
crucial effect of the perceiver's expectancy on the 
interaction and then, most importantly, on the 
erceiver's final representation of the target either. 
Kelly (1950) only measured the students' 
representation of the new lecturer after the lecture. 
It is thus possible that the students already had formed 
their opinions of the lecturer from the introduction, 
and they were reduced slightly by the interaction. It 
is also, of course, difficult to genelise from a 
lecture to any other social interaction. 
Zanna & Pack (1975) were only concerned with the 
self-presentation of targets (females) depending on the 
expected characteristics of the perceivers. It was 
found that females presented themselves in a manner more 
consistent with the traditional female stereotype when 
they expected their attitudes and behaviour to be 
observed by a desirable male whose 
"ideal woman" was of 
the traditional type. There was no interaction with 
these males; they did not exist. 
A further type of a demonstration has used the 
impoverished environment of the prisoner's dilemma ; ame 
Chapter I. page 41 
as the form of interaction between perceiver and target 
(Kelly & Stahelski, 1970; Snyder & Swann, 1978b). This 
in itself probably makes any generalisation to issues 
outside of that particular prisoner's dilemma game 
unjustified (Morley & Stephenson, 197ß). Snyder & 
Swann's main dependent variable was the tactics the 
subjects used in a reaction time game with and without 
noise interference. It is likely that the subjects were 
simply familiarising themselves with the rules of a 
rather bizarre game unrelated to the processes of social 
interaction. Again it is impossible to say whether the 
"reign of error" (Merton, 1957) would continue to 
perpetuate after the initial manipulation, or would 
fizzle out. 
Kelley & Stahelski's study of the "Triangle 
Hypothesis" is, perhaps, the empirical work that comes 
closest to demonstrating how self-fulfilling prophecies 
work in the real world. It is not, however, a true 
experiment. They did not allocate subjects to groups 
randomly and manipulate their expectancies. Instead 
they relied on two different stable types of individ- 
uals, cooperators and competitors (as measured by asking 
subjects what they perceive as the goal of the prison- 
ner's dilemma game to be; to cooperate or to compete). 
They demonstrate how their styles of interaction could 
lead to a perpetuation of the differences in the world 
views of these two groups, which could in turn lead to a 
re-inforcing of their world views (and so on). More 
specifically, it was found that competitors would fail 
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to recognise cooperative acts by others, and force them 
to act competitively, reinforcing their world view that 
the world is made up of only competitive, not 
cooperative individuals. This is not the same, however, 
as actually creating and studying the phenomenon 
experimentally. These personality types contain complex 
constellations of cognitive and motivational factors, 
and it is impossible to fully understand the process by 
simply observing their behaviour under different 
conditions. 
Other Self-fulfilling prophecies have been 
concerned with attitudes about political issues rather 
than perceptions of people (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 199), 
or concerned with self-perception rather than other the 
perception of others (Swann & Hill, 1982b; Snyder & 
Skrypnek, 1981). Even Darley & Fazio (1980) could find 
no direct evidence of perceivers automatically 
interpreting a target's behaviour as confirmation of the 
expectancy. Instead they gloss over this point and cite 
research that suggests that this might be the case. 
Further Statistical Criticisms of Snyder, et al 
1977. 
As well as the main criticisms developed from the 
new definition of the self-fulfilling prophecy, other 
details of Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid's experiments are 
also either dubious or simply wrong. 
For example, one 
of the most impressive claims made 
by Snyder et al was 
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that the only scales that detected significant 
differences between the two attractiveness conditions 
were those scales where the males had expected there to 
be differences. Snyder et al arrived at this conclusion 
after comparing the 21 scales where the males had shown 
a large difference in their expectations of the 
attractive versus unattractive females with the 13 
scales where the initial differences had been small. 
The judges found the differences in the means to be in 
the predicted direction for a large majority of the high 
discriminators (17/21), but for the low discriminators 
the proportion was barely above the chance level (8/13). 
Binomial tests showed that the first proportion (81%) 
was highly significant and the second proportion (62%) 
was not significant. However, no direct comparison was 
made between these two proportions to see whether they 
differed from each other. The obvious way of doing this 
would be by using a chi-square test on the 2x2 table of 
high discriminators vs low discriminators and predicted 
direction vs opposite direction. The calculations 
performed on this table (Table 1.2) actually reveal that 
the difference between these two proportions is 
hot 
- significant , -1-2=1.05, 
df=1, p> . 2, one 
tailed. 
Snyder et al seem to have been forced to use clumsy 
statistical procedures because they 
had a very large 
number of dependent variables and no clear rationale 
for 
analysing them. They were probably 
trying to cover all 
possibilities by taking as many measures as possible. 
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This is often a useful tactic to employ -- indeed 
McGuire's influential paper published in 1973 on more 
advanced conceptual and statistical approaches strongly 
advocates the use of many variables and advances 
multivariate analyses. The dangers of this approach 
are, though, that experimenters can find themselves with 
too many variables for any concise hypothesis testing 
while running a very high chance of committing both 
type one and type two errors simultaneously. The 
combination of approximately three hundred dependent 
variables (many of those already aggregated) and few 
clearcut theory-driven tests led Snyder et al into 
confusion patched up with weak, inappropriate post-hoc 
statistics. There were other dubious facets of the 
empirical work too -- for instance 13 of the 51 pairs of 
subjects were rejected from the experiment, some for 
reasons that were obviously only adopted after the 
experiment -- such as the males feeling that an 
excessive age gap between them and their females had 
affected the interaction! It all points to a poor 
theoretical understanding of what to look for in the 
first place. 
Summary and Conclusions. 
1. The chapter starts with a description of 
Merton's initial conception of self-fulfilling 
prophecies. Then three experiments purporting 
to 
demonstrate self-fulfilling prophecies in social 
psychology are described. 
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2. Two other reviews of the literature on 
self-fulfilling prophecies in social psychology are 
discussed, and shown to contribute little to a real 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
3. It is argued that there are two fundimentally 
different sorts of self-fulfilling prophecy in social 
psychology. The first is primarily concerned with the 
enduring effects of the perceiver's expectation on the 
target, the second is primarily concerned with the 
enduring effects of the perceiver's expectancies on his 
or her own representation of the target. 
4. Furthermore, it is shown that Merton's 
definition of self-fulfilling prophecies is unsuitable 
for this second type. This is the type that is usually 
of most interest in the study of person perception. 
5. The exact criteria that need to be met to prove 
the existence of a self-fulfilling prophecy are outlined 
in detail. It is demonstrated that the considerations 
are different for the perceivers who hold the expectancy 
and the observers who are naive to the expectancy and 
observe the target during the interaction. It is also 
argued that the role of these observers or judges 
has 
been over-rated in previous experiments, and they cannot 
determine whether a self-fulfilling prophecy has 
occurred. 
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6. The crucial feature of this second type of 
self-fulfilling prophecy is that perceivers are more 
certain of their expectancy after interacting with the 
target, either because of the way in which they elicit 
behaviour or interpret that behaviour from the target. 
While some experiments have illuminated how certain 
phases in the phenomena could occur, none of the 
experiments that claim to have demonstrated self- 
fulfilling prophecies in person perception have, in 
fact, found this polarising effect on the perceiver's 
expectation. What evidence there is suggests that 
exactly theofVosite is going on -- rather than being 
made more extreme, expectancies are moderated by social 
interaction. 
7. Because of these factors, and also other 
statistical and methodological faults in these 
experiments, it is concluded that self-fulfilling 
prophecies have been poorly understood in social 
psychology, particularly in the field of person 
perception. While they may well occur, a convincing 
experimental demonstration has yet to be carried out. 
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Table 1.1. Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid's (1977) data 
allegedly demonstrating the selective confirmation of 
only the "High -Discriminator" traits. 
Difference in Predicted Direction? 
Yes No 
High 
Discriminators 
Low 
Discriminators 
17 4 
85 
25 9 
21 
13 
34 
X2=1.05, ns., one tailed. 
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Clzapt er2 
Hypothes is Test ing in 
Social ILriteraction 
Introduction 
In chapter 1 the literature on self-fulfilling 
prophecies in person perception was described in depth 
and critically reviewed. The rest of the thesis c: ill 
deal with a closely related phenomenon, the self- 
confirming hypothesis. The present chapter will start 
by defining the difference between the two phenomena. 
It will then go on to give a detailed description of the 
existing literature on hypothesis testing in social 
interaction. This work attracted much acclaim at the 
time that it was published, and continues to do so. The 
reasons for this are explored by considering the climate 
of reseach in social psychology at the time the rese; ý(, -, h 
was published. It is concluded that the research fitted 
exactly with the other influential publications at the 
time, sharing the same "model of man" and the same 
roots in cognitive psychology; this was probably as 
responsible for the interest shown in the 
hypothesis 
testing paradigm as the intrinsic merit of the 
experiments themselves. 
The description of the literature on the testing of 
hypothesis about other people in social interaction will 
set up some criticisms of the rationale of 
this work, 
and of the methodology used 
in these experiments. 
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Chapter 3 will contain criticisms of Snyder 6L Swann's 
experiments, and of Swann's PhD thesis which they draw 
upon. The work described in this chapter and the 
criticisms of it in the next chapter will form the basis 
for all of the empirical work to be presented in 
chapters 4 to 8 of this thesis. 
Self-Confirming Hypotheses and 
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies. 
The difference between hypothesis-testing and the 
phenomena described in the last chapter dealing with 
beliefs or expectations has hardly ever been fully 
articulated in the literature (exceptions are Burchell, 
( 1984) and, to a lesser extent, Snyder ( 1985) ), ý-et it 
will argued here that they are conceptually quite 
distinct. Furthermore, a failure on the part of 
experimenters and theorists to make this distinction has 
often led to false conclusions being drawn from 
empirical work. 
Many recent social psychology text-books fail to 
make any distinction at all between expectations and 
hypotheses in this context (eg. Wegner & Vallachqy-, 1981, 
p228; Ross & Anderson, 1982, p151; Hamilton, 1981(b), 
p120); the two are discussed interchangably. Some 
experiments have been called examples of 
hypothesis 
testing by the experimenters when, in fact, they are (by 
the definition that will follow) really about actinc., on 
expectations (eg. Darley & Gross, 1983), and other 
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e. -,,. periments combine the two processes without distj. iý- 
uishing between them (e,,.,. Carver &- de la Garza, 1982). 
Snyder has performed experiments both on the 
effects of expectations (eg Snyder, Tanke & Berscheld, 
197,7; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978) and on the effects of 
hypothesis testing (eg. Snyder & Swann, 1978; Snyder & 
Cantor, 1979). Usually he talks about the two types ot 
experiments separatelyp but more rerently he has said 
explicitly what he considered the difference to be 
(Snyder, 1985). Even then he says that while there may 
be a theoretical distinction, they were "in practice 
not different" (p. 261). It will be argued in Chapter 
three, however, that he is still guilty of treatin--r the 
two processes interchangably at times, and ot making 
unwarranted inferences from one to the other t-ihich 
severely undermines the value of his work and the 
conclusions that he draws. 
There are two fundamental difference between a 
hypothesis and an expectation. Firstly, there is the 
belief component, equivalent to the "prior odds" in a 
Bayesian analysis. An expectation has a definite effect 
on the prior odds. For example, the males in Snyder, 
Tanke & Berscheid's experiment expected the females to 
be nicer people in the "attractive target" condition. 
By contrast, testing a hý-pothesis needs no prior 
expectancy. A subject simply trying to find out whether 
a particular target posesses a particular trait 
does not 
need to have any prior assumptions about the 
likelyhood 
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of that hypothesis being true. 
The second distinction between a testing a 
hypothesis and acting on an expectation concerns the 
goal of the act. When testing a hypothesis a subject is 
explicitly told that their task is to discover certain 
things about the target, for instance their level of 
extraversion. Subjects acting on expectations may not 
be involved in a quest for knowledge at all; they may be 
to more concerned with, for instance, managing the 
impression the target forms of them. 
It is, of course, possible to combine the two 
processes in one interaction; For instance Word, Zanna 
& Cooper (1974) not only used the subjects pre-existing 
racist beliefs, they also explicitly set them the task 
of finding out certain things. Similarly, subjects in 
some of the hypothesis testing experiments were also 
given explicit information that led them to believe that 
their hypotheses were particularly likely to be either 
true or false (eg Snyder & Swann, 191-8, investigations 1 
and 3). 
One gap in the literature is a knowledge of when, 
why and how individuals actually set themselves 
hypotheses to test (this point is considered again in 
more detail in chapter 9). It is quite plausible that 
hypothesis testing takes place mainly when an individual 
has an uncertain expectation about a target. For 
instance, it is possible that a subject could test a 
Chapter 2. page 52 
hypothesis that is at variance with his expectations. 
For instance, in Word, Zanna & Cooper's first experiment 
an interviewer may have been testing a black target for 
suitability for the task to follow, whilst 
simultaneously believing them to be probably unsuitable 
because of their colour. It is, however, still 
important to conceptualise the two processes as 
seperate. 
To summarise, a hypothesis is merely a statement 
about the nature of the world. These statements are, by 
implication, to be tested and their veracity determined. 
By contrast, expectations are predictions or diagnoses 
about the state of the world, and are not necessaril, -, - to 
be tested but simply to be used in deciding how to act 
in a particular situation. In Snyder's words thi-s 
difference is between "reality testing" and "realitj, 
coping" (1985, P. 261). . I! ) 
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Snyder & Swann's Key Ex'periment 
Snyder & Swann ( 1978) point out that one of the 
functions that conversations fulfil is to satisf, %- the 
actor's quest for social knowledge. One i,; ay in t,, ýhich 
individuals may structure this quest is by testing 
hypotheses. An example of this may be if one wishes to 
f ind out whether an individual is representative of the 
stereotyped group he is a member of or ý,,, hether a rumour 
we have heard about someone's extreme friendliness is 
true. 
For instance I may know that a new member of staff 
in the department is an American (a nationailty 
stereotyped as being very forward and sociabie) , or an 
old collegue may have told me that she was the i1fe ýind 
soul of her old department, or I may be considering 
inviting her to a party but want to make sure that she 
is outgoing enough. I would probably vý; ish to check on 
her personality myself, to see what she is really like 
-- particularly if I am going to have to work with 
her. 
So, according to Snyder and Swann's thinking I would 
have formed the hypothesis that the nev.; iecturer was an 
extravert, and be preparing to test that hypothesis. 
Having obtained a hypothesis to test, the 
hypothesis tester will need to collect data with which 
to test the hypothesis. Snyder and Swann identify three 
distinct strategies that could be used in Lhe gathei-ing 
of data. Firstly, the search could 
be geared towards 
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finding evidence that would support or confirm the 
hypothesis. Thus, for instance, a test of an extrave-rt 
hypothesis would involve gathering as much evidence of 
sociability and outgoing behaviour as possible. 
Alternatively, the hypothesis could be tested by 
attempting to gather evidence that would disconfirm or 
weaken the hypothesis. Using this strategy an 
individual might attempt to search for examples of 
shyness or social ineptness in testing an extravert 
hypothesis. If such evidence were found, then one could 
conclude that the hypothesis was wrong or inaccurate. 
The other possible strategy would be to devote an 
approximately equal am ount of time to the search for 
both hypothesis-confirming and hypothesis-disconfirmina 
evidence. 
The simpiest method of searching for information in 
a conversation is by askin,,,,,, r questions. Thus, In order 
to f ind out how people test hypotheses in social 
interactions, Snyder and Swann gave individuals 
hypotheses to test and recorded the sort of questions 
that they asked. 
The actual procedure that Snyder & Swann (1978, 
investigation 1) used was as follows. An individual 
(called "the interviewer") was told that they were 
taking part in an experiment to find out how people come 
to understand each other. They were to ask questions of 
another subject waiting in another room 
in order to f ind 
out about the personality of that person 
Ocnoiýn 
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hereafter as "the target"). More specifically, thf---,, - 
were to f ind out whether the target was the t,. -r)e of 
person described on a card they were griven. The. -, - ýý; e re 
then told that the prof ile they were -riven on the card 
dealt in abstract generalities and global character- 
istics, but getting to know someone involves findiný4 
out concrete information and specific facts about what 
the person actually thinks, feels and does. They were 
thus told to select 12 questions to ask of the target, 
to find out whether the target's specific beliefs, 
attitudes and actions in life situations matched the 
general characteristics described in the profile. 
They were -, riven a list of 26 questions to choose 
from by the experimenter. They were told that this list 
was typical of "topic areas often covered by interview- 
ers" and were instructed to select the 12 questions 
that would provide the best information witli ý-. -fiich to 
test their hypothesis about the target. 
When the participants had chosen their 12 questions 
to ask they were told that there was, in fact, no target 
and the interview would not take place. 
There were two orthogonal manipulations in the 
experiment: The hypothesis they were given to 
test and 
the certainty of the hypothesis. The hypothesis i,; as 
manipulated by the personality profile 
that the 
participants were given. Those assigned at random 
to 
the "extravert hypothesis condition" were gl%-en the 
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following description: 
"Extraverts are typically outgoing, sociable, 
energetic, confident, talkative and enthusiastic. 
Generally confident and relaxed in social 
situations, this type of person rarelj- has trouble 
making conversation with others. This type of 
person makes friends quickly and easily and is 
usually able to make a favourable impression with 
others. This type of person is usually seen b. ý- 
others as characteristicallv warm and friendl, v. " 
(p. 1023) 
The participants in the "Introvert Hypothesis 
Condition" were given a description of a typical 
introvert thus: 
"Introverts are typically shy, timid, reserved, 
quiet, distant, and retiring. Usually this type of 
person would prefer to be alone reading a book or 
have a long serious discussion with a close friend 
rather than to go to a loud party or other large 
social gathering. Often this type of person seems 
awkward or ill -at-ease in social situations, and 
consequently is not adept at making good first 
impressi ons - This type of person 
is usually seen 
by others as characteristically cool and aloof. " 
(p. 1024) 
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The certainty of the hypothesis was manipulated by 
giving different subjects different reasons as to the 
origins of the personality profiles. In the "Hich 1ý3 
Certainty" condition participants were told that the 
profiles were generated from a personality test taken by 
the target the week before, and their task was to see 
whether it was an accurate portrayai of the way the 
subjects actually came across in real-life situations. 
A pre-test had confirmed that the subjects had a lot of 
faith in personality tests. 
The subjects in the "Low Certainty" condition were 
given no information to lead them to believe that the 
hypothesis would be correct. They were simply told that 
it was a description of a "type of person familiar to 
us all" (p. 1204) and they had to see how weil it 
described the person they were to interview. 
The dependent ., ýariable was the frequency with which 
various types of questions were chosen by the partici- 
pants. The list of questions had been classified into 
three groups by nine rater-judges. The categories 
provided by the experimenter for this classification 
task were: 
1. Extravert Questions. These are questions 
that one would ask of someone already known to be an 
extravert. An example is "Ishat kind of situation 
do 
you seek out if you want to meet new people: 
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Introvert Questions. These are questi, ms 
judged to be ones that one would ask of someone already 
known to be an introvert. "What factors make it hard 
for you to really open up to people? " is an example of 
this category. 
Neutral Questions. This category was made up 
of questions irrelevant to the introvers ion-extravers ion 
dimension or questions for which there was no consensus 
among the rater-judges. "What are your career --, Poals'ý"' 
or "What do you think the grood and bad points of acting 
open and friendly are? " are both examples of this 
cate-rory. Co 
The results were very clear-cut. Participants 
chose more extraNert questions to ask when testing the 
extravert hypothesis than when testing the introvert 
hypothesis. The opposite effect occurred with the 
introvert questions -- these questions were chosen more 
frequently in testing the introvert hypothesis than the 
extravert hypothesis. The neutrai questions were chosen 
with an equal but low frequency in both h-ypothesis 
conditions. 
The choiCe of questions was, however, completely 
uneffected by the certainty manipulation, there being no 
main effect for Certaint)- and no Certainty by 
Hypothesis interaction. 
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This led Snyder and Swann to their first major 
oonolusion -- that when testing hypotheses individuals 
search preferentially for evidence that is supportive ot 
the hypothesis. This phenomenon they termed the 
"Confirmatory Bias". 
The concept of such a confirmatory bias is not new 
to science, philosophy or psychology. Studies of 
hypothesis testing in non-social settings have_ shown that 
individuals will consistently search for confirmation of 
a hypothesis in a numeric reasoning task (Wason, 1960) 
or a logival reasoning task (Wason & Johnson-Laird, 
1965). The philosopher Francis Bacon drew attention to 
the failing of human reasoning that leads it to find 
support for, rather than evidence against, any theory 
(1620) . More recently philosophers of science have 
warned scientists of their tendancy to be over-zealous 
in their search for support for their hypotheses and 
thus retain those hypotheses longer than is appropriate, 
causing inefficiancy, conservatism and delay in the 
advance of knowledge (Popper, 1959). 
But the finding that people search for confirmation 
of their hypotheses does not lead to any important 
conclusions in itself. If the finding is to be of 
anything more than academic importance, the crucial 
question is whether this search for confirmation 
actually leads people to inaccuracies or biases in their 
inferences about the truth of the hypothesis. In other 
words, are the impressions people form about others a 
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function of the particular hypothesis they happenect to 
be testing? In the second of the four investigations in 
their 1978 paper, Snyder & Swann attempted to find an 
answer to this question. How would this confirmator, i- 
bias in the choice of questions to ask affect the 
opinions that were formed about the likely introversion 
or extraversion of targets after they had been asked the 
questions selected by the interviewers? 
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The Effects of the "(-'onfirmatorv Bias" 
The procedure for Snyder & Swann's second 
investigation was essentially the same as had been used 
in investigation 1, but the interviewers were allowed to 
continue after they had selected the questions and ask 
them of a second subject, the "target". Since the 
certainty of the hypothesis was seen to ha-ve no effect 
on the choice of questions, this manipulation was 
dropped and the subjects were all run under the "low 
certainty" condition; that is to say they were given no 
reason to suspect that the hypothesis was any more 
likely to be accurate than by inaccurate. 
The targets were told that they were to be 
interviewed by another student, and were instructed to 
answer all of the questions in "as informative, open 
and candid a manner as possible. " (p. 1206). ýShen the 
interviewer had selected 12 questions to ask she 
addressed these questions to the target via a microphone 
and headphone intercom. The entire conversation was 
tape-recorded on a stereophonic system so the inter- 
viewer) s and target's channel could be played back 
seperately. 
As before, the types of questions selected for the 
interview were monitored. Analysis showed that the 
11 confirmatory bias" had been faithfully replIcated; 
Int-;.. o\-ert quest: Lons were more likely to be selected to 
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test the introvert hypothesis than the extrax-ert 
hypothesis, and extravert questions were more likei. -, - to 
be employed to test the extravert hypothesis than the 
introvert hypothesis. 
The more important questions involved the ý, -a. v that 
targets responded to these questions, and whether the 
interviewers regarded the behaviour of the targ , ets as 
being evidence supportive of their initial h-ypotheses. 
To determine whether the targets had actuaily come 
to behave in a manner consistent with the hypotheses 
being tested by the interviewers, '' naive" Judges 
listened -to the recordings of tfie tar, -. 7ets' responses to 
the questions asked during the intervieý,;, arid rateJ the 
replies on a number of scales such as talkative-quiet 
and introverted-extraverted. It should be remembered 
that neither the targets nor the "naive judges" were 
aware of the hypothesis being tested by the subjects in 
the role of interviewer. 
And could the judges detect any differences between 
the targets who were being tested for extraversion and 
those whose interviewers were testing for introversion? 
The results showed that this was clearly the case. On a 
variety of measures the tar, --vets in the e-vtravert 
hj-pothesis condition were perceived to be reliably more 
confident, poised, energetic and extraverted than the 
targets in the introvert hj, -pothesis condition. 
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The pattern of events that may occur wh(--n 
individuals use social interactions to test hypotheses 
is, according to Snyder & Swann, becoming clear. it Lill 
starts with the questions that they prepare to ask, to 
test their hypotheses with. They are likely to 
preferentially choose those questions that probe for 
evidence that will be supportive of their hypotheses. 
When asked these questions the targets will reply in a 
way that, more often than not, is consistent with the 
hypothesis. Thus, merely by testing a hypothesis about 
someone (even though they are not aware of this 
hypothesis, and even though the interviewer has no 
reason to believes that the hypothesis is accurate) one 
is likely to make them behave in a manner that is 
consistent with the hypothesis. 
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The search for the limits of the Confirmatory Bias 
Snyder & Swann's next step was to try to find the 
limits of the phenomenon, or how easy it is to lessen or 
remove the confirmatory bias. Their first attempt 
involved looking at situations where it was obvious to 
the hypothesis testers that their hypotheses were likely 
to be false. They did this by incorporating more 
information for the subjects in the instructions gi,.,, en 
before the selection of questions. 
The manipulation in the third investigation 
involved base rates. All of the subjects were given the 
extravert hypothesis to test, but half of them were told 
that the target had been selected from a sophomore 
(women's college society) that had all been -. ri,. -en 
personality test and it was found that 23 of the 30 
women were extraverts. In the other condition the 
" interv i ewers" were told that only seven out of the 30 
were found to be extraverts. In order to ensure that 
the interviewers fully appreciated the implications of 
this manipulation of prior odds (given the consistent 
finding that base rates are often ignored when making 
inferences about others, eg. Tversky & Kahneman, 1982) 
the high or low chance of the hypothesis pro-ving to be 
true in the two conditions was emphasised. A 
manipulation check verified that the subjects were 
sensitive to the high or low probability of the 
hypothesis being accurate. 
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However, the choice of questions seemed to be 
independent of the likelihood of the hypothesis being 
accurate. Snyder & Swann reported that the confirmatorv 
bias was still present and just as strong as in the 
extravert hypothesis conditions in the previous 
investigations, regardless of whether the participants 
believed that their hypothesis was likely to be true or 
false. It seems from this that it is the very fact of 
testing a hypothesis that induces the search for 
confirmatory evidence, not the likelihood of that 
hypothesis being true. Hypotheses can still be 
self-confirming regardless of what the tester perceives 
the prior odds to be. 
In their final investigation (investigation 4, 
r 
1978) Snyder & Swann tried yet another ploy Lo reduce or 
eliminate the confirmatory bias -- a motivationai 
intervention. The subjects were told that a prize of' 
$25 would be awarded to the person who selects the best 
questions for finding out about the target. Aga-Ln there 
was no evidence that this diminished, let alone o,,, errode 
the confirmatory bias. 
This quest for the limits of the confirmatory bias 
was to be the aim of two more journal papers by Snyder 
and his collegues. In 1980 Snyder & Campbell tried yet 
another approach. They argued that one of the reasons 
that subjects showed such a robust and persistent 
propensity to search for confirmatory evidence when 
Chapter 2. page 66 
testin,, p hypotheses t, ýas because the hý'potheses themseives 
were phrased in terms of what information i,. Tould lead to 
their confirmation, but no mention was made of the sort, -ý 
of information that would lead to their rejection. 
Snyder & Campbell ran some subjects (the control 
condition) as usual, but in the experimental condition 
the personality profiles were changed so they contained 
not only examples of what an extraverts (or introverts) 
were, but also instances of what they were not. For 
example the extrovert condition now contained phrases 
such as "... are rarely shy, timid, reserved, quiet, 
distant and retiring" (P. 423) . 
Did this increase in the availability of the 
instances whose presence would be likely to disconfirm 
the hypothesis lead to a weakening of the tendency to 
search preferentiall,,, - for data that would confirm tfie 
hypothesis? Again the answer was no; there ý10-as no 
difference between the subjects who had hypotheses 
framed in both positi-, -e and negative terms and those 
whose hypotheses were framed only in terms of positive, 
hypothesis-comfirming attributes. In fact in another, 
unpublished paper Snyder & White 
(1978) went one stage 
further and phrased the hypotheses exclusively 
in terms 
of disconfirming attributes. 
This still led to an 
undiminished effect T.; hereby questions v,; ere 
selected to 
preferentially seek out confirmation of 
the hypothesis. 
While these results suggest that the confirmatorý- 
bias 
is not simply a function of the mental representation 
of 
hypotheses in terms of positi-.,, -e attributes, 
Snyder & 
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Campbell do consider that there may be another 
explanation; perhaps the manipulation of the personalitv 
profiles given to the subjects may simDly not have been 
powerful enough to overcome the very strong intuitive 
notions of extraversion and introversion known to 
virtually everyone in our culture (especially unýversitv 
students who were the experimental subjects). Thus a 
better test of this theory that the framing of the 
hypothesis is important wouid have to be conducted usin, 4 
a different trait less well popularised in lay terms. 
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Testing Hypotheses about Social Stereotypes. 
Snyder's quest for a tactic that would prevent 
individuals from gearing their search toilý -ards the 
confirmation of hypotheses continued into a sligghty 
different paradigm; he turned to investigating the way 
in which individuals test social stereotypes (Snyder, 
Campbell & Preston, 1982). The procedure was 
essentially the same, looking at the effect of opposing 
hypotheses on the types of questions selected from a 
list. This time various "educational interventions" 
were tried to see if they could weaken or eliminate the 
confirmatory bias. Subjects read one oi' four short 
passages before selecting their questions. These 
passages gave advice on how to go about testing social 
stereotypes most effectively in order to sensitize 
subjects to the value of disconfirming eý,, -idence. 'I fie 
advice ranged in its degree of explicitness from one 
which merely pointed out that our assessment of the 
accuracy of a hypothesis should decrease if information 
not consistent with the hypothesis is found, to one 
which suggested selecting questions which would uncover 
the way in which people do not fit their stereotypes. 
When these four conditions were compared to a 
control condition without any 
intervention the 
predisposition to select questions 
that would tend to 
elicit confirmatory evidence was 
just as strong. A 
simple educational 
intervention was e, ý, identlN- not enough 
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to overcome the confirmatory bias. 
In a second part of the study yet another 
intervention was tried. This time it was pointed out to 
the participants that while they were trying to find out 
about the tar-get, the target would be trying to form an 
impression of them, and that impression would depend on 
the questions that they chose to ask. Thus the 
subjects were told that they may appear to be 
closed-minded if they ask only questions that do not 
give the target the chance to show ways in which fie does 
not fit the stereotype. 
Finally Snyder, Campbell & Preston have identified 
a method of overcoming the confirmatory bias! In this 
last condition the subjects asked the same sorts oi 
questions regardless of the hypothesis tfieý, ýý-ere 
testing, either '-he warm stereotype of a counseilor or 
the cold stereotype of a researcher. Snyder, Campbell & 
Preston go on to explain why this "impression 
management" intervention succeeded in combatting the 
confirmatory bias when all others have failed. Th ey 
suggest that any intervention that implicates onefs own 
self and the opinion that others have of one is iikely 
to bring about a high degree of involvment and thus will 
be considered a lot more carefully by the participants 
than the impersonal educational interventions. 
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Historical Hypothesis Test-ii-l,.,; 
- 
It is worth noting at this point that as tý-eli a. -, 
using social interactions to seek out neiý- information in 
order to test hypotheses, it is also possible to test 
hypotheses using information available to us in other 
ways. An investigation of hypothesis testing using 
information already stored in one's memory was the 
subject of another of Snyder's experiments (Snyder & 
Cantor, 1979). The findings resemble those reported on 
hypothesis testing in social interaction. Individuals 
preferentially recalled data that was supportive of a 
hypothesis, and under-reported information that was 
inconsistent with the hypothesis. This again led the 
hypotheses to be self-confirming. 
This paradigm of "historical hypothesis testing'' 
is, however, sufficiently different from hypothesis 
testing in social interaction to be dealt with 
seperately later in the thesis. It will 
be described in 
more detail in chapter 8, where the results of an 
experiment on historical hypothesis testing are 
reported. 
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Practical Considerations. 
So, what conclusions can be drawn from this series 
of experiments? Snyder, (1981, Snyder L Ga 
; 
teart, 1981 
outlines what he considers to be the practical 
impli(-: ations of this research progranvn; e. He says that the 
mechanisms of some of the best-known phenomena in social 
ps-ychology can best be understood in terms of his 
research. For instance, the stability with which 
erroneous social stereotypes persist over time can be 
explained in terms of the confirmatory bias. Even 
though an individual may attempt to find out for herself 
whether, say, researchers are really cold, unemotional 
people, she is likely to test this by asking questions 
that would make anyone respond in a cold, unemotionai 
way and conclude, on the basis of her m,, n personall. v 
aquired evidence, that the initial hypothesis was indeed 
valid. 
Another way in which this manner of testing 
hypotheses may handicap us is in the testing of our 
hypotheses about the nature of the world. Snyder gives 
4 
the example of the way in which psychiatrists test their 
theories. If, for example, a psychiatrist adheres to a 
theory that puts a lot of emphasis on relationships 
early in life as the causes of later neuroses, she 
is 
likely to probe deeply into the early relationships ot 
all of her patients until they eventually 
disclose a 
potential expla nation. At this she 
is likely to stop 
her --, earch and be that little bit more certain that 
her 
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theory of early relatlonships is correct. What she 
would be unaware of was that it was her confirm, 3 to r,. - 
strategy that lead her to the confirming evidence -- if 
she had enquired about problems in the early relation- 
ships of people who did not have psychiatric problems 
the chances are that she would also have found a ri(--h 
supply of possible roots of a patient's neurosis. 
As a general rule, the reason why hypotheses 
concerning the social world are likely to be so reactive 
to hypothesis testing strategies is because of the rich 
variety of behaviours indulged in by any individual. An 
0 
argument central to modern ýocial i sycholoL, ýy -ind 
personality theories is that there is little consistency 
in behaviour over situations (Mischel, 1968); most 
people will be strongly influenced by situations and 
their behaviour will change accordingly. While the 
extent of this lack of consistency is still debated, 
there is a general consensus in social psychology that 
most individuals are capable of behaving in very 
different ways in different situations. Thus most 
targets will be able to give plenty of instances of 
either characteristically extraverted or character- 
istically introverted behaviour if asked to do so. 
Similarly, the backgrounds of a group of men who were 
selected on the basis of them 
leading healthy, normal 
adult lives were found to be rife with examples of 
traumatic events and "pathogenic factors" that, 
if the-,, - 
were to complain of psychiatric s. ymptoms, would almost 
certainly be evoked in the expla nation of 
the onto, -fený- 
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of those symptoms (Renaud & Estess, 1961). 
i 
This being the case Snyder argues that no 
hypothesis testing strategy is likely to be any more 
accurate than any other. If interviewers used the 
disconfirmatory strategy they would cause the targets to 
behave in a manner inconsistent -with the hypothesis, and 
hypotheses would become self -disconf irming, hypotheses. 
Snyder says that even an "equal opportunity" 
strategy would still be reactive, and produce "half and 
half" people (1981, p. 301). Because of the very nature 
of the social world (unlike the physical world) any 
attempt to test a hypothesis is going to Ckffect the 
validity of the hypothesis. Perhaps, Snyder pessimist- 
ically concludes, the only way to test a hypothesis 
faithfully in the social world is through a sleuth-like 
following of the target, so he can be observed in a wide 
variety of situations which could be somehow averaged by 
the observer/hypothesis tester. Since it is unlikely 
that we will take such a complex approach to our 
gathering of social knowledge, Snyder (1981) ends by 
stating that people "create a world 
in which hypotheses 
become self-confirming and beliefs become self- 
perpetuating. " (p. 301). 
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The Climate of research in the late 1970's 
Snyder's research on the testing of hypotheses in 
social interaction was received with great interest at 
the time it was published, and it continues to be cited 
widely not only in mainstream social psychology but also 
in applied f ields such as personnel selection (Sackett, 
1982), clinical psychology (Witkins, 1982)and management 
training and decison theory (Keisler & Sproull, 1982). 
To demonstrate the way in which this work has been 
accepted into the received wisdom of gocial Psychology 
one needs only to look at the number of the citations 
the research has obtained. In the 1979 edition of the 
Social Science Citation index there were three journal 
articles that cited Snyder's hypothesis testing 
research. This rose to five in 1980,37 in 1981,42 in 
1982,32 in 1983,52 in 1984 and 55 in the 1985 edition 
(see figure 2.1). In addition to these, Snyder's 
hypothesis testing research is now cited in most of the 
general textbooks written on Social Psychology. Snyder 
has also been invited to write chapters 
detailing this 
work in books on attribution theory 
(Harvey, Ickes & 
Kidd, 1981) stereotyping (Hamilton, 1981b) and 
experimental social psychology 
(Berkowitz, 1985). Being 
included in these prestigeous books is further evidence 
of the acclaim his work achieved among 
his peers. A 
further compliment to Snyder comes 
from Pettigrew who 
remarked that Snyder's presentations 
to the American 
Psychological Association's conferences were 
characterised bj- standing-room 
onij- crowds. - (P. 303, 
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1981) . 
It will be argued here that in order to understand 
this widespread acceptance of Snyder's work on 
hypothesis testing, one needs to look be. vond Just Ithe 
research and findings themselves and consider the 
climate of ýocial 
Psychology 
at the time it was 
published. For a number of inter-related reasons 
Snyder's work was destined to be successful in 1978 in a 
way that it probably would not have been *Ln 1968 or 
1988. It f itted in with the model of man that was 
fashionable at the time for cognitive social 
psychologistsp used the perspecti-,, es on emotion arid 
motivation that were prevalent in the 1910's, made t 
substantial contribution to applied areas oi psýciiolog. N 
that were attracting a lot of interest at tfiau Lime, 
drew upon the "right" sources, and complemew ed t. lie 
other key research of its time. 
Models of Man. 
It has long been argued that at different times 
psychological research has employed different "models 
of man" (Chapman &, Jones, 1980). These entail 
different perspectives on the purpose and mechanisms of 
, ed that the the human mind. It is widely accepý 
progression from one model to another 
does not follw, a 
strictly rational advancement acc-ording 
to a simpie 
Popperian conception of scientific progress, 
I)ut that 
there are other factors to account 
for these paradigm 
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shifts (Kuhn, 1962) or, perhaps more appropriate to 
psychology, "metaphysical cores not open to 
falsification" (Lakatos, 1970). These "other factors" 
may include influences such as the types of problems 
that researchers or their sponsors are trying to solve, 
the technology available as tools for research, new 
philosophical perspectives, political influences, and 
sometimes the process may even take on an almost random 
element, changing for the sake of change (see the book 
edited by Chapman & Jones (1980) to see how central yet 
controversial the role played by models in contemporary 
Psychology is). 
The dominant models of man that influenced . 
5ociai 
Psychology in the latter half of the 1970's considered 
man to be an intuitive psychologist (Ross, 1977), an 
intuitive scientist (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Kelly, 1955) 
or an intuitive statistician (Kahnemann, Slovic & 
Tversky, 1982; Edwards, 1965). These models are not 
mutually exclusive -- on the contrary it is very 
difficult to distinguish between them at times. They 
all stress that man is an information processor, they 
all show him as being in a quest for a greater 
understanding of his environment and they all emphasise 
the fact that he is fallible and often falls short of 
the cognitive processes needed to fulfil his goals in an 
optimal manner. This is exactly 
the picture that Snyder 
& Swann portray -- people as 
keen but faulty seekers 
of information to increase their understanding of 
the 
other members of the social world. 
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Moti, vational Considerations. 
One of the common themes runnina throuEzh alt ot' the 
research discussed so far is that it attempts to explain 
all of human judgement, and the shortcomings in that 
judgment, in purely cognitive terms. This is in sharp 
contrast to more psychoanalytically orientated work. 
which explains "irrational " behaviour in motivat, ional 
terms. None of the theorists involved in these 
paradigms would be willing to admit that items were 
forgotten because they were threatening to the 
individual's ego, or an outgroup was e-valuated 
ne,,, -, r, atively to project an individual's own t'aults onto 
that group. The "Lay psychologist" also resorts to 
motivational explanations of the behaviour ot' otiiers, as 
the proverbs -. Vone so deaf as those who doii'L r, ant to 
hear" or "People see what they r.; ant to set, " re-veal. 
The rejection of motivational explanations by soci; iL 
psychologists at the time that Sn3-der & Swann publisned 
their paper has to be understood by lookin-,,; at thi-ý 
history of motivational -,, -erses cognitive explanations. 
Many experiments have claimed to provide 
demonstrations of instances ý, here individuals 
hav(- 
distorted their perceptions in order to 
defend their oi,; n 
FF egos" or boost their own self-esteem. 
Th ese 
experiments have typicall,,, - employed 
one of two foi-ms, 
either looking at interpersonal 
influetice or teain 
achievement. 
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In the first of these types of experiments (the 
first and most notable being reported by Johnson, 
Fiegenbaum & Weiby in 1964) teachers are typically given 
a particular task to teach to two pupils. The 
experimenters manipulate the outcome such that one pupil 
succeeds in learning the task and the other fails. 
teacher is then asked to explain the reasons for the 
success and failure of two pupils respectively. 
Researchers typically found that the teachers saw 
success as evidence of their capable teaching, but 
The 
failure was explained in terms of the inadequacies of 
the pupil. 
Research into the perceived causes of success or 
failure of groups on achievement tasks also arrived at 
similar findings. Subjects typically perform a task as 
a group, and the feedback they receive about the quality 
of their results is manipulated. If a group is told 
that they have been successful then the participants 
each overestimate their own contribution, but if the 
participants were told that the group has performed C) 
poorly then the others in the group are attributed with 
being more influential in causing that outcome (For a 
more complete review of the literature in this field see 
Miller & Ross, 1975). The conclusions reached by this 
line of research are no longer accepted, for three main 
reasons. 
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Firstly, The results of these experiments can be 
explained entirely in terms of inferences made on the 
evidence available to the subjects in these experiments, 
and from their experiences prior to the experiment. For 
instance in the teaching senarios, the teachers see one 
child change (. learn the task) and the other child stay 
at the same level of understanding (not learn the task) 
throughout the experiment. It is therefore not 
surprising that the teacher attributes responsibility 
for the change to himself or herself, but not the lack 
of change (this follows logically from Mill's laws of 
causation). 
Secondly, by manipulating the experiment, some 
researchers have been able to invert the normal outcome 
of these experiments so subjects make more internal 
attributions for failure than success (Ross, Bierbrauer 
& Polly, 1974). If these results were to be explained 
in terms of ego-involvement, it would require the 
postulation of a "counter-defensiie bias* as opposed 
to a defensive bias, which is considered to be rather 
implausible. 
Finally, there are conceptual inconsistencies in an 
information-processing account of these "New Look" 
explanations (as these ego-protective phenomena 
were 
called in the 1940's and 
1950's) (Erdelyi, 1974). There 
is, for instance, a logical paradox 
in perceiving 
something so it can be 
hidden from perceptions, and the 
idea of a homunculus inside our 
heads controlling what 
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we are fit to see or realise is at odds with present 
conceptions of the mind. It is also difficult to see 
how a Darwinian process of evolution would have produced 
a species that would fail to see those items most 
threatening to its survival -- as Nisbett & Ross (1980) 
point out the purpose of such a mechanism is rather 
bewildering! 
Given this background of research, empirical 
demonstrations of cognitive processes that could explain 
phenomeno, previously assumed to be moti, ý,, ational biases 
were received with great relish in the late 19"10's. One 
of the most influential of these was Michael Ross's 
surveys that showed that many common marital disagree- 
ments (over, for instance, the two partners' claims 
about the size of their contribution to the housework) 
were caused by differential availability of evidence 
rather than by e, -gro-protective biases (Ross, 1981; Ross & 
Sicoly, 19719). Similarly, Kelley & Stahelski (1970) 
demonstrated how competitive individuals would cause 
others to be competitive, and thus perceive 
their "Dog 
eat dog" philosophy of life to 
be normal, and Ross, 
Greene & House (1977) set forth the way 
in which 
individuals believe their own ideas and actions 
to be 
more widespread than is actually 
the case, the "False 
II 
consensus effect. 
Thus, it can be seen that Snyder 
& Swann's model of 
man as a hypothesis 
tester again fits in nicely with 
this trend. The unwillingness of people 
to change from 
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their accepted beliefs was caused by shortcomings in 
their information search, rather than through some 
innate stubbornness or fear of change. The question of 
motivation was not tackled explicitly, but there was the 
implicit assumption that runs through much of cognitive 
psychology that the individual is simply motivated to 
achieve an increased understanding of his or her social 
world -- to "predict and control" (Kelly, 1955, p. 4). 
Applied_Aspects -- Stereotyping. 
There were a lot of publications in the late 1970's 
that addressed one of the traditional subject areas of 
social psychology, stereotypes and intergroup behaviour, 
but from a new cognitive basis. Following the Chapmans' 
work on illusory correlations (Chapman & Chapman, 1967 
and 1969), Hamilton & Gifford (1976) and Hamilton & Rose 
( 1980) demonstrated how simple knowledge of &,, roup 
membership or simple expectations of group members 
respectively could lead to errors in inference and 
stereotyping of minority groups or firmer stereotypes 
from mere expectations. Similarly, Taylor showed how 
being a solo female in an all-male group, or a solo 
black in an all-white group could cause observers to 
perceive that individual to be more prominent and more 
characteristic of their ethnic group -- the phenomenon 
even occurred when one member of a group 
dressed 
differently from the others (Taylor, 1981; Taylor & 
Fiske 1978, Taylor et al 1978). Rothbart conducted 
several experiments to show 
how categorisation could 
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effect memory processes and, under some circumstances, 
bolster stereotypes of groups (Rothbart. 1981; Rothbart, 
Evans & Fulero, 1979). The combination of Snyder's work 
on hypothesis testing and his work on self-fulfilling 
prophecies fitted nicely into this framework, leading to 
his 1981 chapter entitled "On the self-perpetuating 
nature of social stereotypes". Taken tolgether, the 
joint impact of these contributions was seen as a major 
contribution to the understanding of stereotypes from a 
cognitive perspective (Hamilton, 1981c; Petigrew, 1981). 
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The Influence from Cognitive Psychnlogy. 
Another feature of this work on hypothesis testing 
was the way it drew upon the findings of "pure" 
cognitive psychology. As well as having the general 
advantages gained whenever the knowledge from one area 
of psychology cross-fertilise another, the application 
of cognitive psychology is held in high esteem at the 
moment, and was probably held in even higher esteem in 
in the late 1970's before it received criticisms for its 
lack of social content (eg. Tajfel, 1981; Harre, 1981). 
Not only was the switch to an emphasis on internai 
processes probably a genuine advantage for 5ocial 
Pisychology, it was also seen as one of the ways in which 
Social Psychology could overcome its latest crisis by 
adopting a more empirical and theory-driven approach. 
This trend was not limited to Social 
Psychology, but was 
also prevalent in personality, developmental and 
clinical branches of psychology as behaviourist orien- 
tations gave way to a cognitive outlook (Forgas, 1981). 
The application of artificial intelligence to cognitive 
social psychology (eg Shank & Ableson, 1977 ) was perhaps 
yet another reason why contributions from cognitive 
psychology should have received such a warm welcome. 
Snyder drew upon three main areas of cognitive 
psychology to help in the generation of 
his experiments 
and the explaination of the confirmatory 
bias. These 
three fields were covariation 
detection, hypothesis- 
testing and the use of negative 
instances. 
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A: Covariation Detection 
The cognitive research in the 1960's generallv 
concluded that the lay-person was a competent 
? Fin uitive statistician" (Peterson & Beach, 196-1 ). 
One exception to this was their inability to judge 
covariation from two by ti.. -o contingency tables first 
noted by Smedslund (1963), and Jenkins & Ward (1965), 
and recently replicated by Jennings, Amabile & Ross 
(1982). In these experiments individuals are presented 
with information in the form of such a table, and are 
asked to judge whether the two variables are related. 
For instance, they could be given the outcome of a 
disease (cured vs not cured) and the medication given 
(drug vs no drug) and asked whether the drug increased 
the chance of a cure. One of the pervasive findings of 
these experiments is that individuals rely alniost 
exclusively on the "present-present" cell (in this 
example drug given and disease cured), which Snyder 
& 
Swann compare to their subjects tendency to look only 
for evidence of extraversion when testing an extravert 
hypothes; s, or introversion when testing an 
introvert 
hypothesis. 
B: Hypothesis Tes ing. 
In 1962 Wason conducted a well known experiment to 
explore the way individuals 
tested hypotheses. The 
hypotheses they tested centred around series of numbers 
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(ie. 2,4,6 ... ) for which subjects had to guess the rules 
, governing the sequence. Wason's emphatic (but 
controversial) conclusion was that subjects were verN- 
poor at testing competing hypotheses and simply 
continued to try and search for more and more evidence 
supportive of their best or latest guess. This led 
subjects to be exceedingly slow in discovering even a 
very simple rule. Later work with Johnson-Laird (1972) 
arrived at a similar conclusion, that people are poor at 
testing rules that require them to attempt falsification 
strategies. Again Snyder & Swann drew upon this work 
and applied it directly to a social setting where they 
found similar results. 
C: Negative Instances 
Finally, Snyder & Swann related their finding to 
research on concept formation and utilisation that 
concludes that individuals prefer to use positive 
instances than negative instances in their thinking 
(Hov, land & Weiss, 1953). A related finding that Snyder 
& Swann also cite is that confirming instances 
have 
more inpact on inferences than negative 
instances 
(Gollob, Rossman & Abelson, 1973), although some recent 
experiments have found the exact opposite 
of this (eg. 
Hastie & Kumar, 19719) making the interpretation of 
earlier findings questionable. 
These three related findings from cognitive 
psychology led to 
Snyder & Swann's conclusion that "the 
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structure and process of human thou. ght Fosters and 
promotes the ready and willing adoption of confirmatorY 
strategies for hypothesis testing. "( 1978, p. 1210). 
Other Influential Research. 
A common theme running through much of the social 
psychological literature since the early 1970's is the 
study of human rationality -- the "validit. v in 
deductive or probabilistic reasoning" (Cohen, 1981). 
Generally speaking most of this research has talien one 
of two forms. In the former, subjects are given a 
problem for which there is an answer deductable from 
normative criteria. If subjects do not arri%, e at this 
right answer, then they can be said to be irrational in 
their thought processes, whether through an inability to 
apply rules correctly or through an ignorance of the 
appropriate ruies. For instance, Wason & Johnson- 
Laird's (1965) deductive reasoning tasks used this 
principle to demonstrate that individuals do not 
understand the logic of conditional statements properly. 
The other way that is commonly used in social 
psychology to demonstrate shortcomings in human judgment 
is to give two groups of subjects logically equivalent 
forms of a problem, but to manipulate some other 
variable which either should or should not alter the 
logical form of the judgemental task. If subjects' 
responses are swayed by this other factor 
but ought not 
to be (for example their seating position when observing 
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a conversation (Storms, 1973) or the salience of one 
category of items over another (Tversky & Kahnemann, 
1973)) or if they are not effected by factors which are 
relevant (for example, base rates (Kahnemann & Tversky, 
1972) or consensus information (McArthur, 1972) ) then 
shortcomings in their cognitive processes can be 
inferred. This research has lead to a model of man as 
having a limited capacity to process information, and in 
at-tempting to cope with this limitation indi-viduals use 
heuristics or "short cuts" which usually lead to optimal 
solutions to problems but sometimes yield predictable 
errors (Abelson, 1976). 
The impact of these sorts of experiment has been 
very great since the start of this era, perhaps started 
by the publication of Tversky & Kehnemann's paper in 
Science in 1974. The application of the knowledge of 
these shortcomings in inference to attribution theory 
(eg. Ross, 1977) has been particularly influential. Not 
only have several books concentrated on this theme (eg. 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980 and Kahnemann, Slovic & Tversky, 
1982), but the influence has also spread throughout 
psychology in applied as well as pure research (see the 
discussion of the Hamilton (1980b) book about 
stereotyping, or Kinder & Weiss, 1978, for applications 
to foreign policy decision making, for example). 
Snyder & Swann's paradigm fits into this popular 
framework too. Individuals are given the task of 
testing a hypothesis about another person, but their 
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estimates of those other people are influrýnced not 
only b-, v the other person but also by the initial 
hypothesis thev are given by the experimenter to test. C3 
Three 
-, j-mportant 
features of this bias in reasonln, -ý are 
common to the other work on shortcomings in human 
judgement. First, the observed errors are not random, 
but hi, -,, rhly predictable. Second, features of the 
underlying epistemological processes can be inferred 
from the observed phenomenon. Third, the identification 
of these potential biases can be used directl-y to 
improve decision-making by taking steps to avoid the 
pitfalls once they have been identified. 
Taken together, it can be seen that this pro, -4ramme 
of research was conducted "in the right place at the 
r, i,;, -,, -ht tiine". Its influence can 
be attributed as much 
to the research mill'etA in which it arose as to its 
intrinsic worth. 
Summary. 
1. Snyder's programme of research into hypothesis 
testing about other people in social interaction 
is 
described. The process is charted from the way 
in which 
an "interviewer" prepares 
to test a hypothesis by 
attempting to elicit mainly confirmatory 
evidence, to 
the way in which "targrets- oblige 
by giving confirmatory 
evidenceq leading to 
the confirmation of the hypothesi-,;. 
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2. The self-confirming hypothesis was then subject 
to many attempts to reduce or remove the effect. It was 
concluded by Snyder (1981) that it was a very robust 
phenomenon. 
3. Snyder also describes how the propensity of 
individuals to find confirmation of their hypotheses can 
also be used to explain other phenomena such as belief 
perseverance and the perpetuation of social stereotypes. 
4. Snyder's research has become very influential 
in &-ocial Psychology. It is argued that this was at 
least in part due to the climate of research in the late 
1970's. The assumptions, methods and conclusions of the 
research are compatable with the models of man, the 
treatment of emotion and motivation and the strong 
cognitive influence prevalent at the time. In addition 
Snyder's research complemented other theoretical 
research on the rationality of human inference 
(including attribution research) and other applied 
research on social stereotypes, botti very popular topics 
for investigation. 
In the next chapter some criticisms of the research 
into hypothesis testing will be put forward, which will 
form the basis of the experiment reported in chapter 
four. 
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Introduction 
In the last chapter Snyder & Swann's crucial (1978) 
experiment was discussed at length. One surprising 
omission in their experiment was that the interviewers, 
the people who actually asked the questions in order to 
form an impression of the ft target", were never asked 
about the impression they formed of the target. rhe 
justification given for this was that other experiments 
had conclusively proved that hypothesis testers tend to 
see their hypotheses as having been confirmed. To quote 
Snyder & Swann's exact words 
But, did the interviewer-parL icipan Es 
-regard 
the hj-potheses as havingr been coni'lrined 
let -part ici pants? by the actions of the ta r-Il 
Although this investigation does not answer 
this question directly, other research (eg 
Swann, 1978)s has demons tra ted tha t af ter 
interacting with other people for the purpose 
of testing hypotheses, individuals do regard 
their hypotheses as having been confirmed. " 
(1978, pp1207-12108) 
tThe work reierred to here is Swann's výpublisned rnD thesis, 
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This point about the interviewer's own impression 
of the target is again discussed by Snyder JLn a review 
of his work in 1981: - 
"But, did the hypothesi s- testers regard their 
hypotheses as having been confirmed b, v the target's 
actions? Apparently so. For, when all was said 
and done, the experimenter (duri n,. --f the 
post-experimental debriefing session) asked 
hypothesis testers what they had learned about 
their target's characteristic nature. Those who 
had tested the hypothesis that their targets rrere 
extraverts, on the average, regarded their targets 
as more extraverted by nature than did their 
counterparts who had tested the hypothesis tha t 
their targets rrere introverts. " 
( 1981, p292) 
These two quotes, both referring to exactly the 
same experiment, are clearly contradictory. The first 
statement infers that no measure of the interviewer's 
impression was taken while the second statement concerns 
such a measure, albeit, perhaps, an informal one. 
The issue of bias and accuracy in the interviewer's 
final impression of the target is fundamental -- 
probably the most important issue in all of Snyder's 
experiments, which makes it all the more surprising that 
it is treated in such a casual manner. While the choice 
of confirmatory questions has been replicated many times 
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by Snyder & Swann ( 1978) in all four of their 
investigations as well as by Snyder and other (-, oll, --., -,, ues 
in follow up experiments (Snyder , ), Campbell, 19ýtO; 
Snyder & White, 1981) and by other independent 
researchers (Cooper, 1980; Semin & Strack, 1(-80) tnere 
is no other published research that actually let the 
interviewers go on to ask their questions, or that 
measured the impressions that the interviewers formed of 
the target. 
So, in order to look in more detail at the 
impression formed by the interviewers after interacting 
with the target and asking their questions, Swann's PhD 
thesis will be investi,, zated in detail. 3 
Sý, ýann's PhD Thesis Described 
Swann's PhD thesis set out to look at t-he i,; ty in 
which individuals use social interactions to find out 
about other people, but the methods used are compieteiy 
different from those used in Snyder's ser-ies of 
experiments investigating hypothesis testing processes 
in social interaction. Swann's experiment (the only 
empirical work in his PhD thesis) will be described 
before it is argued that, whatever conclusions can be 
legitimately drawn from Swann's experiment the. v 
certainly do not support the claim that 
inter-,,, iewers are 
prey to a it confirmatory bias" when 
they test hypotheses. 
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Swann used males as the "hypothesis testers" and 
females as the targets. The males tested the 
hypothesis that a female they received prior information 
about and then interacted with either liked them or, in 
the other condition, didn't like them. The exact 
experimental procedure went as follows. The male 
subjects were told that the experiment was about hovV 
people get a-Cquaiiýted, but first they were asked to fill 
out an "attitudes and values" questionnaire which was 
taken away by the experimenter, and was (allegedly) 
shown to the female subject in the experiment. The male 
was told that this would help to make the interaction 
more realistic, because people generally know something 
about each other before they engage each other in 
conversation. In addition the males were told that it 
is normal for us to have some idea whether a person we 
are about to interact with will like us, but we are 
often fairly unsure about the accuracy of this 
information. In order to simulate this uncertainty the 
females (again allegedly) filled in a form to say 
whether, from the attitudes and values that the male had 
expressed through the questionnaire, she thought that 
she would like the male or not. This form was then 
shuffled in with two other bogus forms before the male 
took one of the forms. Thus the male was explicitly 
given the impression that while the form may 
have been 
from the female he was to interact with, this was by no 
means certain. It was then the male's 
task to find out 
whether the female really was 
favourably or unfavourably 
disposed towards him. 
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In fact the feedback forms did i-iot originate from 
the female subjects at all but formed the 'hvpotheýniS' 
manipulation in the experiment. In Lhe favourable 
Iij-pothesis condition the males received a form tliat 
indicated that the interaction partner thought that the 
male was "moderately likable" and "stronglj- would" 
like to get to know him better. By contrast, in tlie. 
unfavourable hypothesis condition the form indicated 
that the partner thought that the male was "inoderately 
disagreeable" and "strongly would not'' like to get to 
know him better. The male was then given instructioris 
to use the forthcoming interaction to find out / what was 
written on the form accurately reflected what the female 
actually thought about him bearing in mind that it ,,, is 
probable that the feedback form was not in fact. t-he 
genuine one filled in by the female they were goiiig to 
talk with. 
There was also a control condition in ý,: hich the 
male subjects received no feedback about the 
female's 
opinion of them, nor were they given a specific 
hypothesis to test during the conversation. They were 
simply told to use the conversation 
to get acquainted 
with the female. 
There i,, as another factor in the experiment-, 
orthogonal to the hypothesis manipulation. 
Ri--ht at the 
en 
start of the experiment 
the male subjects were given -i 
series of rating scales 
to assess their "self- 
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conceptions". The subjects were divided into two groups 
on the basis of this test. Those with scores above the 
median formed the "high self-perceived sociability" 
group; those with scores below the median formed the 
"low self-perceived sociability" crroup. Thus within 
each of the three hypothesis groups (favourable, 
unfavourable and control) half of the males typically 
expected their social interactions to go well, and the 
other males who generally saw themselves as being less 
likely to make a good impression in social situations. 
The subjects were given four minutes from the time 
they received the feedback to prepare for the conx, ers- 
ation. The experimenter then initiated the conversation 
by asking the two subjects to introduce themselves f rom 
seperate rooms using a telephone system. They were 
allowed to speak for approximately nine minutes. The 
interaction was tape recorded using a stereophonic 
recorder so that the male and the female's voices were 
recorded on seperate channels. 
Independent judges, naive to the purpose of the 
experiment or the experimental condition of any of the 
pairs, listened to the tape-recorded conversations and 
rated them on several different behavioural and 
affective measures. This gave an 
indication of the 
strategies used by the males in testing 
their 
hypotheses. Other measures were taken after 
the 
interaction to see whether the males saw 
their 
hypotheses as having been confirmed. 
These were the 
impression that the males thought that the females had 
got of them (ie. whether they thought that the females 
had liked them), and the impressions that the females 
had actually formed of the males. 
The crucial test of the main experimental hypoth- 
esis, t at the males will consider their hypotheses as 
having been confirmed, was tested by a3 (hj-potheses) 
X2 (percieved sociabilit. y) analysis of variance using 
the males' ratings of the females impression of them as 
the dependent variable. 
As predicted both main effects were si-anificant. 
The males who had received favourable feedback in the 
hypothesis manipulation ended up thinking that the 
females really did like them more than the males In the 
it unfavourable hypothesis" condition, with the control 
condition coming approximately half-way between the two 
hypothesis conditions. There was also a significant 
It perceived sociability" main effect, showing simply that 
the males who rated themselves as being more socially 
adept thought that they had left the females with a 
better impression of themselves than the males in the 
"low self-perceived sociability It condition. A signif- 
icant interaction was neither predicted nor found. 
In the search for the mediators of this effect the 
judges' ratings of the males during the 
interaction were 
also used as dependent variables 
in the 2X3 ANOVA. Of 
the eight affective measures taken 
(agreement, praise or 
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compliments, interest, approval, tension, disappro, %, -al, 
disagreement, and antagonism) many failed to attain 
inter-rater reliabilities above 0.3 and the others 
either produced no significant effects, or the 
significant effects that were found bore no direct 
relevence to the interpretation of the results. 
One other measure was taken by- the judges, the 
frequency with which the males used a "react to 
traits" strategy. This is a conversational technique, 
identified by Swann, that individuals may use to test 
hypotheses. It consists of the male asking the female 
what she would think of a hypothetical person who 
posse--V: ýd certain traits. Examples of this would be the 
questions "What do you think of athletic men: " or 
"What do vou think of doctors"'. 
While Swann states that "The measure of hypothesis 
testing was the frequency with which (males) use the 
-'react to trai ts Y strate,. -, y" (p. 23) , he does not -make 
any predictions concerning this dependent variable at 
all. One plaus; 
'ble prediction is that the males in the 
hypothesis testing conditions would use this strategy 
more than those in the control conditions (ie. a 
"hypothesis" main effect). 
In fact the 2X3 ANOVA using this variable reveals 
no significant main effects. An 
interaction that is 
difficult to interpret indicates that the males in the 
"favourable hypothesis / higgh self-perceived 
Ar 
I 
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sociability" and the "no hypothesis / low 
self-perceived sociabilit. v" cells used this strategy 
more than the males in the other four conditions. 
It is also informative to see what impressions the 
females finally had of the males. Were the hypotheses 
I tru ly self-confirming? Did the females who interacted 
with males testing the hypothesis that they would get on 
well form better impressions of those males than the 
males in the "Unfavourable Hypothesis" condition? 
No evidence was found of this; the main effect for 
the hypothesis manipulation was not significant. 
However, a significant interaction between self- 
perceived sociability and hypothesis revealed that high 
self-perceived sociability subjects made better 
impressions of themselves when testing a hypothesis 
(either favourable or unfavourable) than when in the 
control, no-hypothesis condition, whereas 
low self- 
perceived sociability subjects were not effected 
by the 
hypothesis factor. This finding is again difficult to 
interpret and of no direct relevence to the 
"self- 
confirmimg, hypothesis" question. 
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Swann's PhD Thesis Criticised 
Having given a description of Swann's experiment, 
it will now be evaluated to show that Snyder & Swann's 
(1978) claim that the results demonstrate that 
hypothesis testers will tend to see their hypotheses as 
bein,,,: r,, confirmed after social interactions to test those 
hypotheses, is unjustified. 
The first mistake in their logic is in claiming 
that the males in this experiment were simply given 
hypotheses to test. In fact, they were given both a 
hypothesis to test and an expectation about the female's 
liking for them. 
As has already been argued in chapter two, there is 
a crucial difference between hypotheses and expect- 
ations, and it is of fundamental importance in judging 
the rationality, accuracy and alleged biases of subjects 
testing hypotheses. A hypothesis is merely a testable 
statement about some feature of the world. It contains 
no information about the likely truth or accuracy of 
the 
statement -- it is merely a proposition. 
Thus, in their 
1978 experiment, in most of the manipulations, 
Snyder & 
Swann gave the subjects no reason to believe that 
their 
hypotheses were any more likely to be true 
than false, 
they simply told the interviewers 
that "the personality 
profile is a description of a type of person 
known to us 
all -- the extravert 
/ introvert. You are to find out 
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how well this profile describes the person you 
interview. " (p 1204). 
This is not the case in Swann's PhD thesis tliou, 4n. 
In this case subjects were not only told to " test ithe 
hypothesis that this is how your partner feels -ibout 
you" (p 13) but were also given some information (the 
feedback from the "attitudes and values" questionnaire) . 
Therefore the subjects not only had a hypothesis to 
test, but they were also led to expect that there was at 
least some chance that this hypothesis was more likely 
to be true than false. That is to say, it would have 
been normatively correct of the subjects in the 
"favourable feedback" condition to expect their chance 
of having a partner who found them likable to be higher 
than for the subjects in the "unfavourable feedback" 
condition. As in the Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid 
experiment (1977) the crucial test t,: ould be to see 
whether the males' representations of the females had 
diverged rather than con,, -erged after the interaction. 
Again measures that would allow this crucial test to be 
made were not taken. 
This leads on to the possibility that T-; hen the 
males were asked how much the females had liked them 
after the conversation, they did not onlý- use 
the 
impressions gained during the interviews, but they also 
incorporated this information gained before the 
interaction in their final estimation of the female's 
attitude to themselves. This would 
have been a 
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perfectly rational way for the males to integrate the 
information available to them, in accord with normative 
models of decision making such as Bayes' Theorem. 
It has been pointed out by Nisbett & Ross (1980) 
that it is a common mistake in the psychology literature 
to assume that when individuals use preconceptions (in 
this case the unreliable evidence from the feedback 
form) they are being misled, and arriving at incorrect 
conclusions. For instance Kelley's classic (1950) 
"warm-cold" experiment is often cited as an example of 
subjects using information wrongly. Kelley did not draw 
this conclusion himself, and it is clearly not 
warranted. 
Swann seems to be vaguely aware that this may be a 
problem; what he refers to as the males "merely 
parroting the hypothesis manipulation, without having 
made any attempts to test their hypotheses" (p 30). He 
offers several reasons why this is not the case, 
but 
none of his arguments stand up to scrutiny. 
His first 
mistake is to assume that either the subjects merely 
parroted back the hypothesis manipulation or 
they used 
the interactions to form their impressions; 
he does not 
consider the possibility that 
they used both bits of 
information and combined them using either a 
Bayesian 
model (treating the 
feedback manipulation as the prior 
odds) or some sort of an additive 
or averaging model. 
Either of these could have 
been normatively appropriate. 
Chapter 3. page 103 
I 
His first argument to support his position that 
subjects were not "merely parroting the hypothesis" is 
that because the subjects did use the "react to traits" 
strategy, they were obviously trying to test their 
hypotheses. Apart from the fact that, as stated in the 
previous paragraphi the subjects may well have been both 
making a serious attempt to use the interview as well as 
the hypothesis manipulation, a close inspection of the 
table of means shows that very few of the males used 
this tactic at all; the overall mean is less than 0.3 
1 
per subject per interaction -- only 28 occur-e, -ices of 
this trait were identified by either of two judges in 
the all of the 97 conversations! A careful working back 
from cell means reveals that in fact only 18 of the 97 
subjects were seen to have used the strategy at all by 
either judge. If, as Swann suggests, the use of the 
fireact to traits" strategy is an indication of 
hypothesis testing, one would be led to the conclusion 
that most of the males were not testing hypotheses! 
What makes this argument even less convincing is the 
fact that the strategy was used by more of the males in 
the control or "no-hypothesis" condition (26.5%) than by 
the males in the experimental condition (14.3%). 
Swann never gives any theoretical support to his 
use of this "react to traits" variable. It is difficult 
to see how it adds to an understanding of hypothesis 
testing process at all and seenis to have been added into 
the experiment as an afterthought. He also used an 
analysis of variance model to analyse this variable, 
but 
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the parametric assumptions of the test were wildly 
violated -- two of the cells having zero variance for 
instance! Although Swann seems to have been oblivious 
to these problems, a re-analysis of Swann's data using, a 
non-parametric analysis of variance (a technique 
outlined in Wilson, 1960) again shows no main effect but 
only a highly significant (but uninterpretable) 
interaction. 
A second argument that Swann puts forward to defend 
his position is that there was a significant correlation 
between the males' estimates of the females' liking for 
them and the females' actual liking for them 
93) =0.23, p=0.013, one -tailed). Again, this is 
entirely consistCnt with the males using an averaging or 
Bayesian strategy to combine the information from the 
hypothesis manipulation and the conversation. 
Swann continues with this argument by pointing out 
that the correlation is higher in the hypothesis testing 
conditions (r( 60) =0.25, p<0.025, one-tailed) than in the 
control, no-hypothesis condition 
(r( 3 1) =0.11, ns. ). 
Not only did an analysis of this 
difference using 
Fisher's Zr transformation (See Ferguson, 1981, 
for 
further details of this technique) show that this 
difference was highly non-significant 
(Z=0.62, p=0.27, 
one-tailed) but it is not clear why 
one should expect a 
higher correlation in the hypothesis 
testing rather than 
the control conditions anyway. 
It could equally well 
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have been argued that one wouid expect higher accuracy 
in the no-hypothesis conditions since they did not have 
any bogus feedback information to confound their 
inferences! 
There is a further important difference between 
Swann's (1978) experiment and the type of effect that 
Snyder & Swann are tryin,,,!: '. to obtain in their 191-8 
investigations. Swann clearly finds that, whatever the 
hypothesis testers conclude about their hypotheses, this 
is entirely an "in the e, ve of the beholder" effect. 
That is to say, there was no ob. jecti,,, e evidence that the 
females had actually come to like the males in the 
favourable hypothesis condition more than the maies in 
the unfavourable hypothesis condition. In fact, a close 
inspection of the means indicates that the maies in the 
unfavourable hypothesis condition were actually 
oonsidered to be slightly (but not significantlý-) more 
likable and friendly by the females whoothey interacted 
with than the males who were in the favourable hypoth- 
esis condition! If this small difference in means does 
reflect a real effect then there is a very interesting 
process occurring. The males may be compensating for 
the view they belie-ve that the females hold of them, 
causing a it suicidal prophecy" -- the males who thou, -r--,, ht 
that the females did not like them initially came to be 
more liked. 
While this surprisingr reverse effect is not 
significant, Snyder & Swann (1978) go 
to great lengths 
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to point out that the hypothesis testing procedure 
"caused the targets to provide actual behavioural 
confirmation of the participants' hypotheses" (p. 1202). 
The discussion in chapter one (ibid) suggested that the 
I 
conceptual difference between objectively and subject- 
ively perceived support is not as simple as Snyder has 
assumed in his experiments, there does seem to be an 
important difference between the hypotheses being tested 
for in Snyder & Swann's experiment and the hypotheses 
being tested in Swann's thesis. 
In testing for introversion or extraversion 
interviewers are testing for an enduring and already 
formed quality of an individual. By contrast, the 
liking that is being tested for in Swann's thesis is not 
a pre-formed trait but an affective and cognitive 
representation that is formed during the interview. 
While it is hardly likely that the interviewer could 
have a real effect on the target's enduring extraversion 
during a short interview, one's own behaviour clearly CD 
can have an important effect on other people's liking 
for oneself. Thus, any inferences drawn from Swann's 
thesis (even if it did find unequivocal evidence of a 
self-confirming hypothesis) and Snyder's introversion- 
extraversion paradigm must be carefully considered 
in 
the light of this difference. What is clear 
is that the 
uncritical way in which Snyder & 
Swann (19718) make 
inferences between one experiment and the next is 
unjustified and misleading. 
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To conclude these criticisms, Swann's (1978) data 
OL#-'k entirely consistent with the notion that the males 
integrated all of the information available to them 
about the female's impression of them in a normatively 
appropriate and rational manner, and there is no 
evidence of a "confirmatory bias" on the part of the 
hypothesis testers at all. 
To relate this back to the assertion by Snyder & 
Swann (1978) that hypothesis testers themselves are 
likely to consider the hypotheses they test as being 
confirmed -- this is clearly not proven, as Snyder 
claims it is, by Swann's (1978) work. Whether 
hypothesis testers are biased by the hypotheses in 
making judgments about the validity of their hypotheses 
remains an unanswered empirical question. 
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Summary and-Conciusions 
Snyder ( 1981, Snyder L Swann, 1978) does not 
provide any empirical support for the assertion 
'-hat the interviewers in his experiments considei-ed 
their hypotheses as having been confirmed. Instead he 
refers back to Swann's unpublished PhD thesis as proof 
of this. 
Swann's PhD thesis was described in detail, then 
criticised for the following reasons: 
I/ The concepts of hypothesis testing and 
expectancy utilisation which are crucial in 
understanding the tasks of the subjects in these 
experiments were confused. This meant that even the 
- Swann claims to have found for s(ý11*- support thall 
fulfilling IIYPO-r-heses is highly equivocal. 
2/ There was, in f act, no main ef f ect f or the 
favourable / unfavourable hypothesis manipulation on 
crucial dependent variables -- the only significant 
effects were interactions that proved difficult to 
interpret. 
3/ The measures taken to analý-se the soclai 
interactions in the experiment ( in particular the -rf, act 
to traits" measure) were without construct validity, and 
conceptually confused. 
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4/ Many of the statistical techniques utilised by 
Swann to bolster his interpretation of the empirical 
findings are either wrongly applied or incorrectly 
interpreted. 
5/ There were conceptual differences in the nature 
of the hypotheses used in Swann's PhD thesis and in 
Snyder's experiments (eg. Snyder & Swann, 1978) that 
should cast doubts on any direct generalisations from 
one of these experiments to the other. 
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From the preceeding three chapters it can be seen 
that Snyder and his collegues have conducted a detailed 
series of experiments that have explored the tendency 
for people to test hypotheses by searching preferent- 
ially for confirmatory evidence. Several pieces of 
empirical work will now be presented that will continue 
the investigation into this phenomenon. 
This first experiment is an attempt at a 
constructive replication of Snyder & Swann's secon(i 
investigation in their initial, 1978, paper on the topic 
of hypothesis testing. Several key features of the 
experiment will be modified either to extend the 
understanding of the results or to correct inadequ4. cies 
that were identified in the paradigm. 
Following from the case made in the last chapter, 
the first modification was straightforward addition to 
the experimen-ý. After the inter-views have taken place, 
the interviewers were asked whether they thought that 
their hypotheses have been confirmed. This il. -as done 
getting them to use the same 10 bipolar scales used by 
the "naive rater-Judges" in Snyder & Si,: ann's experiment. 
Chapter 4. Introduction. page 111 
They also completed another measure of their estimation 
of the target's extraversion by filling in a version of 
the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI) as they thought 
that the target would answer the statements. With these 
measures it will be possible to determine whether the 
hypothesis-confirming phenomenon is a true "participant 
experienced" self-confirming hypothesis, or the less 
important "observer experienced" self-confirming 
hypothesis. The main reason behind using an additional 
second measurment is to aid in the estimation of the 
magnitude of the hypothesis effect. This will be 
discussed in more detail later in this section. 
Another modification to the procedure involves the 
task given to the rater-judges. It will be recalled 
that in Snyder & Swann's 1978 experiment the rater- 
judges listened to only the targets' responses to the 
questions and not the questions themselves. The reason 
for this, though not made explicit in the report, was 
presumably to completely eliminate any possibility of 
the interviewer communicating the hypothesis directly to 
the rater-judges. Thus Snyder & Swann hoped to show 
that if the judges rated the targets as being more 
extravert in the extravert-hypothesis condition than in 
the introvert-hypothesis condition this can only have 
been because the interviewers made them behave in that 
way. 
There is a fundamental flaw in the logic of this 
methodology. In looking at just the response without 
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the question that elicited that response, one is looi.. in- 
at behaviour in a vacuum, ;,; ithout considering full, - ýie 
possible causes of that behaviour. In the simplest 
analysis of the causes of a particular behaviour tt; o 
possibilities have to be considered; either the 
behaviour was caused by something internal to the actor, 
or the actor was made to behave in that way by 
situational factors. This internal / external 
distinction is generally considered to be one of the 
most fundamental attributions that indi-viduals make ý,: Iien 
analysing the actions of others (Kruglanski, 1983). 
What Snyder & Swann have done by not giving thtý 
rater-judges access to the situational forces acting ori 
the target is to make it virtually impossible for t he 
judges to correctly attribute the targets' responses tu 
either the dispositlons of the targets tfiemsetves or ý-o 
other, situational factors. 
An example will help to make this point clear. 
Imagine that as a rater-judge one hears a tar, -, fet respond 
"When I was 12 years old I went to the local youth club 
but I didn't get on with anyone there so I didn't go 
again - That was the onl, ý- 
time that I can recall. " As 
the statement stands one might conclude that this 
reveals little about the personality of the target; 
on e's isolated experiences at the age of 
12 are very 
poor predictors of sociability as an adult. 
Howevei-, if 
this response came in answer to the question 
"Tell me 
about an. v times that you joined a group or society. 
Ho r, - 
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well do you typically get on in those t,; -pes of 
situations? " then the fact that the only e,: ample that 
the tarret could give of joining a group ý,:,, As when he was 
twelve years old, and then it was a failure, is very 
strong evidence of introversion. Con-ý. -ersely, if the 
question was "Tell me about all the times that vou have 
felt that you didn't get on well with a group 11 then the 
fact that the target had to delve back so far into the 
past to find one, and only one, example of social 
isolation would probably lead one to the conclusion that 
she was usually extremely confident and proficient in 
social situations. 
It can be seen from the theoretical analysis and 
from the hypothetical example that the practice of 
letting the rater-judges listen only to the target's 
responses is highly artificial and not representati%, e of 
the usual information available to participants in 
conversations. Rather than making the perceptions of 
the targets by the rater-judges more objective, it has 
succeeded only in making them largely irrelevant. How 
often, after all, does one hear only one side of a 
conversation, the answers but not the questions? 
This is exactly analogous to the argument put 
forward in Chapter 1, where it was pointed out that 
several expectancy-confirmation experiments also 
hid the 
perceivers' behaviour from the observers, again to the 
detriment of the generalisability of the experimental 
findings. 
Chapter 4. Introduction. page 114 
This is not to say that there are not also problems 
in allowing the rater-judges to listen to the 
interviewer's side of the conversation too. For 
instance Swanný Giuliano & Wegner (1982) found that 
rater-judges will form impressions of targets even when 
listening to just the questions asked of them by 
interviewers. Merely detecting the fact that the 
interviewer is probing for either introversion or 
extraversion can lead the rater-judges to infer that the 
interviewer is searching for that information with some 
justification. 
Another consideration is to what extent will the 
rater-judges actually use the questions asked by the 
interviewer in interpreting the targets' responses? The 
evidence from the social cognition literature shows that 
individuals tend to ignore or under-utilise any 
situational factors and attribute the behaviour of 
others to their stable dispositions even when the 
situational forces are blatantly obvious. For example, 
Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz (1977) found that even when 
students were randomly assigned to the roles of 
questioner and contestant in a mock-up of a quiz show 
and the questioner was allowed to ask any questions he 
chose, the questioner was consistently rated as more 
intelligent than the contestant by both contestants and 
observers. The persistance and power of this effect 
whereby other people's behaviour is attributed to 
dispositional rather than situational factors has le d 
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to it being called the "Fundamental Attribution Er-ror" 
(Ross, 1977). 
A further addition to the measures taken wili aid 
in the interpretation of the results, by analysing the 
amount of variance accounted for by the confirmatorv 
bias. As was discussed in chapter 2 (ibid) Snyder has 
made some provocative inferences from his laboratory 
experiments to the real world, with quotes like 
individuals may live in social worlds in which 
hypotheses become self-confirming hypotheses and beliefs 
become self-perpetuating beliefs -- social worlds in 
which beliefs can and do create realit. y. " (Snyder 
Gangestad, 1981). 
In order to consider that an effect has importance 
outside of the laboratory one has to show not only that 
the effects observed are statistically significant, but 
also that they are of sufficient magnitude to make 
their contribution important (see, for example, Keppel, 
1973 or Winer, 19711). While Sn-yder & Swann did not 
compute the variance accounted for by the hypothesis 
manipulation, a crude "eyeball test" of their results 
ge. For instance, suggests that the effects are not larg 
only four of their ten measures associated with 
extraversion (introverted - extraverted, confident - 
unconfident, awkward - poised and energetic - relaxed) 
showed significant differences between the ti,; o 
conditions and the overall summated F ratio was only 
just significant (f(1,38)=4.56, P=0.04)). It could 
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well be that a weak effect could fade into irreievance 
when compared with other sources of variance such as I 
individual differences in the "acutal" extraversion of 
the targets or error on the part of the interviewers' 
perceptions. For this reason the subjects in the role 
of the target were selected to form two groups, an 
extravert group and an introvert group. Both groups had 
scores on the EPI (Eysenck Personality Inventory) at 
least one standard deviation from the mean. Thus a 
comparison could be made between the relative strength 
of the confirmatory bias phenomenon compared to the 
stable dispositions of the targets as measured by a 
proven personality assessment questionnaire. 111 
addition, the interviewers were asked to fiil in the 
questionnaire after -the interview as they thought the 
target would fill it in. This formed another dependent 
measure, but one that was more helpful for the 
estimation of the magnitude of the effects. 
Another simple methodological change was to allow 
the interviewer and target to sit face to face, rather 
than restricting communication to an audio-only link. 
It is not clear why Snyder & Swann chose to conduct the 
experiment in this rather artificial way; they do not 
give any justifications in their report, but the reasons 
were probably more historical rather than logical. 
In 
Snyder's two previous papers there had been good reason 
to separate the subjects during the interaction. 
The 
subjects in Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid (19-17) were 
deceived about each other's physical attract iveness , so 
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face-to-face interaction was clearlv not permitted to 
guard the experimental manipulation. Snyder & Swann's 
( 1978b) subjects were separated because the experiment 
took -the form of a prisoner's dilemma game, and the 
communication between the two "contestants" was liniited 
to the bare minimum. Swann's PhD thesis (submitted in 
1978 also) was also conducted over an audio-only link. 
The only justification given by either author for the 
use of this limited channelling of communication in 
these experiments (that are so atypical of most social 
interactions, telephone conversations being the one 
notable exception) is given in a later paper by Swann, 
Giuliano & Wegner ( 1982) where they say that, it would 
"prevent (the subjects) from emplojing nonverbal 
signals that r,,, ould riot be recorded on the audiotape. " 
1028). 
This being the case, ý,: hy not use face to face 
interaction and videotape the proceedings for the 
judges? It may return some of the normality to an 
already artificial situation in the laboratory. 
There 
are, after all, well researched differences 
between 
interactions conducted o-,, -er different channels of 
communication such as telephone conversations, 
face to 
face conversations and video-linked con-,. -ersat 
ions 
(Short, Williams & Christie, 197 6; Williams, 197 
7)- 
Intuitivel, y one would expect that person-perception 
would be more accurate in 
face-to-face interactions than 
audio-only interactions 
because of the greater number of 
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cues available, particularly the very revealing 
non-verbal cues which one has less conscious control 
over. Who, for, instance, would interview Job applicants 
or interrogate suspects, 'o,,,, er the telephone? 
Surprisingly, the consensus of research on the 
topic has found exactly the opposite. Inferences about 
the personality of others are more accurate the further 
the judge is removed from the non-verbal components of 
the message. In one experiment reported by Short et al, 
for instance, it was found that subjects were best able 
to d7i scriminate between true and false statements by 
witnesses when just given a transcript of their 
evidence, and audio-visual contact was less accurate 
than just listening to a recording. The reason seems to tn 
be that judges tend to devote too much of their time to 
trying to utilise the non-verbal "leakage'' and thus 
ignore the more valid , -erbal and factual components of 
the message. Whether this would still be the case in 
this experiment where there in no motivation to deceive 
on the part of the target is less clear. Most studies 
that have explored this issue have found no significant 
effects of medium of communication on accuracy, although 
liking is often found to increase with the richness of 
non-verbal cues. Again, it is difficult to predict what 
effect, if any, this manipulation will 
have on a 
hypothesis-confirming bias. 
One final change was made to Snyder & Swann's 
methodology, again to make the experimental situation 
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more representative of the kinds of situation in which 
people do try to find out about each other. In ; -ill of 
the previous experiments on hypothesis testing the 
subjects chose all of their questions to ask before the,, 
even met the target, so their part in the interaction 
consisted of simply presenting the pre-determined 
questions in a pre-determined order. This is very 
atypical of most social interaction. Even in , -er-, - 
formal semi-structured interviews only some of the 
questions that the interviewer will ask would have been 
prepared beforehand. The rest would evolve ciurin,, r th(-- 
conversation, depending on the target's answers to 25 
previous questions. In less formal con,,, ersations where 
people attempt to form impressions of each other it is 
doubtful whether the participants would have an, %-Lhing 
more than a vague idea of some of the topics of 
conversation they may evoke. It has often been ar,, -ued 
that one of the major criticisms of -ý'ocial 
Psycholo. 
ý, y Ls 
its attempt to reduce complex, dynamic processes and 
analyse them as if they were simple decisions. In this 
situation such artificialit-y is not necessary, the 
interviewers can choose which questions to ask as the 
interaction proceeds. It can then be seen whether the 
interviewers' questioning strategies are Qffected by the 
cognitive pressures of simultaneous speech, and i, 
hether 
their strategies change over the course of the 
interaction as they develop an increasingly complex 
representation of the target's personality. 
It is 
predicted that this modification will lead to a 
reduction of the confirmatory 
bias over the course oi 
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the interview. Whereas the interviewers are iikeiy to 
start off by asking confirmatory questions in the first 
half of the interview, as they become more involved in 
the sItuation the power of the confirmatory bias will be 
reduced. This will show itself by an interaction 
between the hypothesis under test and the order of the 
questions in -the interview on the types of question 
asked. Other variables, such as the personality of the 
target may also interact with the ordering of questions 
in the interview such that extravert targets come to be 
asked more extravert type questions in the second half 
of the interview (and vice-versa for introvert tar, -,, ets) 
as the interviewer comes to concentrate more on the 
characteristics of the target than on the nature of' the 
hypothesis. 
The net effect of all of these changes (and a few 
very minor ones outlined in the method section) is 
difficult to predict. On balance though there are 
probably as many chances that may lead to a bolstering Cý 
of the effect as ones that may reduce the effect. The 
main reasons for running this first experiment is thus 
to replicate the confirmatory bias in social 
interaction 
(given that only one of the many experiments on question 
selection for hypothesis testing 
have actually allowed 
the subjects to continue to ask the questions), 
to check 
Snyder's claim that the hypothesis-confirmation 
is 
experienced by the interviewer as well as 
by the 
rater-judges and to see whether 
the effect per-sists 
under more naturalistic conditions. 
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Subjects 
Fort-s, - maie and 40 female underý4raduates from the 
University of Birmingham volunteered to participate in 
the experiment. Half of these had already been selected 
for the role of target by virtue of their extraversion 
scores being one standard deviation or more from the 
mean for the population. 
A further 27 subjects were selected from the 
University of Warwick to act as rater-judges. 
Procedure 
The questions used in this study ý, -ere seiecteci from 
the list of ; ý6 questions but were re-classified into 
three groups using 14 judges (Snyder &, St,; ann used only 
nine). The three groups were: - 
Questions one would ask of someone already Icnor,, n 
to be an extravert. 
Questions one would ask of someone already known 
to be an introvert. 
and a neutral categor-y for the remainder. 
Chapter 4. Method. page 122 
Snyder & Swann used a simple majority (ie. five or 
more judges) to assign a question to one of the two 
former categories, otherwise they were assigned to the 
last category. 
The criteria used here were more stringent; a 
two-thirds majority was required for inclusion into the 
first two categories. The neutral questions were then 
excluded since there tended to be low-consensus about 
these questions, and they were not of theoretical 
interest. This left a list of 18 questions, nine 
extravert and nine introvert. 
The subjects in the role of interviewer were given 
exactly the same instructions as in Snyder & Swann's 
second investigation. More specifically, they were 
, criven a card with either 
the personality profile of an 
introvert or the personality profile of an extravert on 
it, and were told that it was their task to find out 
whether the person that they were to meet was of the 
type described on the card. They were given no reason 
to suggest that this was likely to be an accurate 
description of the target, as in Snyder & Swann's "low 
certainty" condition. They were then told that they 
would find out about the target by asking questions of 
the target, and were given the list of 18 questions on a 
sheet entitled "Topic areas often covered by 
interviewers" (a copy of these questions can be seen in 
Appendix 4.1). They were told to study this list 
carefully, but to only choose one question 
to ask first 
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-- they would decide which other questions to ask as the 
interview proceeded. 
The targets were simply told that the other person 
would be asking questions in order to find out about 
them, and they were instructed to answer them in as open 
and informative way as possible. To simplify things and 
eliminate further sources of variance the targets were 
all matched with an interviewer of the same sex. 
The two subjects were then led into the same room, 
introduced and a check was made to ensure that they did 
not know each other except by sight. The interaction 
was then conducted over a round table in the laboratorýý, 
and was filmed with the use of two video cameras, one 
opposite each subject. These channels were integrated 
usino' a video-editor, to give one recordiný, of a In - 
split-screen picture with one subject in each half, both 
facing their respective cameras. Although they were 
informed that they would be filmed the cameras were made 
to be as unobtrusive as possible. 
After the interaction the subjects were led into 
seperate rooms again, and the interviewer-subject was 
asked to fill in the ten item bipolar scales, identical 
to those used by Snyder & Swann. The ten scales were: - 
Talkative Quiet 
Unsociable Sociable 
Friendly - Unfriendly 
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Poised - Awkward 
Introverted - Extraverted 
Enthusiastic - Apathetic 
Shy - Outgoing 
Energetic - Relaxed 
Cold - Warm 
and 
Confident - Unconfident 
As well as being ten independent measures Snyder 
Swann found that these scales had a high internal 
reliability (Coefficient alpha = 0.95) so could be 
summed to obtain one measure of general extraversion. 
One minor change was made in the administration of the 
test; instead of being six-point scales they were 
changed to 80 millimetre lines which the subject marked 
at an appropriate point to signify his or her estimate 
of the target's personality on that dimension. The form 
was scored using a key that divided the lines into 18 
sections. Summed over the ten scales this gave scores 
on a 1710 point scale from -85 to +85, higher scores 
indicating a greater degree of extraversion. 
Then the interviewers were given a copy of the EPI 
to fill in for the target, being instructed to answer 
the questions as they thought that the target would 
answer them using the knowledae that they had gained 
from talking with them. Twenty-four of the 5-1 questions 
related to the scale of extraversion, the questions 
requiring simple yes/no answers. Examples of the 
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questions are " Would you do an, vthin-,,, for a dare? " and 
"Do you like talking to people so much that You never 
miss a chance of talking to a stranger""'. The ran2ýe of 
possible scores on this test is from 0 to 24, hi, ':, ther 
scores being nearer the extraverted end of the ran, 4e. 
The subjects were then individuallý- debriefed and 
thanked for taking part. 
This part of the experiment was a fullý- 
randomised 2 (personality of target) X2( introvert 
hypothesis vs extravert hypothesis) X2 (sex of dyad) 
design with five dyads per cell. 
The next stage in the experiment was to see whether 
rater-judges who saw the interactions but ý,; ere naive to 
the hypothesis being tested by, the interviewer also saw 
the actions of the targets as being e-vidence in favour 
of the hypothesis. 
Twenty-seven rater-Judges were used, all 
undergraduates, postgraduates and staff of the 
Uni-versity of Warwick. This ensured that none of the 
rater-judges were familiar with any of the 
interviewers 
or participants. Each rater-judge saw videotape s of 
ten 
inter-views shown in random order, with five 
from the 
extravert target and five from the 
introvert target 
condition, but all within one hypothesis condition. 
Also, all rater-judges saw only dyads of the same sex as 
themselves. After seeing the recording of each 
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interview they rated the target using the same tý,, o 
measures as the interviewers, the EPI and the ten 
bipolar scales. 
In order to ensure that the judges were diligent in 
their tasks a lie scale was included in with the 
extraversion questions. Rater-judges who scored over 
seven on the nine point scale were eliminated from the 
analysis. I Seven rater-judges were eliminated using 
this criterion, leaving 20. With 40 dyads in total, and 
20 rater-judges seeing ten interactions each, each 
interaction was seen by five rater-judges. 
The time taken by the judges to see and rate all 
ten interactions was about two and a half to three 
hours. This stage of the experiment was compietely 
automated so a computer gave all of the instructions, 
administered all of the questions and told the 
rater-judges when to fill in the bipolar scales and go 
on to the next video-recording. This reduced any chance 
of experimenter effects and allowed the subjects to 
complete the tasks in their own time without feeling 
hurried. 
I For the first 14 subjects to run, I, ne experiment was autonticaily týrmiriatel by 
the computer program as soon as a score on -, ne lie scale exceeded six on he lie 
scale. The last three subJects who exceeded the limit of more than six : osltives on 
the lie scale did complete their alWeJ 10 interviews, and when t'Leir da-a. alons, 
with the data from whatever i; ý,, Ierviews were rated 
by the other fou7 "rejecte,, 
judges wert analysed *ýshowed the same overall Tattern as the 20 Other 
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Results 
For the, sake of claritN7, the results section will 'be 
divided into three sections: - the questions asked: the 
impressions formed by the interviewers: and _he 
impressions formed by the judges. As no sex effects 
were predicted or found in any of the results the se--,, ý 
factor will be ignored in the descriptions of the data 
and analyses (with one minor exception that will be 
discussed later). 
The Questions Asked 
An analysis of the number of extravert quesLions 
asked in the various conditions found no signii'lcant 
effect for the hypothesis factor (F( 1,32)<l , n. s. ), 
Nor was there a significant effect for the personai-Lty 
of the target, F(1,32)=1.57, n. s. ). (Table 4.1). 
The analysis for the introvert questions is an 
exact replication of this since the number of introvert 
questions selected was necessarily nine minus the number 
g no neutral of extravert questions asked, there bein., 
questions. 
However, a more detailed analysis of the resuits 
revealed a very interesting trend. The data was re- 
analysed incorporating the order in which questions ý, -ere 
asked as a fourth, repeated measures factor in the 
analysis of variance by separating the 
first four from 
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the final five questions asked. There was now a 
significant interaction between hypothesis and order on 
the proportion of extravert questions asked, F( 1,02) 
3.57, p=0.03,1 tailed). This indicates that the 
subjects started by asking questions that 
Pý-eJol%- ýA*Jlý 
probed for confirmatory evidence in both conditions, but 
then this trend was re-versed. The number of confirm- 
atory questions asked thus went from 59//0 down to 46% 
(see figure 4.1). The difference in the proportion of 
extravert questions asked in the first four between the 
two hypothesis conditions was not, however, significant 
(t(38)=1.10, n. s., I tailed). 
The interviewers' impressions of The targets 
After the interviews the interviewers rated the 
extraversion of the targets by filling in the ten item 
bipolar scales and the EPI for them. The bipolar scales 
were found to have a very high internal consistency 
(coefficient alpha = 0.91), and were thus summated to 
form one overall measure. The results for the summated 
scales and the EPI are shown in tables 4.2 and 4.3 
respectively. There was a highly significant main 
effect for the personality of the target on both 
measures, the extravert personality group being 
perceived as more extravert than the introvert 
personalit-, N- , -Troup (Summated Scales: 
F(1,32)=1-1.4, 
p=0.001; EPI: F(1,32)=28.9, p<0.001). 
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There was, however, no main effect for the 
hypothesis factor (both Fs<l) , and none of the 
interactions approached significance. 
The proportion of the total variance accounted for 
by the various effects was computed using the r, -z 
statistic described by Vaughan & Corballis (1969). The 
personality of the targets accounted for 41% of the 
total variance using the EPI or 25% of the variance with 
the summated scales. For both of the measures the mean 
square of the hypothesis factor was less than the mean 
square of the error term (i. e. the F ratios were less 
than 1) indicating that the proportion of the totai 
variance accounted for by this factor was exceedim4iý- 
small or non-existent. 
One more analysis was attempted to detect aný, 
hypothesis manipulation effect. By removing the 
variance attributable to the exact self -administ-er-ed EPI 
scores of the targets the error term would be reduced 
giving a much more powerful test more likely to detect 
even the weakest of effects. Even when this was done 
with an analysis of covariance (using the target's 
self-administered EPI score as the covariate) the 
hypothesis factor was still not significant, although 
there was now a non-signif icant trend, F( 
1,3-1 ) =2.36, 
p<O. 1,1 tailed), with the small difference 
between 
the adjusted means in the predicted direction. 
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The rater-judges' impressions of the targets 
The rater-judges' impressions of the tarigets were 
very similar to the interviewers' impressions. A!: ýain 
there was a strong main effect for the personality of 
the target indicating that the introverted tars4er-s ý, ere 
seen to behave in a more introverted manner than 
extraverted targets (Summated scales: F(1,32)=12.8, 
p=0.001; EPI: F(1,32)=29.9, p<0.001). The means 
can be seen in tables 4.4 and 4.5. 
The rater-judges' perceptions of the targets were 
uneffected by the hypothesis being tested by the 
interviewers; both F ratios were again beloý4 1. 
The personality of the targets as measured by the 
self-administered EPI again accounted for a iar,,,,, e 
proportion of the total variance in the rater- i ud.,., es' 
impressions of the targets on both the EPI (42%) and the 
summated scales (23%). As before, since the F ratios 
for the hypothesis effect were less than 1 the 
proportion of the variances accounted for b-y the 
hypothesis manipulation was at most very small. 
Again an analysis of covariance was performed on 
the data as a last attempt to detect the effect of the 
hypothesis manipulation on the rater- j ud, -,, res' impressions 
of the targets. It should come as no surprise 
by now 
that the hypothesis factor was still not significant, 
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but again there was a slight trend in the predicted 
direction, F(1,37)=2.72, p<0.1,1 tailed. 
One surprise finding was that the interaction 
between sex and hypothesis was significant with the 
summated scale measure (F(1,32)=4.4, p=0.041) but 
not +-he EPI(F<I). Given that this effect is only just 
significant, and on only one measure, it is quite likely 
to be a type one error. Furthermore it is of no clear 
theoretical interest, nor does it help in understanding 
the results. 
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Table 4.1. Mean Number of Extravert questions 
Selected 
Target's Personality 
Extravert Introvert 
Extravert 
Hypothesis 
Introvert 
M= 4.8 M= 4.8 
SD= 0.9 SD= 1.0 
n= 10 n= 10 
M= 4.9 M= 4.0 
SD= 0.9 SD= 1.6 
n= 10 n= 10 
4.9 4.5 
4.8 
M=4.4 
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Table 4.2. Interviewers' Perceptions of the Target 
Using the Summated Scales 
Target's Personality 
Extravert Introvert 
Extravert 
Hypothesis 
Introvert 
M 29.0 M 7.7 
SD= 30.6 SD= 14.6 
n= 10 n= 10 
M= 31.5 M= -1.9 
SD= 23.6 SD= 12.8 
n= 10 n= 10 
18 .4 
M= 14.8 
M= 30.3 M=2.9 
Table 4.3. Interviewers' impressions of the targets 
Using the EPI 
Target's Personality 
Extravert Introvert 
Extravert 
Hypothesis 
Introvert 
M= 14.8 M= 5.7 
SD= 6.4 SD= 4.9 
n= 10 n= 10 
m= 13.7 M= 3.6 
SD= 6.2 SD= 3.7 
n= 10 n= 10 
M= 14.3 4.6 
10.2 
8.7 
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Table 4.4. Rater-Judges perceptions of the Targets 
using the Summated Scales. 
Target's Personality 
Extravert Introvert 
Extravert 
Hypothesis 
Introvert 
M= 20.5 M= 3.0 
SD= 19.2 SD= 20.1 
n= 10 n= 10 
M= 21.0 M= -2.2 
SD= 18.7 SD= 16.0 
n= 10 n= 10 
M= 20.8 0.2 
M= 11.8 
9.4 
Table 4.5. Rater-Judges perceptions of the Targets 
using the EPI. 
Target's Personality 
Extravert Introvert 
Extravert 
Hypothesis 
Introvert 
M= 14.0 
SD= 4.0 
n= 10 
M= 13.9 
SD= 4.4 
n= 10 
M=8.1 
SD= 4.4 
n= 10 
M=6.5 
SD= 2.2 
n= 10 
14.0 7.3 
M 11.1 
10.2 
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Discussion 
These results are clearly at odds with those found 
by Snyder L Swann (19-t8). Not only did Lhe interviewers 
not display a confirmatory bias in the questions they 
asked but, at the end of the day, they also failetý to be 
misled into thinking that their hypotheses had been 
confirmed (or, if the non- significant trend from the 
analysis of covariance did turn out to be a reliable 
effect, the effect was so small as to be trivial). 
, rhe possible reasons for these differences will be 
discussed in two sections -- the questions asked and t-, he 
impressions formed -- before the implications for both 
the concept and relevance of the "confirmatory bias" are 
considered. 
The Ouestions PeoDle Ask. 
Snyder and his collegues conducted a long and 
arduous series of' experiments in the attempt to f in(I an-, - 
influences that would limit the power of the confirm- 
atory bias. Three years after his first published paper 
on hypothesis-testing Snyder concluded "If anY 
procedure exists for inducing individuals to eschew 
confirmatorj- hlpothesis-testing strategies in 
fai,,, our oi' 
either disconfirmatory or "equal -opportuni t. ý- 
" hi-pothesis 
-testing stratefies, that procedure 
has j-et to appear. " 
(1981, p. 290). 
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The neý. t year he rejoiced in having found such a 
strategy, but that was only after having ýýone to 
extraordinary lengths with various educational and 
99 impression management" interventions (Snyder, 
Campbell & Preston, 1982). 
Yet in this experiment the interviewers formulated 
"equal -opportuni ty " strategies under very normal, 
everyday circumstances. There are two possible 
expla -nations for this non-occurrence of the conf irmatorv 
strategy. Either it was because the list of questions 
--Was different from those used in Snyder's series of 
experiments, or it was something to do with selecting 
the questions during rather than before the 
interaction. 
There are two reasons thy the non-occur-l- rice of the 
effect t,; as probably not simply caused by the different 
questions. Firstly, other experimenters have also found 
the phenomenon using their own lists of questions 
developed and categorised independently from Snyder's 
list -- and a lot further removed from Snyder's list 
than the list used here (Cooper, 1982; Semin & Strack, 
1980) . It i,,, ould thus seem unlikel-.,, - that there were some 
particular artefact, of Snyder's question list that 
0 
caused the confirmatory bias. Secondl. y, there is 
evidence that the interN, iewers in this experiment 
started by asking more conf irmatory questions but that 
it was something that occurred during the interaction 
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1 
that made the interviewers reject their confirmatory 
hypothesis-testing strategy. 
This leads on to the other possible e: ý: pla nation -- 
that the hypothesis-confirming strategy has been 
interfered with by making the question choice occur 
simultaneously with the interview, rather than making 
the interviewer select all of the questions before the 
start of the interaction. 
0 An analysis of the information available to the 
interviewers before and during their question selection 
task shows why this small change in methodologý, may iiave 
influenced the types of question chosen by the 
interviewers to test their hypotheses. 
One of the main lessons to be learned from the 
social coIgnition. literature is that individuals are 
often influenced by salient, -vivid or concrete 
information at the expense of abstract,, dull or pallid 
information (egl. Reyes, Thompson & Bower, 1980 -- See 
Nisbett & Ross, 1980, Ch. 3 or Fiske & Taylor, 198-1, Ch. 
7 for reviews of the literature on this point. ). ý%hen 
the questioning strategly required interviewers to select 
questions before their interactions with the targets, 
all they had to go on L,, Cre- the experimental instructions 
and the personality profiles of a tý-pical introvert or 
extra-vert - In such a situation 
these instructions would 
have been utilised to the full in selecting the 
questions. It is even likely that the interviewers used 
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a "matching" heuristic in deciding which questions to 
ask. This is a strategy identified by Evans (1972 and 
1980) by which subjects, faced with a complex task, 
simply choose responses that have the same surface 
appearance as the phrasing of the task itself. In other 
words, the interviewers testing, say, the introvert 
hypothesis would identify the task as being "something 
to do with introversion" and then select out any 
questions on the theme of introversion. 
However, when selecting questions during the 
interview the information available to the interviewer 
is both more complex and more plentiful. The target is 
quickly going to take over from the hypothesis as the 
most vivid feature of the environment; as Heider said 
"Behaviour ..... has such salient properties it tends to 
engulf the -total field" (1958, p. 54). The crucial 
factor in determining which question to ask is rapidly 
going to shift from the hypothesis to the target. 
While this explaination seems very plausible there 
is a minor point that detracts from it. It would be 
reasonable to expect that, if the main factor in the 
choice of questions had transferred to the target from 
the hypothesis, then there would either be a main effect 
for personality or an interaction between order and 
personality such that the interviewers came to ask more 
extravert type questions of extraverted targets and more 
introvert type questions of introverted targets. There 
was no evidence of this at all; in fact both of these 
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F, ratios were less than one. This may not go entirelv 
against this theory, since other experimental evidence 
shows that individuals do not search for confirmation of 
their beliefs, only their hypotheses (Semin & Strack, 
1980; Merteens, 1984). This distinction, often confused 
in the literature, was discussed in greater detail in 
chapter 2. One puzzle that remains is to determine what 
strategies interviewers are using when selecting 
questions if the types of questions chosen are unrelated 
to either the hypothesis under test or the personality 
of the target. 
There are, in fact, several other strategies that 
the interviewers could be using in making their question 
choices. For instance they may be selecting what they 
perceive to be the most diagnostic questions to ask, a 
strategy that has been shown to be more prevalent and to 
account for more of the variance than the confirmatory 
strategy (Trope & Bassok, 1983). Another strategy for 
choosingr questions that has been identified follows from 
considerations of social desirability. Cooper (1982) 
assumes that interviewers probably do not want to seem 
rude or make themselves or the targets feel uncomfort- 
able by asking awkward questions. He asked rater-judges 
to rate each question on a seven point scale to indicate 
how comfortable or uncomfortable they would feel asking 
that question of a stranger. It was found that the 
Snyder & Swann's introvert questions were, on average, 
rated as being more uncomfortable to ask than the 
extravert questions. Cooper predicts that this may 
be 
k 
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the reason why, over aii of these experiments, the 
introN, ert questions are generaily selected iess often 
-than the extravert questions. 
One other possibility is that the lack of a 
confirmatory questioning strate! zy could have been an 
arte, fact associated with the modified and shorter list 
of questions. As explained earlier, the neutral 
questions were removed, the list was trimmed down to 18 
from 26 questions and interviewers ý,, ere told to select 
only nine (as opposed to 12) of the remaining questions. 
Both the lack of a confirmatory bias and the order 
effect may also have been an artefact of the mathematics 
fe subset of items, ý, ithout of selecting such a lar, 
replacement, from a finite list. For instance, an 
interviewer may have looked down the list and reJected 
all of the questions they considered to be embarrasdng 
to ask or non-diagnostic ( that is to say, of no use in 
differentiating betiveen introverts and extraverts). 
This may only have left about half of the questions 
deemed to be acceptable, so there ,; ould have been, in 
effect, a "Hobson's choice" between questions searching 
for confirmatory or disconfirmatory e-vidence. Moreover, 
the interviewers may have "exhausted" the acceptable 
confirmatory questions first, then been forced to use iip 
the disconfirmatory questions, thus accounting for the 
order effect. 
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A post-hoc test was performed to look into this 
possibility. was reasoned that if this were r-he 
case, and if there were a high consensus betwe,: ý, n the 
interviewers as to the good and poor questions, there 
should be clear evidence that some of the questions il. , er- 
utilised reliably more often than others. A Chi-square 
test revealed that this was not necessarily the case 
(A7 ( 17 ) =21 . 97, p> .2), but this is only an 
indication. It may be the case that while the 
interviewers were using this "eliminate then choose'' 
strategy, there was simply no consensus as to which 
questions were considered preferable. A true test ý; ill 
be to see whether interviewers choose confirmatory 
questions from the exact list used here, but when they 
have to choose before rather than during the inter- 
action, that is to say under similar conditions to t1iose 
in Snyder & Swann's (1978) experiment. This wili be 
checked in the next experiment by using the sauie 18 
questions as in this experiment, but with the question 
., the inter,, -iev,;. selection stage preceedin, -zr 
If, however, it is found that the critical variable 
is the interaction during the question selection, then 
the important question now becomes which of the two 
methodologies is more representative of the hypothesis 
testing processes in people's unconstrained everyda-y 
environments? 
As discussed earlier, situations in which the 
questioner would have a fully prepared set of questions 
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to ask before an interaction are exceedingly rare. 
Television and radio interviews by journalists may 
sometimes seem to take this form, and look how 
unrepresentative of normal intractions they seem! Have 
Snyder & Swann (1978) overlooked one essentiai feature 
of social life; that, rather than being discrete actions 
and decisions, it unfolds as a dynamic and ongoing 
process? 
The results of the next experiment are necessary 
before this conclusion can be verified. 
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The interviewers'- perception of the target. 
Virtually no evidence was found to suggest that the 
interviewers' perceptions of the targets were biased by 
the hypotheses they were testing. This lack of an 
effect was unlikely to have been caused by by a lack of 
sensitivity of the measuring instrument or a lack of 
diligence on the part of the interviewers given the very 
strong effect for the personality of -the target. 
This finding is also contrary to those of Snyder & 
Swann (1978), although from the critique of the evidence 
presented by Snyder & Swann and Snyder (1981) in 
chapters 2 and 3 of -this thesis, it is perhaps not 
surprisinggr that 'the confirmatory bias was not found. 
There is an obvious reason why the interviewers in this 
experiment did not tend to conclude that their 
hypotheses had been confirmed. Snyder's hypothesised 
mechanism for the confirmation of hypotheses requires 
the interviewers to ask questions that seek out 
confirmation of the hypothesis. Because the method of 
question selection prevented there being a confirmatory 
bias in the questions asked in this experiment, this 
confirmatory mechanism was necessarily ruled out. 
It is impossible, therefore, to know whether the 
interviewers would have thought that their hypotheses 
were confirmed if they had asked a majority of questions 
that sought out confirmatory evidence. One tempting way 
to answer this question would be to re-analyse the data 
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collected looking for differences between the 
interviewers who asked more extraverted questions and 
interviewers who asked more introverted questions. This 
would not, however, give an unequivocal answer since the 
reasons why interviewers chose the questions they did is 
not known, but there may well have been good reasons for 
different questioning strategies that were not 
independent of the target's personality or behaviour in 
the interview situation. 
Unfortunately the question of whether the 
self-confirming hypothesis phenomenon caused by an 
imbalance in information search is a "participant 
experienced" as well as an "observer experienced" 
confirmation remains unanswered by the data collected 
from this experiment. A further experiment in which the 
interviewers are induced into asking confirmatory 
questions must be conducted in order to answer this 
question. 
The rater-judges' perceptions of the target. 
The rater-judges did not detect any differences 
between the targets in the introvert hypothesis 
condition and the targets in the extravert hypothesis 
condition. It would have been very surprising, in fact, 
if the rater-judges had found there to be any difference 
between the hypothesis conditions given that there was 
no difference between the types of questions asked 
in 
the two conditions, and that they were naive as to the 
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nature of the hypothesis under tels-A an. %-ýI-aý-. 
It is worth noting again thouch hoi,, ý -he --Dtron,, ý 
effect for the personality of the targget accounted foiý a 
moderately large proportion of the variance. This 
demonstrates that the rater-judges were doing . their task 
at least somewhat conscientiously and that the lack of 
the hypothesis effect could not have been caused by the 
insensitivity of the measures. 
General Discussion 
It seems as if the lack of any of the effects for 
the hypothesis manipulation predicted by Snyder & Swann 
(19718) can be attributed whoiely to the way in which the 
interviewers chose their questions. It is interesting 
to note that the predisposition of subjects to seek 
confirmation of their hypotheses may not occur in social 
interaction at all, but only under very artificial 
laboratory conditions. 
It is still of theoretical interest, however, to 
find out whether interviewers would consider their 
hypotheses as having been confirmed if they did ask 
a majority of questions that preferentially attempted 
to seek out evidence supportive of the hypothesis. This 
question will be addressed directly in the neNt 
experiment. 
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Conclusions 
It uas found that ý; hen the interviewers selecred 
their questions to ask during the interaction with the 
target there was no overall confirmatory bias in the 
questions asked. Furthermore there was an interaction 
between the types of questions asked and the order or 
the questions; interviewers were more likely to ask 
confirmation-seeking questions in the first half of the 
interview than in -the second half. 
It was argued that this effect was probably due to 
the presence and salience of the target, over-riding the 
hypothesis manipulation as a factor in question 
evaluation and selection. This cannot be proved 
conclusively, though, until the confirmatorý- bias in 
question choice is replicated using the same list of 
questions as employed here, but with the selection task 
preceeding the interaction between target and 
interviewer. 
/ 
The hypothesis under test did not affect the 
interviewers' or the rater-judg,, es' perception of the 
tarcet. However, as there was no difference in the 5 
questions asked between the two hypothesis 
conditions, it is not possible to generalise this 
finding to situations where a confirmatory evidence is 
sought. The next experiment will address this question 
too. 
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Introduction. 
The Questions Asked 
The previous experiment found that the self- 
confirming hypothesis effect did not replicate when 
several changes were made to the experimental procedure. 
It was not clear exactly which of these changes was 
responsible for over-riding the effect, but the lack of 
a predominance of confirmation-seeking questions was 
likely to have been a principal factor in eliminating 
the effect. 
While it seemed plaus"ible that the absence of the 
confirmatory bias was caused by the interaction with the 
target during the choosing of the questions, there was 
another possible explanation that could not be ruled 
out; that it was an art(--fact of choosing a larger subset 
of questions from a finite list. In order to eliminate 
this possibility, the same set of questioris will be used 
in this experiment, but the interviewers will select 
their questions to ask before the interaction with the 
target. If, under these conditions, the interviewers do 
select confirmatory questions then that will demonstrate 
that it must have been the interaction with the target 
that removed the confirmatory bias in questioning 
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strategy in the last experiment. 
The Impressions Formed 
If the confirmatory choice of questions is 
replicated, this experiment will allow further questions 
to be answered. The most important question is whether, 
if the interviewers seek out evidence in favour of their 
hypotheses by their choice of questions, they will be 
"fooled" into thinking that the data is representative 
of the targets' true dispositions rather than simply a 
function of the questions that were asked of them? This 
weak link in Snyder & Swann's confirmatory process was 
described in Chapter 3, and still has not been properly 
tested due to the lack of the confirmatory bias in the 
questions asked in the previous chapter. 
This question can be answered simply enough by 
letting the interviewers continue to ask the questions 
that they selected, and then by determining whether the 
impressions the interviewers have formed of the targets 
were dependent upon the hypotheses that the interviewers 
were testing. 
If the interviewers did perceive their hypotheses 
as having been confirmed, the audio and video recordings 
of the interactions could be analysed to shed more 
light 
on the exact mechanisms that cause the effect. As 
Darley & Fazio (1980) argued, two conceptually different 
mechanisms can be identified that could 
lead to self- 
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fulfilling prophecies occurring. The first occurs ýNhen 
individuals are presented with mixed or ambiguous 
evidence, and they interpret it as being consistent with 
the expectation. This may occur because individuals 
might preferentially recall confirmatory evidence or 
weight confirmatory evidence more strongly than 
disconfirmatory evidence. The second type of self- 
fulfilling prophecy occurs when individuals act in such 
a way as to collect an unrepresentative set of evidence 
which would appear to confirm the prophecy even to 
someone who was unaware of that expectation. 
There are several examples of the first type of 
self-fulfilling prophecy in the literature. For 
instance, Rothbart, Evans and Fulero (1979) found that 
when subjects were given expectancies about the likely 
behaviours of a group of men, they would recall more of 
the expected types of behaviour and thus consider that 
their initial expectancy was indeed true. Similarly, 
Snyder & Uranowitz (1978) showed how preconceptions -- 
this time brought about by stereotyped expectations of 
homosexual as opposed to hetrosexual women -- could bias 
the recall and processing of mixed evidence. There is 
also empirical evidence that exactly the same phenomenon 
can occur in hypothesis-testing. Snyder & Cantor showed 
again the testing of a simple hypothesis could effect 
the recall of previously learned material (1979). 
To see whether the effect Snyder & Swann claim to 
have discovered is truly an example of a situation where 
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the interviewers have created evidence that would 
convince individuals who saw just that evidence and were 
not aware of the hypothesis testing that led to the 
evidence, "naive" rater-judges could be used, as in 
the previous experiment. 
If the interviewers did perceive their hypotheses 
as having been confirmed, the audio and video recordings 
of the interactions could be analysed by rater-judges to 
shed more light on which of the two mechanisms caused 
the effect. If rater-judges who saw the tapes agreed 
with the interviewers that the targets were behaving in 
a manner consistent with the hypotheses, then the 
interviewers really would have made the targets seem to 
act like the personality profiles in the hypotheses. 
Alternatively if the interviewers perceived the 
hypotheses as having been confirmed but the rater-judges 
saw no difference between the targets in the introvert 
hypothesis and the extravert hypothesis condition, then 
the confirmation would have been "In the eye of the 
beholder" only, the first type of hypothesis-confirming 
bias outlined above. 
The rater-judges will see the tapes under two 
conditions, answers only and both questions and answers. 
If the rater-judges only see the hypothesis-confirmation 
under the answers only conditiony then this would also 
detract from Snyder & Swann's findings. It would 
demonstrate that it was only by hiding the situational 
constraints on the targets' behaviour that Snyder & 
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Swann were able to force their rater-judges into making 
erroneous inferences about the target's dispositions. 
It should be noted, however, that were no evidence 
of a self-confirming hypothesis on the part of the 
interviewers, the judging of the tapes would then be of 
little theoretical or practical value, and would 
therefore be omitted due to the time-consuming nature of 
the empirical work involved. 
Medium of Communication 
A second factor was also introduced into this 
experiment to see whether the confirmatory bias was 
dependent on the impoverished medium of communication 
used by Snyder & Swann, or whether the effect would be 
maintained in a full face-to-face interaction. Snyder & 
Swann (1978) only allowed communication via headphones 
and microphones. This may have affected the subjects' 
propensity to bias in person perception, though the 
literature on media of communication is inconclusive as 
to whether the audio - only channel of communication is 
likely to cause more or less error in person perception 
than the full face-to-face interaction (Short, Williams & 
Christie, 1976). The possible reasons W4y. medium of 
communication might affect the hypothesis testing 
process were outlined in more detail in the introduction 
section of the last chapter. 
Chapter 5. Introduction. page 153 
The crucial measures in this second piece of 
empirical work were again the number of extravert 
questions asked in the extravert hypothesis condition 
compared to the introvert hypothesis condition, and also 
the interviewers' estimates of the targets' extraversion 
as measured by the EPI and the summated bipolar 
scales. It was predicted that more extravert questions 
would be asked in the extravert hypothesis condition 
than in the introvert hypothesis condition, and thus the 
opposite would necessarily occur for the introvert 
questions. It was also predicted that the targets in 
the extravert hypothesis condition would come to be 
perceived as more extraverted than the targets in the 
introverted hypothesis condition by both the 
interviewers and the rater-judges. No firm predictions 
were made as to what effect the medium of communication 
would have on the hypothesis-confirming phenomenon. 
If the interviewers' perceptions of the targets 
reveal that the interviewers have concluded that their 
hypotheses were confirmed, then the rater-judges' 
analyses of the interactions would reveal whether there 
was any basis in the target's behaviour for concluding 
that the hypothesis had been supported, or whether it 
was purely an "in the eve of the beholder" effect. 
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Method 
Subjects. 
sixty-ý our female volunteer subjects took part in 
this experiment. It was conducted at the University of 
Warwick, but the subjects who took part were a mixture 
of undergraduates, postgraduates and Open University 
students. One of each pair was recruited from the 
library, the other from a coffee bar. This helped to 
ensure that none of the subjects knew the person they 
were to interact with more than by sight. 
Female subjects were used for reasons of 
availability and convenience. This was notIthought to 
limit the generalisability of the experiment as the 
phenonenon has so far seemed to be independent of sex 
effects. 
Procedure. 
In the face-to-face condition the two subjects were 
scheduled to arrive at the laboratory at the same time. 
A coin was tossed in front of them to allocate them 
randomly to the roles of interviewer and target. They 
were then shown into different rooms. 
The target completed the extraversion scale from 
the EPI using a computerised version written for this 
experiment, and was then given the same 
instructions as 
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in the previous experiment, tellin-,, them that the 
interviewer wouid be asking questions of them and thev 
were to answer in as open and revealing a way as 
possible. 
Meanwhile the interviewers were taken through the 
question-selection task in exactly the same way as in 
all of Snyder's hypothesis-testing experiments. This 
differed from the previous experiment in one important 
way; all of the questions were selected before rather 
than during the interaction. The 18 questions used were 
exactly the same as those used in the previous experi- 
ment and the interviewers again selected nine. 
When this was completed the target was led into the 
same room as Lhe interviewer, and they sat at opposite 
sides of the tabie. They were informed that they v,; ould 
be video-recorded, and the wall-mounted cameras were 
pointed out to them. The interviewer was then told to 
start asking her questions when the experimenter had 
started the recording equipment. 
When the nine questions had been asked the 
experimenter again entered the laboratory, and 
led the 
target back to the other room. The interviewer was then 
asked to use the EPI (on the computer) and 
the ten 
bipolar scales (identical to those used 
in the previous 
experiment) to rate her impression of 
the personalitý 
of the target. While the interviewer 
did this the 
target was thanked and debriefed. Finaily, 
the 
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interviewer was asked to provide a written answer to the 
question on the last page of the instructions booklet, 
phrased thus: Please state whether you felt that the 
questions that you chose before the interview were 
suitable for your purpoes, i. e. finding out whether the 
person you were interviewing was really an extravert 
(introvert). They were then thanked and the aims of 
the experiment were explained to them. 
In the audio condition the subjects did not meet 
before the interaction, and they were given the 
additional information that the experimenter was 
interested to see how people got to know each other on 
the telephone, so they would not see each other. They 
then communicated from their separate rooms using a 
microphone and loud-speaker in each room. They were 
informed that their conversation would be tape-recorded 
for possible later analysis. Due to an oversight in the 
preparation of the experimental materials the 
interviewers in the audio condition were not asked the 
question about their satisfaction with the questions 
they had asked. In all other ways the audio and 
face-to-face conditions were identical. 
The design of this experiment was thus a2 
(introvert hvpothesis vs extravert h. ypothesis) X2 
(audio vs face-to-face communication) fully randomised 
design, with three dependent variables: the number of 
extravert questions selected by the interviewer; 
the 
interviewers' perception of the target using the EPI; 
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and the interviewers' perceptions of the targets as 
measured with the summated scales. 
The video and audio tapes of the interviews were 
kept for inspection by rater-judges, but this was 
conditional upon their being evidence of a confirmatory 
bias in the interviewers' perceptions of the targets. 
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Results 
The results will be considered in two sep, -. rate 
sections for simplicity -- firstly the types of 
questions selected for asking by the interviewers, then 
the impressions of the targets formed by the 
interviewers after they had asked those questions. 
The Questions asked. 
In order to determine whether the preferential 
selection of questions seeking confirmatory evidence is 
replicable with the new list of 18 questions used in 
this and the previous experiment, a2 (Introvert 
hypothesis vs Extravert hypothesis) by 2 (audio- 
only vs face-to-face conditions) analysis of -variance 
was performed on the number of extravert-type questions 
asked. 
The hypothesis factor was significant showing that 
the average number of extravert questions asked in the 
extravert hypothesis condition (M=5.75) was greater 
than the average number of extravert questions asked in 
the introvert hypothesis condition (M=4.13), 
F(1,28)=7.97, p<0.005, one tailed. 
Neither the medium of communication effect nor the 
interaction were significant (both Fs<l). This was to 
be expected since the treatment of the interviewers in 
the two medium conditions was identical until after the 
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question-selection part of their task. 
This has shown that the type of questions 
selecti-eqRed is dependent on the hypothesis the 
interviewer is given to test. Does this bias in the 
type of questions asked affect the interviewers' 
judgment? 
The impressions formed of the targets 
by the interviewers. 
The same 2X2 analysis of variance was performed 
on the EPI scores given to the targets by the 
interviewers after the interaction. The mean scores are 
shown in table 5.1. It can be seen that there is very 
little difference between the two hypothesis conditions, 
and the effect was not significant (F<1). There was, 
however, a very weak trend that indicated that targets 
were perceived to be more introverted in the visual 
condition than in the audio condition, F(1,28)=2.55, 
p<0.2, two tailed. 
It is likely that a lot of the variance would have 
been accounted for by the "actual" extraversion of the 
target. In the analysis of variance this would have 
simply been included in the error variance, limiting the 
power of the analysis. This variance was removed using 
the targcts' self-administered EPI score as the 
covariate in an analysis of covariance (See Winer, Ch 
10 
for details). 
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This achieved more than a fivefold reduction in the 
magnitude of the error term, making the medium of 
communication effect highly significant, F(1127)=9.90, 
p<0.01, two tailed. The hypothesis factor was still 
not significant, the F ratio being a mere 0.02 
reflecting not even a hint of difference between the two 
conditions. 
The parallel analyses that were performed for the 
Summated Scales measure yielded different results. 
There was no evidence of a medium of communication 
effect in either the analysis of variance or the 
analysis of covariance (both Fs<l), but the difference 
in the means was in the same direction as for the EPI, 
again indicating that targets were perceived to be more 
extraverted in the audio condition than in the face-to- 
face condition (Table 5.2). 
There was slightly more evidence that the impress- 
ion formed by the interviewer of the target was effected 
by the hypothesis, but the difference was nowhere near 
significant for either the analysis of variance 
(F(1,28)=1.78) or the analysis of covariance 
(F(1,27)=2.13). As can be seen in Table 5.2, the most 
surprising thing about the difference in these means is 
that it is in the opposite direction to that which was 
expected; the targets who were tested for introversion 
and were asked more introvert-type questions were 
perceived to be very slightly more extraverted than the 
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targets who were tested for extraversion! 
Neither the EPI nor the Summated scales produced 
any evidence of a significant interaction (all Fs<1). 
The Interviewer's comments 
Fifteen of the 16 interviewers who were asked to 
report on whether they felt that the questions they 
chose were satisfactory did so. After reading all of 
these accounts, several types of comment were noted as 
being of theoretical interest. 
Six (40%) of the interviewers expressed complete 
satisfaction with the questions. Only one subject 
complained about the inefficiency of selecting all the 
questions before meeting the targets. Three 
interviewers commented in any way that the questions 
were leading or hinted in any other way that the 
questions were biased. Other causes for dissatisfaction 
with the questions were that they were too superficial, 
too probing or too embarrassing to ask. These accounts 
will be described in more detail in the discussion 
section. 
The Rater-judges. 
Since no evidence of an effect for the hypothesis 
manipulation was found for the interviewers on either 
the EPI or the Summated Scales, the audio and video 
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recordings were not analysed to see whether there was 
any detectable difference in the targets' appearance to 
to naive" rater-judges. 
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Table 5.1. 
Interviewers' ratings of the targets after the interaction 
using the EPI. 
Communication Medium 
Audio only Face to face 
Extravert 
Hypothesis 
Introvert 
M= 8.6 M= 13.1 
SD= 8.1 SD= 6.8 
n 8 n 8 
M 9.3 M 12.6 
SD= 6.8 SD= 6.0 
n 8 n 8 
8.7 12.9 
=10.9 
M =10.9 
Table 5.2 
Interviewers' ratings of targets after the interaction 
using the Summated Scales. 
Communication Medium 
Audio only Face to face 
Extravert 
Hypothesis 
Introvert 
M= 19.8 
SD= 28.8 
n=8 
M= 31.5 
SD= 25.7 
n=8 
M= 17.5 
SD= 25.8 
n=8 
M= 29.0 
SD= 16.4 
n=8 
25.7 23.3 
M =18.6 
, ll =30.3 
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Discussion 
The finding that even when interviewers ask 
questions that seek out evidence supportive of their 
hypothesis they still do not automatically accept that 
hypothesis, goes against all of the assumptions made by I 
Snyder in his reviews of hypothesis-testing in social 
interaction (Snyder, 1981; Snyder & Gangestad, 1981). 
This finding and the conclusions that can now be drawn 
about question selection in interactive settings will be 
considered seperately. 
When will Confirmatory Information-Search occur? 
Not only was the "Confirmatory bias" effect 
replicated and found to be highly significant, but also 
the ratio of extravert questions selected in the 
extravert hypothesis condition to the number of 
extravert questions selected in the introvert hypothesis 
condition was approximately 42: 58. This was almost 
exactly the same ratio as in Snyder & Swann's 
investigations (if anything slightly stronger, but this 
may have been caused by the exclusion of the neutral 
questions). It is rea%pring to know that the effect is 
truly replicable, and particularly with the set of 
questions used in this experiment. 
This means that an important but tentative 
conclusion from the last experiment can be confirmed; 
the lack of a difference in the questions chosen to test 
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the two opposing hypotheses was caused by the questions 
being selected during rather than before the interact- 
ion. This limiting factor on the self-confirming 
hypothesis effect means that a lot of the interpersonal 
situations which Snyder postulates would be affected by 
the phenomenon are in fact unlikely to be affected at 
all. Certainly, individuals are unlikely to formulate 
biased questioning strategies in the spontaneous 
informal conversations that characterise our everyday 
lives. 
Snyder himself seems to have realised in his later 
writings on hypothesis-testing that the issue of 
pervasiveness needs to be considered more seriously, 
rather than simply inferring that hypothesis testing is 
the framework of all social information gathering. In 
the paper he co-authored with Gangestad in 1981 Snyder 
addresses this issue of pervasiveness directly. He 
concludes that hypothesis-testing is probably occurring 
whenever an individual is trying to find out about 
anyone else -- in all situations from the research 
seminar to the proverbial cocktail party. But they 
cover themselves by saying even if the predisposition to 
confirm hypotheses only effects us occasionally in, for 
instance, employment interviews, then this will still 
have a major effect on our lives. 
The combined findings of this and the previous 
experiments lead one to conclude that the self- 
confirming hypothesis could not occur 
in cocktail 
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parties or any other informal or spontaneous situation. 
But what about situations like the job interview, where 
it is possible that the interviewer has taken time 
before the interview to prepare a list of questions to 
ask? The results of this and the other hypothesis- 
testing experiments lead us to believe that under these 
circumstances the interviewer would select a majority of 
questions that would seek confirmation of the hypothesis 
under scrutiny. Would the asking of these questions 
then force the confirmation of the hypothesis? 
Were the Hypotheses Self-Confirming? 
The Interviewers' Perceptions of the Targets. 
The answer to this question is again no. Even when 
the interviewers in this experiment enacted their 
confirmatory questioning strategy there was no evidence 
that they were swayed by their questions into believing 
that the targets' dispositions were more consistent with 
their hypotheses than was the case. This again is 
clearly a major blow to the self-confirming hypothesis 
paradigm. This raises two points of interest: Firstly, 
why do the interviewers not consider their hypotheses as 
proven; and secondly, why did Snyder & Swann (1978) 
arrive at the opposite conclusion? 
There are several possible reasons why the 
interviewers may not have been misled into accepting the 
target's answers to the biased questions as being 
evidence supportive to the hypothesis. One possibility 
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is that the targets simply did not give evidence in 
favour of' the hypotheses in answerina the questions. 
This is unlikely according to evidence from Snyder In 
Swann's similar experiment (1978, investigation 2) where 
the naive rater-judges listened to onlýr the tarclets' 
answers and found that the targets' responses were 
consistent with the hypothesis being tested by the 
interviewer. What is different here is that the 
interviewers knew which questions were being asked, and 
thus could compensate for this in assessing the impact 
of the answer (this point is dealt witti in more detail 
in chapter 3 of this thesis). In particular since most 
of the interviewers (all bar three to be precise) asked 
at least three of each sort of question, the interview- 
ers may well have noticed how the tar-. rets answered 
different sorts of questions differently. They may then 
have avoided simply using an averaging rule to 
it calculate" the extraversion of the tarL4ets, but could 
have used a more wholistic method to inteE4rate the 
information from the nine questions. It is, after all, 
rather simplistic to assume that we use straight-forward 
aver-aging rules to deal with the varied and complex 
information we gather in our social interactions 
(althou-, -, rh some theorists such as 
Anderson (19-11) would 
argue that we do). 
The second issue is why -- when this experiment has 
shown conclusively that a confirmatory questioning 
strategy does not cause hypothesis-confirmation -- 
Snyder and others have argued that hypotheses are self- 
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confirming. 
The actual empirical evidence found by Snyder & 
Swann (1978) for this claim was examined in detail in 
chapter 3. To recap briefly, in the original paper 
Snyder & Swann state that no measure was taken of the 
interviewers' perceptions of the target after the 
interview, yet in an article in 1981 Snyder completely 
contradicts this and says that during debriefing it was 
noticed that interviewers did think that their 
hypotheses had been confirmed. Snyder & Swann also 
claimed that other research had demonstrated that the 
interviewers would have thought that their hypothes'ls 
had been confirmed, but a critical appraisal of this 
literature showed that this claim was also unjustified. 
Another mistake has been to assume that because t. he 
,I rater-judges (listening to just the targets' responses) 
thought that the targets were beha-ving in a manner 
consistent with the hypothesis, this was proof' that the 
interviewers would reach the same conclusion. The 
flawed logic in this argument was also exposed in 
chapter 3. 
So, in fact the empirical findings in this 
experiment are not in direct conflict tith any other 
empirical findings -- it is the interpretation of those 
findings that has been the cause of conflicting 
conclusions. But it is also clear that several features 
of the methodology used by Snyder & Swann were so 
artificial that it is difficult to see how any sensible 
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generalisations to the real world could have been made. 
What started as the identification of a uniquely soci . Lal 
eature of information processing isas implimented in 
experiments that were as far removed from most real- 
life situations as most purely cognitive psycholoalcal 
experiments. 
Medium of Communication. 
The only significant effect found for the 
interviewers' perception of the target was caused by the 
medium of communication. The interviewers rated the 
targets as being more extraverted on the EPI when the 
interaction was conducted in the audio-onlv condition 
rather than face-to-face. Why this should have 
occurred, and why on the EPI but not the Summated Scales 
is not clear from either this experiment or the mediated 
communication literature. It is, however, of' no direct 
interest to any of the theoretical issues being 
considered in this thesis. It was the hypothesis by 
medium interaction that would have been of more 
interest, which would ha,,, -e suggested that h-ypothesis- 
confirmation is more likely to occur under some 
situations but not others. There was no evidence of 
hypotheses being self-confirming in either face-to-face 
or audio-only interaction. 
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Rater-Judges 
If the interviewers had considered that their 
hypotheses had been confirmed then it would have been of 
interest to use rater-Judges to explore the process by 
which this bias had occurred. However, since the role 
of the rater-judged is of no intrinsic interest in 
itself, and since the interviewers did not consider 
their hypotheses to have been confirmed, any data that 
was obtained from rater-judges viewing the audio and 
video recordings of the interactions could have added 
little to -the understanding of the confirmatory bias. 
This part of the proposed experimental procedure was, 
therefore, not conducted. 
The Interviewers' Accounts and the Debriefinas 
An additional component of the present experiment 
is that the interviewers themselves were asked v. -hether 
they were satisfied with the procedures they went 
through. Were they as sceptical about their task as the 
empirical findings and critique has suggested they 
should have been? Reading their written answers to the 
question they received at the ,, -ery end of the e-lperiment 
should shed some light on this. 
A casual treatment of the written reports shows 
that there was very little consensus about any problems 
the interviewers encountered. Forty percent of the 
inter, viewers stated that they were satisfied that the 
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questions they had chosen permitted them to form a clear 
impression of the target's extraversion or introversion. 
Many of the complaints made by the other interviewers 
concerned issues such as the questions being too 
superficial and not probing enough or being too probing 
and embarrassing to ask -- points unrelated to the 
issues of interest here. Only one subject complained 
about the artificiality or inefficiency of choosing all 
of the questions to ask before the interview, and even 
this was only articulated tangentially by saying that 
one of her later questions was made redundant by an 
answer to one of her earlier questions. 
One of the specific reasons for asking this 
question was to see if subjects were dissatisfied with 
the types of questions they had to choose from. It will 
be recalled that 21 of the 26 questions on Snyder & 
Swann's list were of the sort that "would typically be 
asked of someone already known to be extraverts" or of 
it .... people already 
known to be introverts" (1978, 
p. 1204, emphasis in original). Snyder & Swann do nJ say 
why the list was made up of this sort of question, 
rather than questions that set out to differentiate 
between introversion and extraversion. This and the 
previous experiment used the same type of questions 
for 
the sake of replication -- in fact to an even greater 
extent by excluding the neutral questions completely. 
Did any of the interviewers feel dissatisfied with 
this 
limited variety of different sorts of questions 
to ask? 
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Only a fifth of the interviewers (3 from 15) could 
be said to have expressed any comments along these 
lines. One subject said that the questions that she had 
chosen were 11 ee*. very much I oaded for a posi ti ve 
response from an extravert"; six of the nine questions 
she had selected were of the extravert type. Another 
said the questions ". .. were not open enough -- aa- if 
and went on to elaborate on an interesting strategy 
whereby one might find out whether the target was an 
introvert by ' "putting them on the spot"' (her speech 
marks). This could be done by making them talk a lot 
and if they became embarrassed or shy one would then 
know that they were introverted. This could be taken to 
be an example of a subject considering a falsification 
strategy (albeit with hindsight -- she had selected 
seven introvert questions for her initial test of an 
introvert hypothesis). The third subject, who chose all 
nine extravert questions to test the extravert 
hypothesis could maybe be considered to have criticised 
the types of questions by calling them "restricted", and 
she stated that whereas she had originally chosen 
it questions which were associated with being lively" 
she now thought that it would have been more valuable 
to also enquire about times that the target was 
introverted. 
What is clear from this is that only a few subjects 
criticised the questions for being of this "--- alreadl 
known ... " sort when asked specifically about 
the 
questions, and even then it was apparent that of these 
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individuals some had only come to this realisation after 
asking their questions. This is not to say, of course, 
that given a free choice, they would generate this sort 
of question themselves. 
next experiment. 
Conclusions 
That is to be the topic of the 
1/ The interviewers selected questions that sou, -, crht 
confirmation of their hypothesis. This proves that the 
absence of the "confirmatory bias" in the previous 
experiment was not an artefact of the particular list of 
questions used, but was caused by the interaction of the 
interviewer and target. This finding severely limits 
the external validity of any confirmatory bias in the 
testing of hypotheses about other people in social 
interaction. 
2/ Even when the interviewers did select and ask 
questions that sought confirmatory evidence this did not 
necessarily lead them to conclude that their 
hypotheses 
had been supported. This clearly undermines the effect 
that Snyder claims to have demonstrated, but it is not 
clear whether it is, in fact, contrary to any actual 
empirical findinggs. Snyder (19819 Snyder 
& Swann, 19-18) 
gives contradictory accounts of what he actually 
did and 
did not measure. 
3/ Subjects were generally satisfied with the 
types of questions they were given to select 
from and 
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with the selection procedure. The few subjects who did 
comment on the inadequacies of the questions or 
procedure seem to only have noticed the inadequacies 
after selecting their questions and askin. 9 them. 
Chapter 5. Discussion. page 175 
c:: U ä! 3L ]P t:, 4--- : r- 95 
1: ), K: > IP -E--- c> 1:: > _IL «-- 
IZ c-- ex 
_IL 
X 3r zýx -«-3 
ik 
IB JL AZ-x ---2g «-- CJL QLA &-- eý3 -L JL c> ri 223 -? 
Introduction 
One feature of the experimental paradigm that has 
not been explicitly challenged in the two previous 
experiments is the sort of questions that the 
interviewers were given to choose from. 
A conceptual analysis of the type of questions 
suggests that the choice of questions that Snyder 
Swann first used in 1978 and others copied (Snyder 
Campbell, 1980; Snyder & White, 1981; Cooper, 1982 and 
Semin & Strack, 1980) was not very well thought out. 
To recap, Snyder & Swann's subjects were required 
to select 12 questions from a list of 26 compiled by the 
experimenters. Of this list ...... 11 questions were 
ones that the majority of rater-judges thought would 
typically be asked of people already known to be 
extraverts, ... 10 questions (that) would character- 
istically be asked of individuals already known to be 
introverts ..... (and) ..... 5 questions for which there 
was no consensus that they were extraverted questions or 
introverted questions and those ..... irrelevant to 
introversion or extraversion" (1978, p-1204, emphasis 
in original). 
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However, the most appropriate questions to ask for 
the interviewers, given that their task was to 
differentiate between introverts and extraverts, would 
not have been any of these sorts of questions. At no 
point does Snyder ever question or justify this choice 
of questions. In all of his examples and anecdotes he 
just assumes that these are the sort of questions 
suitable to the testing of hypotheses. 
On the other hand, there seems to be little 
evidence that subjects were dissatisfied with the choice 
they were given. In the last experiment only three of 
the 16 subjects expressed dissatisfaction with the 
questions, and that was when they did not even have the 
third category of neutral questions to choose from. 
Another sign that the subjects did not feel unhappy 
about choosing from the list can be obtained from the 
fact that when they did have a neutral category to 
choose from, the subjects chose those questions slightly 
less frequently than one would expect by chance. For 
example, on average over investigations 1,2, and 4 of 
Snyder & Swann's (1978) experiment subjects chose to ask 
an average of 1.94 neutral question, that is 39% of the 
total number available. This compares to 10.04 of the 
combined introvert and extravert questions that were 
chosen, or 48% of the total of 21. This argument could 
be countered, though, by the fact that some of the five 
neutral questions were possibly irrelevant to 
introversion or extraversion (on topics such as favorite 
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charities). 
This experiment is aimed at finding out what sort 
of questions individuals would generate themselves in 
order to test a hypothesis, if they were not constrained 
to choosing from a list. 
I 
The procedure to be used in this experiment is thus 
very simple and very similar to the procedure used in 
the last experiments. The main difference is that the 
subjects, instead of being given a list of questions to 
choose from, were simply told to write down the 
questions they wanted to ask. 
Two main hypotheses can be proposed. Firstly, it 
is not clear why subjects should assume, in the wording 
of their questions, that the targets should already 
possess one of the traits they are testing for. For 
example, instead of asking a question like "What do you 
dislike about loud parties? " it would seem more 
sensible to ask the simpler question "Do you dislike 
loud parties? ". Thus when the questions are categor- 
ised by judges, fewer of the "subject generated" 
questions should fall into the category of questions 
that make unjustified assumptions about the target than 
the proportion of such questions on Snyder & Swann's 
list. 
Secondly, though, there may still be some evidence 
of a "confirmatory bias", albeit in a much weaker form. 
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The subject matter that interviewers use in the phrasing 
of questions could either be drawn from the activities 
and feelings of a typical extravert, or they could be 
drawn from the activities and feelings associated with 
introversion. If subjects are simply using the 
personality profiles to provide topics to ask questions 
about, then it would be expected that subjects would ask 
more questions about introverted topics when testing for 
introversion, and ask more questions about topics 
associated with extraversion when testing for 
extraversion. 
This experiment will also be used to investigate a 
further aspect of the confirmatory bias. It was noted 
before that one possible expla. nation of why individuals 
tend to choose questions that seek out confirmation of 
hypotheses originates in the way that hypotheses are 
phrased. The personality profiles given to the subjects 
gave plenty of examples of the type of evidence that 
would confirm the hypotheses, but no examples of the 
types of evidence that would weaken or falsify the 
hypotheses. Thus one way to weaken or remove the 
confirmatory bias would be to make the interviewers 
aware of evidence that would run counter to the 
hypothesis while they are choosing their questions. One 
attempt to do this was by rephrasing the personality 
profiles so they contained both evidence that would 
support and evidence that would contradict the 
hypothesis (Snyder & Campbell, 1980). This attempt, in 
fact, failed to detract at all from the power of the 
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confirmatory bias -- just as many confirmatory questions 
were asked as when the hypothesis was framed in 
exclusively confirmatory terms. An even more extreme 
manipulation was performed in an unpublished experiment 
in which the profiles were framed exclusively in terms 
of the characteristics that would be absent in someone 
of that personality type. Again the subjects continued 
in their attempt to use the questions to solicit 
confirmatory evidence (Snyder & White, 1978). 
An independent line of enquiry in a sepckrate realm 
of psychology also concluded that the way in which 
logical tasks are phrased can be crucial in determining 
the way individuals select information to test 
hypotheses. Evans (1972) was exploring the parameters 
of subject's defective reasoning in Wason & Johnson- 
Laird's (1972) propositional reasoning tasks. One way 
he found of manipulating the solutions given by subjects 
was to alter the phrasing of the propositions, from the 
Ifif p then g" form to "if not p then not g", "if p then 
not q" or "if not p then q". There was a consistent 
bias in the subjects' proposed solutions to the task to 
match rather than to alter the values named in a rule. 
The reason given by Snyder & Campbell for their 
failure to remove the effect was that perhaps the notion 
of introversion-extraversion is so well known and 
familiar to the lay-person that the simple change of 
phrasing of the personality profile was not powerful 
enough a manipulation to change the subject's mental 
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representation of the construct. Another way of making 
the subjects aware of the alternative to a hypothesis 
would be to give them not just one description of the 
evidence required to confirm the hypothesis, but also a 
separate description of the types of evidence that would 
be needed to falsify the hypothesis. This may sensitise 
them to the importance and relevance of falsifying 
evidence more than by simply providing a mixture of 
examples of falsifying and confirming evidence. 
Therefore a second, orthogonal manipulation to the 
hypothesis factor was the number of personality profiles 
that subjects saw. In the "confirmation-only" 
condition subjects would see just the description of the 
personality type that they were testing for. In the 
Fp confirmation and disconfimation" condition the sub- 
jects would receive both the introvert and the extravert 
personality profiles to read before they prepared their 
questions to ask. The hypothesis was phrased in exactly 
the same way in both conditions, asking the subjects to 
test to see whether the person they were to interview 
was of the type in the extravert (or, in the introvert 
hypothesis condition, introvert) description. 
If this manipulation does have the predicted 
effect, then there will be an interaction between the 
two independent variables for the introverted and 
extraverted questions such that the confirmatory bias is 
weaker or non-existant in the "both profiles" condition 
than in the "confirming profile only" condition. Also , 
it is likely that there will be more neutral questions 
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in the two-profile conditions than in the one-profile 
conditions. 
The three hypotheses can be summarised thus: - 
Hypothesis 1 
The questions generated by subjects will 
contain very few of the questions used predominantly by 
Snyder & Swann (1978) -- that is, questions one would 
ask of people already known to be either extraverted or 
introverted. 
Hypothesis 2. 
There will be some difference between the 
questions generated to test the two hypotheses. 
Subjects will tend to ask more questions about 
introverted behaviours or feelings when testing the 
introvert hypothesis, and more questions about features 
of extraversion when testing the extravert hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3. 
The weaker form of the confirmatory bias 
outlined in Hypothesis 2 will be weakened further by 
giving the subjects a personality profile of the 
opposite personality to the one they are testing for, as 
well as the personality profile of the typical 
individual who would confirm the hypothesis under test. 
There will be less of an imbalance between introvert and 
extravert questions, and more neutral questions when 
both personality profiles are presented. 
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4- 1- - -3 
Subjects 
Twenty male and 20 female undergraduates from the 
University of Warwick and the Open University volunteer- 
ed as subjects. In addition two male postgraduate 
psychology students, naive to this program of research, 
were used as rater-judges. 
Procedure 
The procedure for this investigation closely 
followed the procedural paradigm developed by Snyder & 
Swann, (1978) and used in the other hypothesis-testing 
experiments in social psychology. Participants were 
told to prepare to interview another undergraduate to 
determine the extent to which the target's behaviour and 
experiences match those of a typical extravert 
(extravert hypothesis condition) or those of a typical 
introvert (introvert hypothesis condition) They were 
told that they should prepare nine questions to ask of 
that person, and that they should write those questions 
on the sheet provided. ' 
The second factor was introduced by giving some 
subjects just one personality profile to read; the 
subjects in the other condition received two personality 
profiles, which included the opposing personality 
profile as well as the profile they were testing 
for. 
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When the subjects had written down their nine 
questions they were told that, in fact, no interview 
would take place. The reason for the deception was 
explained to them, and they were debriefed and thanked. 
This part of the experiment formed a2 (introvert 
hypothesis vs extravert hypothesis) X2 (one profile 
vs both profiles) fully randomised design. The 
dependent variables were to be the frequency with which 
the "interviewers" generated various types of questions. 
Two rater-judges were used to determine this. 
Categorising the questions 
The 26 questions from Snyder & Swann's list were 
combined with the nine questions from each of the 40 
subjects, making a total of 386. They were mixed in a 
randomised order and typed in a format to make Snyder & 
Swann's questions indistinguishable from the questions 
generated by subjects themselves. 
The two rater-judges were then individually and 
carefully briefed on the categories 
they were to 
allocate each question to. It was stressed 
that while 
the categories were not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
it was important to assign each question 
to the one 
category that it 
fitted most closely. 
Chapter 6. Method. page 184 
The five categories were described thus: - 
Extravert Questions which ask about a feature 
derived from the extravert personality profile (Refered 
to from now on as "E" questions for brevity). 
Introvert Questions which ask about a feature 
derived from the introvert personality profile ("I"). 
Biased extravert questions which assume that the 
target is an extravert and do not allow an answer 
indicative of introversion ("BE"). 
Biased introvert questions which assume that the 
target is an introvert and do not allow an answer 
indicative of extraversion ("BI"). 
and 
Neutral or Non-directional questions which either 
present a choice between an extravert and an introvert 
alternative, or are open ended, or are irrelevant to the 
introversion-extraversion dimension( 
" t! "). 
The rater-judges were also given the following 
examples of each type of question to clarify the 
categories. *- 
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E: Do you like parties? 
1: Do you get nervous in the company of strangers? 
BE: Why do you like socialising so much? 
BI: In what situations do you find it impossible to 
talk to strangers? 
N: What are your hobbies? 
or 
Do you prefer reading books or talking to 
peopl e 
or 
What sort of music do you like? 
The two judges worked through the list of questions 
seperately in their own time. A full set of 
instructions, including the two personality profiles they 
were each provided with, is included in Appendix 6.1 
IA pilot test had revealed that subjects had considerable difficulty in thinking 
up 12 questions to ask, so the nu3ber was reduced to nine, 
2 The categories used here were a close copy of the categories used in an 
unpublished paper by Trope & Alon (1980). Several other aethods of categorisation 
were attempted, for instance measuring the degree of constraint put on the answer 
by the question on a 7--point scale. Although the overall pattern of results was 
the same regardless of the categorisation method tried, the inter-rater reliability 
was found to be much lower with other methods. 
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Results 
The rater-judges agreed on the categories of 70.2% 
of the questions'. Cohen's Kappa was computed as 0.53 
(p<0.001), showing that the agreement between rater- 
judges was far higher than one would expect by chance 
alone. 
The information from the two rater-judges was 
combined to compute an average number of questions in 
each category for each subject. For instance, if one 
rater-judge had put four of a particular subject's 
questions into the neutral category, and the other judge 
had classified five as neutral, then that subject would 
score 4.5 for the neutral category. 
The proportion of subject-generated questions that 
fell into the two biased categories compared to the 
proportion of Snyder & Swann's questions that were 
categorised as biased is shown in Figure 6.1. It can be 
seen that, as predicted, the proportion of biased 
questions generated by subjects (2.8%) is far less than 
the proportion on Snyder & Swann's list (50%)2 .A 
chi-squared test showed this difference to be highly 
significant (X2=185, df=l, p<0.001). 
In order to test the second and third hypotheses 
the numbers of introvert, extravert and neutral 
questions generated by each subject were analysed 
seperately using a2 (introvert 
hypothesis vs extravert 
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hypothesis) X2 (one personality profile vs both 
personality profiles) analysis of variance. There were 
too few biased questions generated to satisfy the 
assumptions of a parametric test, but they were asked 
with approximately the same frequency in all conditions. 
For the introvert questions there was a significant 
difference in the types of questions asked in the two 
hypothesis conditions; more introvert type questions 
were generated to test the introvert hypothesis (M=1.95) 
than to test the extravert hypothesis (M=0.82), 
F(1,36)=6.05, p<0.01, one tailed). (Table 6-1). 
The difference in the means for the extravert 
questions was also in the predicted direction, with more 
extravert questions being generated to test the 
extravert hypothesis (M=2.10) than to test the introvert 
hypothesis (M=1.97), but this difference was not 
significant (F<1). (Table 6.2) 
One difference was found due to the manipulation of 
the "confirmatory only" compared to the "confirmatory 
and disconfirmator-y" personality profiles. Although 
there was no support for the third hypothesis from the 
introvert or extravert questions (in both cases Hypoth- 
esis by Profiles interaction Fs<1) , there was clear 
support for it from the neutral and non-directional 
questions (Table 6.3). More neutral and non-directional 
questions were generated when subjects were given 
both 
personality profiles with the 
hypotheses to test 
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(M=5.875) than when only the confirmatory personality 
profile was presented to them (M=4.77), F(1,36)=3.12, 
p<0.05, one tailed. 
I Ihis is much lower than the figure of 92% given by Trope & Alon There are two 
possible reasons for this. Firstly, the conditions under which the subjects in 
Trope & Alon's experiment may have been different -- it seems as if they were 
encouraged to ask questions that required a simple yes/no response, which were 
probably easier to categorise, Secondly, the inter-rater reliability is a 
function of the similarity between raters. Whereas the raters in this study were 
chosen for their different areas of study, the raters in Trope & Alon's study may 
have been aore homogeneous. 
2 This figure is seemingly at odds with Snyder & Swann's judges who put 21 of 
the 26 questions, or 81%, in their equivalents of the biased categories. This 
difference is, however, entirely attributable to the fact that there were only 
three possible categories available to those judges, as opposed to 
five available 
to the raters in this experiment, 
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Table 6.1. Mean Number of "Introvert" 
questions generated (all ns=101 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
One Profile 
Number of 
profiles 
Both Profiles 
2.2 
.6 1.7 
1. -1 
1.1 
.82.0 1.4 
Table 6.2. Mean Number of "Extravert" 
questions generated (all ns=10) 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
One Profile 
Number of 
Profiles 
Both Profiles 
2.5 2.1 
1.9 1.8 
2.3 
1.8 
2.1 2.0 2.0 
Table 6.3. Mean Number of "Neutral" 
questions generated (all ns=10) 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
One Profile 
Number of 
Profiles 
Both Profiles 
5.1 4.5 
6.5 5.3 
4.8 
5.9 
5.8 4.9 
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Discussion 
The three hypotheses will be considered seperately 
before their combinet impact on hypothesis-testing in 
social interaction is considered. 
Hypothesis 1 received overwhelming support. While 
the judges rated 50% of the questions on Snyder & 
Swann's list as being in one of the biased categories, 
less than 3% of the questions generated by subjects 
were judged to be of this sort. This meant that most 
subjects would not have generated any of these sort of 
questions at all. The logic of using the biased 
I 
questions on the list is now very suspect. It was 
clearly a mistake, and it is dubious whether any 
experiments using this type of questions can have any 
direct bearing on real-life social interactions. 
Hypothesis 2 received firm support from the 
introvert questions, but only weak non-significant 
support from the extravert questions. An inspection of 
the means shows that over twice as many introvert-type 
questions were asked to test the introvert hypothesis 
compared to the extravert hypothesis. The other 
interesting feature is the very low overall frequency 
with which introvert questions were asked in either 
condition. Even when testing the introvert hypothesis 
subjects generated an average of less than two 
intro- 
vert questions, less than the number of extraverted 
questions they generated. 
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The reason for this laok of difference in the mean 
number of extravert questions asked in the two 
conditiuns may be a function of the way in which the 
introv,: ýrt-extravert dimension is represented 
linguistically. Extraversion is thought to be the 
"positive" end of this dimension. To ask how outgoing 
or extraverted somebody is is a fairly neutral 
question, but to ask a question like "How shy or 
introverted is the new member of staff? " is a 
"loaded" question that strongly suggests that there 
is reason to believe that she is, to some degree at 
least, introverted. Thus the mention of "introversion" 
probably calls "extraversion" to mind automatically, 
whereas the mention of extraversion does not 
necessarily make the notion of introversion as 
available. (Clark & Clark, 1977). 
Another possible expla nation is that the introvert 
questions were less "socially desirable" than the 
extravert questions. Cooper (1982), using a list of 
questions similar to those used by Snyder & Swann 
(1978), asked subjects to rate how comfortable they 
would feel asking each question. Subjects consistently 
rated the introverted questions as being less easy to 
ask, which Cooper concluded was the reason that fewer 
introverted questions than extraverted questions are 
selected to be asked in all of these hypothesis testing 
experiments. This can be seen from a quick look at the 
list of questions; the extravert questions are about 
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events with connotations of positive affect like making 
friends and going to parties, but the introvert 
questions are about failures in social functioning, 
marked by feelings of lonliness, shyness and 
awkwardness in dealings with others. This would 
account for not only the fact that fewer introvert 
questions were asked overall, but could also account 
for the fact that so very few were asked in the 
extravert hypothesis condition. If subjects are asked 
to test for introversion they may feel that they have 
little choice but to ask at least some questions about 
introversion, but if they are told to test for 
extraversion they not may feel so compelled to ask 
those "less friendly" questions. There is, after all, 
strong evidence that the impression that the 
interviewers think that the targets will gain of them 
is a very powerful influence in the selection of 
questions (Snyder, Campbell & Preston, 1982). 
Hypothesis 3 also received some support. More 
neutral questions were asked in the two-profile 
condition than the one-profile condition. These 
neutral questions are probably the fairest and best 
sort of questions to ask to test between two competing 
hypotheses because they either allow a direct 
comparison between a feature of extraversion and a 
feature of introversion, or they allow the targets to 
choose their own "arena" for their answer. 
The 
debriefing of the subjects revealed one further tactic 
in asking questions that fell into this category; 
to 
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ask questions that would make the target talk, and in 
doing so their extraversion could be gauged from their 
mannerisms and style rather than the actual content of 
what they said. 
The implications for hypothesis-testing in social 
interaction. 
The conclusions drawn by Snyder that any hypothesis 
testing that takes place in social interaction would be 
doomed to automatic confirmation (Snyder & Swann, 1978; 
Snyder, 1981) now look even more unfounded. As well as 
the evidence amassed so far about the artificiality of 
choosing questions to ask before rather than during an 
interaction, and as well as the conceptual criticisms 
of some of Snyder's methodology, and as well as the 
demonstration that interviewers do not consider their 
hypotheses as having been confirmed, there is now clear 
evidence that the questions used in all of the previous 
studies were very different from those actually 
generated by individuals to test hypotheses anyway. It 
is difficult to imagine how the sorts of questions 
generated here could ever lead to self-confirming 
hypotheses; they would seem to give the targets 
complete freedom to answer in a manner indicative of 
their true personalities, and without constraining them 
into accepting false premises. 
One point of interest to emerge is the way in which 
the vast majority of subjects fully accepted the 
list 
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of questions they were given to chooose from in 
previous experiments, despite the fact that they would 
hardly ever generate that sort of question to ask 
themselves. It would be of interest to find out to 
what extent individuals are aware of the constraints 
that some types of questions can put on the respondant. 
This experiment seems to have highlighted what 
Cohen (1981) would call a "cognitive illusion". 
Subjects have been made to behave in a seemingly 
irrational way in the laboratory, but only because of 
the grossly artificial situation which the experiment 
has put them in. With a few moments' reflection, or 
with a little help, the subjects would realise that 
what they were doing was not rational and correct it. 
But, would there be any time when subjects would 
ask "biased" questions? One situation in which 
subjects might be induced to ask questions that already 
assume that a person is an introvert or an extravert is 
if they had a plausible reason to make that assumption. 
What would happen, then, if subjects did have a good a 
priori reason to believe that their hypothesis was 
likely to be true? This is the main empirical question 
set for the next experiment to investigate. 
Another unanswered and important question is how 
individuals phrase the hypotheses they set themselves. 
If subjects ask more neutral questions when given a 
hypothesis in terms of two competing alterna ives 
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rather than just one possibility, then it becomes 
important to know the exact form of the hypotheses 
individuals set themselves to test in their social 
lives. If they are of the form "I wonder whether the 
new member of staff is an extravert or an introvert*? ", 
rather than "I wonder whether the new member of staff 
is an extravert? " then there is even less reason to 
think that questioning strategy is going to be a 
function of the hypothesis under test. This point will 
be discussed again in more detail in chapter 9. 
Conclusions 
1/ When choosing their own questions to ask, 
individuals hardly ever choose biased questions. 
Instead they ask questions that both introverts and 
extraverts could answer equally well. 
2/ It is very difficult to see how the asking of 
these "fair" questions could lead to self-confirming 
hypotheses. This makes most of the generalisations 
from the experiments that have used Snyder & Swanns 
(1978) list of questions totally unwarranted. 
3/ There is a slight tendency for subjects to 
still draw upon features of the hypothesis that they 
are testing rather than its alternative in formulating 
questions to ask. While this could be called a very 
weak form of a confirmatorv bias it probably could 
not lead to interviewers confirming their hypotheses. 
Chapter 6. Discussion. page 197 
In any case, the majority of questions 
generated are of the neutral sortq which either 
contrast features of the hypothesis and features of the 
alternative or are completely open ended allowing the 
target to answer in an unconstrained waý. 
5/ When presented with personality profiles of 
both the typical person who would conform to the 
hypothesis and the person opposite to the hypothesis, 
subjects were even more likely to formulate neutral 
questions. This further weakens any predisposit, ion to 
think in terms of the hypothesis rather than t-he 
alternative. It is not known whether people naturaily 
think in terms of single hypotheses rather t-han 
competing pairs. The research to date has, týlt, fiout 
justification, always assumed that people think solely 
in terms of the hypothesis and not tlie -iLternatlve. if 
this is not the case it is yet another flaw in the 
self-confirming hypothesis paradigm. 
6/ The findinggs of this experiment, taken with the 
two previous experiments, make self-confirming 
hypotheses seem even less likely to occur in social 
interaction. 
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The next experiment is an attempt to find out if 
interviewers might use biased questions if they had 
good reason to believe that their hypotheses are most 
likely to be true. 
0 
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Introduction 
The last experiment showed that under normal 
conditions of hypothesis testing in social interaction, 
individuals do not generate questions that could bias 
targets into answering in a manner representative of 
introversion or extraversion. But are there any 
conditions in which interviewers might formulate 
"biased" questions of the type used by Snyder & Swann 
( 1978) ? 
One possible situation which may give rise to this 
would be if the hypothesis testers had reason to believe 
that the hypotheses they were testing was probably true. 
Under these circumstances individuals may perceive 
hypothesis testing as being a task which involves 
collecting a few more bits of evidence to become certain 
that the hypothesis is true, rather than an open-ended 
quest for information. 
Snyder & Swann manipulated the certainty of the 
hypothesis in two of their investigations, to see 
whether it affected the questioning strategies of 
the 
interviewers. In their first investigation they 
manipulated the alleged origin of the 
hypothesis. 
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) Subjects in the "Low Certainty" conditions were not 
given any information as to the origin of their 
hypotheses, in the same manner as in the three 
experiments described so far in this thesis. 
Conversely, subjects in the "High Certainty" condition 
were told that their hypotheses were derived from the 
results of a personality test taken by the target the 
previous week, and it was their task to see whether the 
results of the test were accurate by looking at the 
behaviour of the target herself. Pretests had shown 
that undergraduates had considerable faith in 
personality tests, so Snyder & Swann reported that they 
were confident that this was an effective and strong 
manipulation of the certainty of the hypothesis. 
Snyder & Swann reported that the "confirmatory 
bias" was unaffected by this manipulation. The 
interviewers were just as keen to use their questions to 
search for confirmation of their hypotheses regardless 
of whether they thought that the hypothesis was highly 
likely to be true or whether the hypothesis was merely a 
hypothetical premise (1978, investigation 1). 
The third investigation wentone stage further in 
attempting to encourage the subjects to reject their 
confirmatory strategies. In this experiment all of 
the 
subjects were instructed to test for extraversion, 
but 
some were given a compelling reason to 
believe that 
their hypotheses were probably true, and others were 
given a compelling reason to think that their 
hypotheses 
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would probably turn out to be false. This was done by 
telling the interviewers that the individual they were 
to interview was in a sorority of which all the members 
had been previously tested for extraversion. The 
interviewers in the "Many extraverts" condition were 
informed that the results had shown that 23 of the 30 
members were extraverts, so it was their task to find 
out whether the particular member they were to interview 
was one of those many extraverts. In the "Few 
extraverts" condition the interviewers were told that 
only seven of the 30 members of that particular sorority 
were extraverts, and their task was to find out whether 
the particular member they were to interview was one of 
those few extraverts. As before, a manipulation check 
ensured that subjects were fully aware of the 
implications of the instructions. 
Snyder & Swann (1978) concluded, from their 
analysis of the questions selected to test the 
hypotheses in these two conditions, that the strength 
of the "confirmatory bias" was unaffected by 
manipulating the certainty of the hypothesis. Even when 
subjects thought that the person they were to interview 
was unlikely to conform to the hypothesis, they still 
selected questions that searched for confirmation of 
that hypothesis. This analysis compared the number of 
extravert, introvert and neutral questions asked under 
the "few extravert" and "many extravert" conditions 
with "comparison conditions" constructed 
by adding tog- 
ether various sets of data from investigations 
1 and 2. 
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A re-analysis of Snyder & Swann's results 
Given the general inadvisability of comparing 
results from one experiment directly with results from 
other experiments, it is difficult to understand why 
they went to such lengths to analyse two groups of data. 
An analysis that would have been both simpler and more 
powerful could have been performed by three t-tests 
between the number of extravert, introvert and neutral 
questions asked in the "many extraverts" as opposed to 
the "few extraverts" conditions. This re-analysis 
reveals that significantly more extravert questions were 
selected for asking in the "many extraverts" condition 
(M=6.93) than in the "few extraverts" condition 
(M=6.07), t(28)=1.80, p<0.05, one tailed. There was 
a corresponding trend, just short of statistical 
significance, for more introvert questions to be chosen 
to test the extravert hypothesis under the "few 
extraverts" condition (M=3.87) compared to the "many 
extraverts" condition (M=3.00), t(28)=1.53, p<0.1, 
one tailed. Exactly the same number of neutral 
questions were selected in both conditions 
(Ms=2.07). 
An inspection of the data from th F condition of 
interest, where interviewers prepared to test a 
hypothesis that they thought was probably false, reveals 
that the behaviour of the interviewers still resembles 
the "extravert h. Ypothesis" questioning strategy much 
more closely than the strategy adopted 
to test the 
introvert hypothesis. The correct interpretation of the 
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results seems to be that while interviewers will still 
seek confirmation for a hypothesis they think is likely 
to be false, there is also evidence that this effect is 
weaker when there is a negative expectation. 
Question types and certainty of hypotheses 
In light of the results of the previous experiment, 
though, it seems as if Snyder & Swann's may have been 
looking in the wrong direction for the effects of 
certainty of the hypothesis. Instead of asking more or 
less of the same types of questions depending upon the 
certainty of the hypothesis, individuals may ask 
different types of questions depending on whether they 
consider the hypothesis more or less likely to be 
accurate. The results from the previous experiment 
demonstrated that when the interviewers had no 
compelling reason to suggest that the hypothesis was 
accurate, they ask only an exceedingly small proportion 
of "biased" questions. If one thing ; Is likely to make 
them generate questions that do make assumptions about 
the target, it may be if they were given information to 
lead them to believe that the hypothesis is probably 
true. They may then see their task of finding out 
exactly how much of an extravert the target is, instead 
of whether he or she is an extravert or an introvert. 
When distinguishing between levels of extraversion, the 
interviewer may well inadvertantly assume at least some 
degree of extraversion. This may be the foundation of 
self-confirming hypothesis in social interaction. 
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Examples of some of the biased questions used by 
Snyder & Swann (1978) will help to illustrate this 
point. In testing for introversion, instead of asking 
whether the target disliked loud parties, the 
interviewer may ask "What things do you dislike about 
loud parties? " if she has strong reason to believe that 
the target is an introvert. Similarly, if the 
interviewer thought that the target was very likely to 
be an extravert, she might be tempted to ask "What do 
you like about living in situations in which there are 
lots of people around? " instead of simply enquiring 
about preferences in living arrangements. Both of these 
questions (from Snyder & Swann's list) are of the sort 
that would make most people relate their introverted and 
extraverted behaviours respectively, regardless of their 
actual personality. 
This experiment is designed to look more closely at 
this possibility. If the theoretical analysis above is 
correct then one would expect more of the "biased 
introvert" or "biased extravert" questions to be 
selected to test hypotheses that have a high subjective 
probability of being true than when testing I 
hypotheses 
with no information to suggest that they are true. 
The present experiment also presents the 
opportunity to test several further hypotheses. 
Firstly, this experiment will act as a constructive 
replication of the findings of the previous experiment 
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that the proportion of biased questions selected to test 
hypotheses with no evidence to suggest that they are 
true will be very small. It can also be used as an 
opportunity to replicate the weak form of confirmatory 
bias found in the last experiment, whereby more 
introvert type questions are selected to test an 
introvert hypothesis than an extraverted hypothesis, and 
more extravert type questions are be selected to test 
extravert hypotheses than introvert hypotheses. This 
experiment will return to the methodology whereby the 
interviewers select questions from a list in preparing 
to test a hypothesis, rather than the form of the task 
in which the interviewers generate their own questions. 
It will then be possible to see whether any of the 
differences between the questions selected from a list 
in the experiments reported in Chapters 4 and 5 and 
those generateaby the subjects in the last chapter were 
simply artýfacts of the method of selection. 
Social Desirability 
A final test of interest was to see why, in all of 
the hypothesis testing experiments tested here and 
elsewhere, there are always more extravert_'questions 
asked than introvert questions. It 
is possible that the 
biased introvert questions from Snyder & Swann's 
list 
are more embarrassing to ask of strangers, particularly 
ones likely not to be introverts (this point was 
discussed in more detail in the previous chapter). 
Rater-judges will rank all of the questions on a scale 
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according to how comfortable they would be to ask of 
a stranger. Two hypotheses can be proposed from these 
scores. Firstly it is predicted that the judges will 
report that they would be less comfortable asking the 
biased introvert questions than any other category. 
Secondly it is predicted that there will be a positive 
correlation between a question's "comfortableness" 
rating and the number of times it is selected by the 
II "interviewers , 
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Subjects 
Twenty male and 20 female subjects volunteered to 
participate in this experiment. They were all attending 
an Open University summer school at the University of 
Warwick, studying either introductory Psychology or 
technology. 
A further 8 undergraduates and postgraduates from 
the University of Warwick were recruited to act as 
rater-judges. 
Materials. The Question list. 
This experiment required a list of questions for 
subjects to choose from, which had to be constructed. 
It contained 48 questions, eight from each of the 
following categories: - 
Biased Extravert 
Biased Introvert 
Extravert 
Introvert 
Neutral 
and 
irrelevent. 
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The questions for each of these categories were 
selected from the questions categorised by the judges in 
the previous experiment. The same rater-judges re- 
categorised the neutral questions to form a seperate 
category for any questions that they considered 
irrelevent to introversion-extraversion. All of the 
questions that the judges had not placed in the same 
categories were excluded, and eight of the remaining 
questions of each type were selected randomly. A check 
was made to eliminate any questions that were very 
similar in form and content to other questions. One of 
such pairs of questions was replaced with another 
question from the same category. The 48 questions were 
then put in a random order and presented on three typed 
A4 sheets, entitled "Questions used in Interviews". 
copy of this list is included in Appendix 7.1. 
Procedure. 
Whenthe subjects arrived at the laboratory they 
were told that this was an experiment on impression 
formation. They were given written instructions that 
A 
informed them that they were going to interview another 
person to determine whether they were an extravert 
(introvert). As in previous experiments they were told 
to select questions to ask from a list provided by the 
experimenter. They were also given the personality 
profile with the description of a typical extravert 
(introvert), and the list of 48 questions. They were 
told to read the personality profile and then study all 
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of the 48 questions carefully before selecting the 
questions to ask. A pretest had revealed that subjects 
found that selecting questions from the longer list was 
fairly difficult and time consuming, so the number of 
questions to be selected was reduced to eight. 
The certainty of the hypothesis was manipulated by 
the information given relating to the origin of the 
hypothesis. In the "hypothesis plus expectancy" 
condition, the interviewers were told that "a 
personality test taken by the person concluded that 
their characteristics were very similar to the 
description in the profile; we want you to see whether 
they actually come across like that when they meet 
someone. 11, 
In the "hypothesis onlv" condition interviewers 
were simply told " Your task is to find out how well the 
introvert profile describes the person you interview. ". 
In both conditions the rest of the instructions 
were similar to those given by Snyder & Swann (1978, 
investigation 1) to their subjects. 
The subjects were left alone to select their eight 
questions by ringing the numbers of those questions on 
the list. They were told to inform the experimenter 
when they had done this, so they could be introduced to 
the person they were to interview. The selection of the 
questions typically took about 10 to 15 minutes. After 
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this time the subjects were informed that, in fact, the 
interview was not going to take place but that it was 
the selection of the questions themselves which was 
focal point of the interview. The selection of the 
questions was discussed in detail with the subjects 
before the aims of the experiment were explained to 
them. The experimenter apologised for the deception 
used but explained why it was necessary, and the 
subjects were thanked for participating. 
the 
The design of the experiment was fully randomised 
with two factors and two levels to each factor, high vs 
low certainty of the hypothesis by introvert vs 
extravert hyothesis. There were ten subjects per cell, 
five males and five females. 
In addition to the main experimental procedure, one 
other measurement was included to aid in the interpret- 
ation of the results. The eight rater-judges were asked 
to read through the list of 48 questions, and rate each 
of the questions on "how comfortable you would feel 
asking that question to a person you had not met 
before? " They were to rate each question on a seven 
point scale from one "I would feel very uncomfortable 
indeed" to seven "I would not feel at all 
uncomfortable". They were carefully briefed by the 
experimenter before completing the task individually in 
their own time -- usually about 20 minutes to half an 
hour. 
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Results 
The analyses of the data were different for each of 
the hypotheses being tested, the only common element 
being that the number of questions asked from some or 
all of each of the six categories formed the dependent 
variables. 
For the reasons already discussed in chapter 6 
comparisons of the frequencies of each type of question 
asked with each other would be very difficult to 
interpret. This is because no attempt has been made to 
control for confounding variables including differences 
between the questions other than those directly relevant 
to the criteria of categorisation. For instance, some 
of the questions may happen to be more diagnostic or 
attractive for whatever reason -- no attempt has been 
made to control for this. However, the approximate 
frequency with which the various categories are selected 
will be of interest, given the exceedingly large 
disparity between frequencies found here compared to the 
last experiment. 
Are biased questions more likely to be asked in 
the hypothesis plus expectation conditions? 
The main hypothesis was that more biased questions 
would be asked to test the hypothesis when it was 
accompanied by a positive expectation. Evidence 
for 
this would be found by two planned t-tests, for the 
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biased extravert questions between the two levels of the 
certainty factor within the extravert hypothesis, and 
for the biased introvert questions within the introvert 
hypothesis. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 show the mean number of 
each type of question asked in each of the four cells. 
The t-test for the biased extravert questions provided 
support for the hypothesis with a difference in the 
means that was just significant. Subjects testing the 
extravert hypothesis selected more biased extravert 
questions to ask if they had some evidence that the 
hypothesis was probably true (M=2.4) compared to the 
subjects in the "hypothesis only" condition (M=1.4), 
t(18)=1.91, p<0.05, one tailed. The difference in 
the introvert questions was, however, in the opposite 
direction to that predicted. More biased introvert 
questions were asked when the subjects testing the 
introvert hypothesis had no reason to believe the 
hypothesis (M=0.9) than when they had some firm evidence 
supportive of the hypothesis (M=0.8)! Since one-tailed 
tests were planned and the difference was in the 
opposite direction to that predicted, no inferential 
test was employed but it can be seen that the difference 
between these means is, in fact, negligIble. 
Were open-ended questions 
prefered to biased ones? 
The second hypothesis was that the number of 
biased 
questions selected would be very small. 
This was not 
the case; The combined total of biased questions was 
an 
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average of 2.6 questions out of eight, or 32%. This was 
almost exactly the same number that would have been 
chosen if subjects were selecting by chance alone 
(33.3%), so it does not seem as if subjects were 
attempting to avoid bias in their questions. A goodness 
of fit chi-square test showed the high degree of 
closeness to this chance level, X2=0.3, df=l, p>0.8. 
A further surprise is that even the irrelevant 
questions were selected fairly frequently, 12% of all 
questions asked being from this category compared to a 
it chance guessing" figure of 16.7% (see Figure 7.2). 
One valid comparison that can be made is with the 
subjects in the last experiment who selected only 2.8% 
biased questions. A Chi-square test between these two 
experiments shows that the proportion of biased 
questions generated in the present experiment (32%) was 
clearly much higher than the proportion selected in the 
last experiment (28%), A2=104, df=l, p<0.001. The 
type of questions chosen is clearly very reactive to the 
method of selecting questions, that is whether they are 
chosen from a list or generated by the subjects. 
The "Confirmatory Bias" 
The third hypothesis was to see whether the 
questions selected conformed to the usual confirmatory 
bias. The prediction is that more biased extravert and 
open extravert questions would be asked 
to test the 
extravert hypothesis than the introvert 
hypothesis, and 
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more biased introvert and open introvert questions would 
be selected to test the introvert hypothesis than the 
extravert hypothesis. 
Not one of these four main effects proved 
significant (all Fs(1,36)<2.2, all ps>0.07, one 
tailed) but, as can be seen from Tables 7.1 to 7.4, they 
were all in the predicted direction. However, even when 
both categories of extravert questions and introvert 
questions respectively were added together to make two 
composite dependent variables, they were still nowhere 
near significant, both Fs(1,36)<1.9, both ps>0.1, one 
tailed. There were no significant effects for the 
neutral or irrelevant questions either (Tables 7.5 and 
7.6) . 
Social Desirability 
To check that there was consensus between the 
judges on their ratings of the "comfortableness" of the 
questions a form of Levi's (1974) "generalisability 
coefficient" was computed. This statistic gives an 
estimate of the amount of shared variance there would be 
in the scores of the questions used here and the scores 
expected if another group of eight rater-judges from the 
same population were to rank the same questions. The 
coefficient of 0.90 clearly demonstrates that the 
ratings are reliable. 
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The scores for the eight rater-judges were then 
averaged, and a one-way analysis of variance was 
computed to compare the social desirability of the six 
types of questions. This showed that there was a 
reliable difference between the six means, which are 
displayed in Figure 7.1, F(5,42)=6.01, p<0.001. 
Tukey's HSD test was employed to find which means were 
reliably different from the others. The biased 
introvert questions were found to be significantly less 
socially desirable than all of the other categories of 
questions (all p's<0.01), but there were no other 
differences (all p's>0.1). 
A significant correlation between the social 
desirability of the questions and the number of subjects 
that chose to ask that question (Spearman's Rho=0.28, 
p<0.05, one tailed) demoristrates that social 
desirability is Probably one of the influences on the 
questions asked. 
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Table 7.1. Mean Number of "Biased Extravert" 
questions selected (all ns=10) 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
Hypothesis 
Only 
Certainty of 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Plus 
Expectation 
1.4 1.8 
2.4 1.5 
1.4 1.7 
1.6 
2.0 
1.8 
Table 7.2. Mean Number of "Biased Introvert" 
questions selected (all--ns=10) 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
Hypothesis 
Only 
Certainty of 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Plus 
Expectation 
.7 .9 
.7 .8 
.7 .9 
.8 
.8 
.8 
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Table 7.3. Mean Number of "Extravert" 
questions selected (all ns=10) 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
Hypothesis 
Only 
Certainty of 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Plus 
Expectation 
1.5 .8 
1.2 1.2 
1.2 
1.4 1.0 
Table 7.4. Mean Number of "Introvert" 
questions selected (all ns=10) 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
Hypothesis 
Only 
Certainty of 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Plus 
Expectation 
1.7 1.8 
1.8 
1.3 1.8 
1.2 
1 
.2 
1.8 
1 
.3 
1.5 
Chapter 7. Tables. page 218 
Table 7.5. Mean Number of_"Neutral" 
questions selected (all ns=10) 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
Hypothesis 
Only 
Certainty of 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Plus 
Expectation 
2.0 1.6 2.3 
1.9 1.4 
1.8 1.9 
Table 7.6. Mean Number of "Irrelevant" 
1 
.7 
1.8 
questions selected (all ns=10) 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
Hypothesis 
Only 
Certainty of 
Hypothesis 
Hypothesis 
Plus 
Expectation 
1.0 1.3 
1 
.1 .9 
.8 
1.2 
1.0 
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Discussion 
Not one of the three main hypotheses tested in this 
experiment received clear support, but only the second 
hypothesis, regarding the proportion of biased questions 
asked, can be rejected unequivocally. 
Why were biased questions asked? 
Whereas subjects in the last experiment generated 
only a very small proportion of biased questions, the 
subjects in this experiment did not seem to avoid 
picking such questions from the list at all. The 
crucial difference between the two experimonts is the 
way in which the subjects selectad their questions; if 
they selected the questions from a list containing both 
open and biased quýýstions then they were quite prepared 
to solect both sorts of question with approximately 
equal frequency. If, however they generate their own 
questions to ask then the biased types of questions 
simply do not come to the subjects' minds. 
This phenomenon is looking even more like one of 
Cohen's "cognitive illusions" (1981). By giving people 
biased questions to ask, we are virtually "putting 
words into their mouths". Yet, although the concept of 
bias in questions is not readily appreciated by the 
subjects, it would seem as if they may become aware of 
it if they actually go ahead and ask questions. To 
support this, remember that some of the subjects who 
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were debriefed after asking their (biased) questions in 
the second experiment (ibid. ) mentioned how the 
questions were leading or biased. These subjects spoke 
as if they were not originally aware of the bias in the 
questions, but became aware of the constraints as they 
asked those questions. Further evidence comes from an 
(albeit unsystematic) closer look at the interviews 
themselves. Often the interviewers would re-phrase a 
question during or after asking it, as if it was only by 
verbalising the question that the notion of bias became 
apparent. This is a typical transcript of a question 
from the first experiment (Chapter 4, ibid): - 
Interviewer: In what situations do you (pause) 
I? Well, do you sometimes wish you could be more outgoing. 
Target: Mmm (pause) Yes, yes, sometimes I do I 
suppose, 
Interviewer: (interupts) In what situations? 
The interviewer has, while in the process of asking 
the question "In what situations do jrou wish you could 
be more outgoing? " changed the question so that it is 
asked in two stages; the first stage checks that the 
premise is founded, and the second utterance on the part 
of the interviewer follows on from this and asks the 
remaining part of the question. This modified style of 
asking the question was not at all unusual 
in the 
interactions. 
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Thus, while it is easy to fool individuals into 
presuming that these types of question are alright to 
ask in some artificial situations, it is highly unlikely 
that biased questions would ever be unwittingly used in 
everyday interactions. It is worth noting at this point 
that (as argued in Chapters 3 and 9 ibid) even the 
asking of biased questions need not necessarily lead to 
biases in person perception. Indeed, the experiment in 
Chapter 5 found that they did not. More importantly 
though, if the choice of questions is that reactive to 
the exact method of choosing, then imagine how different 
the qustions asked during everyday social interactions 
are likely to be from the questions written down or 
selected to ask in the laboratory! 
The Effect of Expectation 
The first hypothesis, that the frequency of 
selection of the biased type of questions would increase 
with the certainty of the hypothesis, has received only 
moderate support. Although there was a significant 
effect for the biased extravert questions to be asked 
more often in the expectancy plus extravert hypothesis 
cell than in the corresponding hy-pothesis-only cell, 
the evidence from the biased introvert questions was in 
the opposite direction. In testing this "effect of 
expectanc. v" hypothesis the possibility of a tvpe 
1 
error cannot be ruled out, particularly given 
that only 
one of two one-tailed hypotheses was significant at 
the 5% level, an occurrence with a probability of almost 
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10% (or one minus 19/20 squared)'. 
Why no "Confirmatory Bias"? 
The third hypothesis, searching for the all too 
familiar "confirmatory bias" did not receive any support 
from significarrt effects either. Although all of the 
relevant effects were in the predicted direction, they 
were very weak. One of the reasons ýý test. ýthis 
hypothesis was simply as a check on the experiment. The 
of confirmatory bias" in question selection has now been 
replicated so many times and without failure (from the 
present experimenter's experience at least), that its 
absence here must lead us to question this experiment. 
Is something going wrong here? 
The power of the present experiment certainly was 
not too low. Using an average of the sizes of effect 
found in previous experiments, (combined investigations 
1 and 2 from Snyder & Swann, 1978, and Chapter 5, ibid. ) 
the power of this experiment should have been in excess 
of 0.99 if alpha is set at 0.05 and with 40 subjects 
(Keppel, 1973, ch. 24). 
So, were there any other important differences 
between this experiment and previous ones? One crucial 
difference may have been in the population from which 
the subjects were drawn. The experiments 
discussed so 
far on hypothesis testing in social interaction 
have, 
without exceptiong used exclusively (or 
in chapter 6 
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ibid. , mostly) "normal" university undergraduates. Yet 
the subjects in this experiment were all Open University 
students. The Post-experimental debriefing session 
revealed that many of these individuals had experience 
of interviewing in a personnel selection context, so 
they may have used more sound criteria in their 
selection of questions. 
one study published recently is of direct relevance 
to this point. Sackett (1982) ran the now classic 
hypothesis testing paradigm using professional 
interviewers (Campus recruiters), and found that the 
hypothesis they were testing did not have any effect 
whatsoever on the types of questions asked. Experienced 
interviewers, he concludes, have well formed ideas about 
the types of questions that are useful in forming 
impressions of others in the interview situation, and 
are thus not likely to be affected to any great extent 
by the manipulation of the hypothesis. Other reasons 
could be that the interviewers are generally aware of 
the importance of an outgoing personality for many jobs, 
and thus automatically select questions to "confirm" 
this. It is interesting to note that in both Sackett's 
data and the data from this study, the ratio of biased 
extravert questions to biased introvert questions 
selected in all conditions is very high (2.4 :1 and 
2.3 
:1 respectively)v compared to the results 
from chapter 
(ibid. ) or the combined investigations 1 and 
2 from 
Snyder & Swann, (1978) (both 1.4 
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An explanation for this high ratio of biased 
extravert to biased introvert questions may be in the 
social desirability of the questions. As the data from 
the rater-judges demonstrated, it is probably no 
coincidence that the biased introvert questions were 
selected least frequently of all the questions, even 
when including the "irrelevant" category, and they 
were also considered to be the questions that one would 
feel most embarrassed to ask. Perhaps the more mature 
and experienced subjects were also more aware of the 
importance of making the interviewees feel at ease, and 
of retaining one's own poise as a skilled interviewer. 
If people with more experience of interviewing are 
less prone to the bias than others to whom the task is 
novel, then this might be an important but neglected 
consideration in the literature on shortcomings in human 
judgment. It is quite normal to use university under- 
graduates as subjects in the experiments then generalise 
the findings to some particular group such as interview- 
ers or educators. If, however, skills learned by those 
experts make them impervious to certain biases, then 
this technique for research may well be inadequate. 
The debriefing also revealed other sophisticated 
strategies that were being used by subjects in the 
selection of questions to ask. The results showed that 
the average number of "irrelevant" questions asked by 
each subject was one out of the eight. These questions, 
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for instance "What do you think of Margaret Thatcher9" 
or "What is your opinion of marriage? "g were initially 
included as filler items, and their consistent selection 
was rather surprising. During debriefing the experi- 
menter drew attention to these questions to see why they 
were selected. The subjects were readily able to defend 
their inclusion, usually by saying that either the 
question would make the target talk at length, thus 
revealing more about themselves, or by saying things 
like "It would be a good question to start with., to get 
the interview flowing". 
These kinds of subtleties to do with the finer 
points and "rituals" of social interaction can easily be 
missed if an oversimplistic approach is taken to the 
social sciences (Harre/, 1981). In our eagerness for the 
hard, mathematical rigor of the physical sciences we may 
miss the finer points that are so important in and 
characteristic of our everyday social lives. In the 
experimental social psychologist's endeavour to 
scrutinise social interactions in terms of information 
search and hypothesis testing, an important omission has 
cre pt in. In this paradigm social interaction is 
conceptualised as ahistorical in relation to individual 
lives, situation and cultural context, devOld of a 
dynamic develor, ýment over time with spontaneity, affect 
and a multiplicity of goals for both participants. The 
present paradigm represents social interaction as a poor 
shadow of reality. If simplification is the goal of 
science, the hypothesis testing paradigms (and perhaps 
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others in social cognition) have overdosed! 
Conclusions 
1/ There is some weak evidence to show that biased 
questions may be asked more frequently when testing a 
hypothesis with a positive expectancy rather than simply 
a hypothesis that is as likely to be right as it is 
wrong. 
2/ Contrary to the findings in the previous 
experiments, subjects chose biased questions with 
approximately the same frequen cy as other questions. 
It is concluded that the selection of questions is very 
reactive to the nature of the task, whether the 
questions are selected from a list or generated by the 
subject. Presumably the questions might be as 
different again if generated during social interactions. 
The "confirmatory bias" in the questions 
chosen was weak and not statistically significant. One 
possible reason for this may be that the subjects were 
not the normal university undergraduates but mature Open 
University students. Other experiments have also failed 
to replicate the confirmatory bias with people with 
interviewing experience. If the confirmatory bias only 
affects people without experience, this 
is yet another 
blow to Snyder's generalising of the laboratory effect 
to real situations. 
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4/ It was found that people felt less comfortable 
about asking the Biased Introvert questions than any 
other category of questions, and less comfortable 
questions are selected less frequently by the 
"interviewers". This can account for the reason why all 
of the experiments have found that biased extravert 
questions are selected more often than biased introvert 
questions. 
I This probability is arrived at by subtracting the probability of two 
non-significant results (19/20 squared) from 1, giving 0.0975. The assuiption of 
co3plete independence is satisfied here, because the comparason is between 
different subjects, those in the extravert hypothesis condition and those in the 
introvert hypothesis condition. 
A further possibility was looked into, that the effect could have partially been 
the function of an inappropriate parametric test on data that was, because of the 
very low means, not normally distributed or had unequal variances within 
different cells This is not the case, as was shown by a significant Mann-Whitney 
test on the same data, U: 18.8, n's: 10,10, p(O. 01, one-tailed. 
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Introduction 
The four experiments reported so far have been 
attempting to explore the way in which individuals test 
hypotheses about other people by asking them questions. 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, this is not the only way 
in which individuals may go about searching for 
information to test hypotheses. This chapter departs 
from the theme of the previous chapters and looks at. 
biases in the way individuals might test hypotheses but 
using information not gathered in social interaction. 
Another two possible mechanisms for testing hypotheses 
immediately spring to mind, testing hypotheses using 
information gathered by proxy or testing hypotheses 
using information already available in one's own memory. 
In the first of these possibilities individuals may 
gather information from third parties. If, for example, 
I want to know whether another researcher is a good 
person to work with, I could ask questions of her 
co-workers. This would be an exactly parallel situation 
to the one investigated so far in that individuals may 
seek information in such a way as to collect an 
unrepresentative pool of knowledge about the target, and 
I 
thus erroneously infer that the initial hypothesis was 
correct. 
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The second possibility is that we could already 
have a fair amount of information about the stimulus 
person stored in our memory, and simply try to remember 
information relevant to that hypothesis. Again, there 
is the possibilitY of biased recall leading to a 
predisposition to confirm hypotheses. For instance, say 
a collegue asked me "Do you think that the new Head of 
Department lacks confidence? " I might immediately have 
tryed to think of incidents in the past that confirmed 
the hypothesis. If, however, I had been asked to test 
the hypothesis that she was very sure of herself, I may 
have immediately tried to recall instances when she 
handled difficult situations with confidence, and again 
ended up concluding that the hypothesis was valid. 
Snyder & Cantor's Experiments 
The latter of these possible effectswas the topic 
of another of Snyder's long list of papers on hypothesis 
testing (Snyder & Cantor, 1979). Three experiments were 
reported in this paper, the first two being directly 
relevant here. These two experiments involved almost 
exactly the ame methodology, the second one filling 
some methodological and conceptual faults uncovered 
while conducting the first. For current purposes, 
though, they can be described together. 
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Subjects read a lengthy passage about a ficticious 
woman called Jane. The passage depicted her behaving in 
a variety of ways; sometimes she behaved in a character- 
istically introverted manner (eg. being shy and timid at 
the supermarket) and sometimes she behaved in a way 
typical of an extravert (eg. not hesitating to talk to 
strangers while out jogging). In order to simulate the 
time factor involved in most person perception tasks, 
there was then a gap of two days before the second part 
of the experiment. 
When they returned to the laboratory the subjects 
were told that Jane had applied for a job. In the 
Introvert hypothesis condition subjects were then told 
that the job that Jane had applied for was as a research 
librarian (a pretest had shown this to be perceived as a 
job highly suitable for an introvert). In the 
Extravert hypothesis condition the subjects were told 
that Jane had applied for a job as a real-estate sales- 
person (a job highly suitable for an extravert). Thumb- 
nail sketches were provided to enhance the stereotypes 
of people suitable for these jobs. 
They were then asked to try to remember and write 
down anything that would help them to use a six-point 
scale to indicate her suitability for that job. 
Finally, they were asked to rate her suitability for the 
two jobs, firstly the one that they were told she was 
applying for, then the other one. 
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There was also another, orthogonal, manipulation. 
Whereas some subjects were only told that Jane was 
simply applying for the job, others were told that she 
had been accepted for the job. 
There was also a control condition in which 
subjects read the passage, but were not given any 
hypotheses to test or information about jobs. They were 
to provide the standard by which recall in the other 
conditions could be judged. 
The results approximated to what Snyder & Cantor 
predicted. In both hypothesis conditions subjects 
reported more confirmatory incidents than hypothesis- 
disconfirming incidents. However, an (unpredicted) 
interaction between the hypothesis and the "Applied- 
Taken" factors showed that this effect was only 
reliable in the "Applied For" conditions, not the 
"Job Taken" condition. Comparisons with the control 
group showed that it was an increase in the reporting of 
hypothesis-consistent items that caused the "confirm- 
atory bias" effect, rather than a reduced reporting of 
hypothesis-disconfirming items. The authors tentatively 
explain the absence of confirmatory bias in the "Job 
Taken" condition as being caused by the subjects 
inferring that when she was offered the job that was 
already evidence enough of suitability for the post, and 
thus there was no need to seek further confirming 
evidence. 
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Subjects in all conditions then rated Jane as being 
better suited to the job that they had been told about 
initially rather than for the other job. 
In interpreting these results Snyder & Cantor draw 
an analogy between the human mind and an archive 
library. When testing a hypothesis we sort through the 
contents of this library, and assemble all the data 
collected in this manner that we deem to be relevant 
before proceeding to analyse thc-vx data. They claim to 
have shown that there is a tendQncy to preferentially 
retrieve information that is consistent with the 
hypothesis under test. 
They suggest several different mechanisms that may 
be responsible for this confirmatory bias. It may be 
because subjects believe that confirmatory information 
is more important than disconfirmatory information for a 
wide variety of tasks such as transmitting concepts 
(Hov-. land & Weiss, 1953), assessing covariation (Jenkins 
& Ward, 1965; Smedlund, 1963), evaluating propositions 
(Wason & Johnson-laird, 1972) or judging similarity 
(Tversky, 1977). 
Their findings lead them to conclude that 
individuals are prone to exactly the same confirmatory 
bias when testing hypotheses using "historical" data as 
when they collect "fresh" data (ie. Snyder & Swann, 
1978); hypotheses become self-confirming. 
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Using both the theoretical framework and empirical 
findings from this thesis so far, two major criticisms 
of this paper can be advanced. The first concerns the 
distinction between hypotheses and expectations, and the 
second deals with the artificiality of the experimental 
procedure. 
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Expectations and Hypotheses (revisited). 
It has already been argued in Chapter 2 that 
hypotheses and expectations are conceptually distinct, 
and that this distinction is critical i6 evaluating the 
rationality of subjects in hypothesis testing experi- 
ments. To recapitulate, a hypothesis is merely a 
proposition about a feature of the world to be tested. 
An expectation, by contrast, is a prediction about the 
state of the world that gives information about likely 
states or outcomes. Whereas the particular hypothesis a 
subject is given to test should not affect the subject's 
final judgment, it is correct for an expectation to have 
such an effect. However, in exactly the same way as in 
Swann's PhD thesis (which it was argued in chapters 2 
and 3, ibid, is a crucial link in Snyder & Swann's 
(1978) paper) Snyder & Cantor have completely confounded 
hypothesis testing and the effects of prior 
expectancies. 
Subjects in this experiment have clearly been given 
a hypothesis to test, to see whether their knowledge of 
Jane makes her suitable for a particular hypothesis. 
But as well as being given this hypothesis, they were 
also told that Jane had either applied for or been 
accepted for a particular job. This, it will be argued, 
not only gave the subjects some plausible reason to test 
their hypotheses (which was presumably the authors' 
intentions), but it also gave the subjects some real 
information about Jane -- that she was probably an 
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extravert to apply for the job of real estate person, or 
that she was probably an introvert to apply for the job 
of research librarian. To deny that this inference 
could be legitimately made is paramount to saying that 
the types of jobs people apply for are totally unrelated 
to their personal dispositions. Even an individual with 
the gloomiest view of the accuracy of peoples' 
self-perceptions or of careers advisory services would, 
surely, not go that far! Furthermore, if we infer that 
a person is extravert because they apply for certain 
types of jobs, it follows logically that they will 
probably be less suitable for other jobs that require an 
introvert's disposition. So, instead of proving that 
individuals are displaying a shortcoming in their 
inferential powers by automatically confirming any 
hypothesis given to them, Snyder & Cantor's subjects may 
have instead, demonstrated that individuals are able to 
integrate expectancies into the hypotheses they test in 
a normatively appropriate manner according to Bayes 
Theorem. The very fact of applying for a job probably 
means that one stands a fairly high chance of being 
suitable for it. If a true self-confirming hypothesis 
is to be proven, then different hypotheses must not be 
confounded with different expectations or prior odds. 
It is not being argued here that a confirmatory 
bias won't be found under these conditions, but simply 
that this crucial question is not answered by Snyder & 
Cantor's experiment. Indeed, the literature on long 
term memory structures suggests that several 
different 
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processes would account for a propensity to recall 
hypothesis-consistent information. 
For instance, a network model of memory would 
predict that once a certain type of incident had been 
specified, (eg. extravert type incidents) similar 
incidents will be easier to remember since those nodes 
of memory will already be activated (see, for example, 
Hastie et al, 1980 for an extensive account of how a 
knowledge of the mechanisms of memory allows a greater 
insight into the processes of person perception). Thus 
the specification of an extravert hypothesis will 
stimulate more extravert memories in the brain, and make 
them more likely to be reported and subsequently used in 
the inferential process. 
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The artificialitY Of the experiment. 
As well as demonstrating that an exact under- 
standing of the information available to a subject be 
fully understood in hypothesis testing experiments, the 
thesis so far has also shown that some of the effects 
that work under very artificial conditions do not 
replicate when the tasks given to subjects are more 
realistic. The loss of the "confirmatory bias" in the 
sorts of questions that are asked when they are selected 
during rather than before an interaction was but one of 
many examples of this (Chapter 4, ibid). It would, 
therefore, seem prudent to make the experimental 
conditions as close as possible to the situation that 
one is attempting to generalise to. 
The feature of Snyder & Cantor's experiment that is 
obviously most artificial is the presentation of 
information about Jane. While trying to simulate a 
store of knowledge that is built up over a long period 
of time and by many different types of experiences, 
Snyder & Cantor have simply presented subjects with a 
passage of information and asked them to read it. There 
is no evidence that recall from such a store of evidence 
is at all similar to a more naturally acquired set of 
information about a person. This point is similar to 
that made by Neisser when he states that "The 
sentences and brief 'stories' that are popular in 
research laboratories today are an improvement on the 
nonsense syllable, but they are far from representative 
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of what ordinary people remember and forget" (1982, 
p. 11). 
There is also strong empirical evidence that the 
knowledge built up from social interaction is quali- 
tatively different from anything that can be simulated 
from other methods of data presentation. For instance, 
Gorman, Clover & Doherty (1978) found little evidence 
that similar processes are involved when interviewing 
real people and in "interviews" of "paper people". 
It is hardly surprising , given the lengthy nature 
of the processes that occur in the formation of our 
memory about other people, that experimenters have tried 
to take short cuts in the testing of their theories. It 
would be prohibitive to suggest that all experiments 
like Snyder & Cantor"s should be performed with the 
stimulus material being presented over a period of, say, 
several years. Fortunately, though, such processes are 
occurring all of the time outside of the laboratory in 
our everyday social lives. All that needs to be done is 
to bring these ready-made archives of information into 
the laboratory, to study the information-retrieval 
processes. 
This is exactly what this present experiment is 
designed to do. The principle is quite simple -- 
subjects will be asked to test hypotheses about people 
that they have known for some time (stimulus individ- 
uals). Some will be asked to test the hypothesis 
that 
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the stimulus individual is an extravert, the other group 
will be asked to test the hypothesis that the stimulus 
individual is an introvert. After this hypothesis 
manipulation, the subjects will be asked to rate the 
stimulus individual on an extraversion-introversion 
scale. In addition, before the subjects make this 
rating of the stimulus individual, they will be asked to 
write down any particular memories that they have of the 
stimulus individual that they think relevant to testing 
the hypothesis. These memories will help to understand 
the recall and decision mechanisms that underlit the 
hypothesis testing processes. If, for instance, 
subjects report hypothesis-confirming and hypothesis- 
disconfirming evidence with equal frequency but then 
confirm their hypotheses, it could be inferred that the 
confirmatory bias occured at the information processing 
stage of the task. If, though, it is found that 
subjects preferentially report hypothesis-confirming 
data (as Snyder & Cantor found), then it can be inferred 
that the bias occumd at the data retrieval stage of the 
task. 
The choice of stimulus individual was the next 
problem. It seemed reasonable to assume 
that if these 
biases do occur, then they may be more 
likely to occur 
when testing hypotheses about individuals 
that one is 
only moderately familiar with. If 
the stimulus 
individual person is too well known to the 
hypothesis 
testers, they may have a "pre-processed" reaction 
to the 
hypothesis and not need to go through the 
hypothesised 
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retrieval and processing stages. It was assumed that 
chairpersons of university departments might be suitable 
in this respect. 
The following two hypotheses were made. Firstly, 
it was predicted that, in testing hypotheses about other 
people from memory, subjects would tend to report more 
hypothesis-consistent information than hypothesis- 
inconsistent information. Secondly, that they would 
rate the stimulus individual as being more extravert 
when testing the hypothesis that the stimulus individual 
is an extravert than when testing the hypothesis that 
the stimulus individual is an introvert (the introvert- 
extravert dimension was used again to make the results 
comparable with the previous experiments). 
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Method 
Subjects 
Fifty-two undergraduates from the University of 
Warwick volunteered to take part in this experiment. 
Thirty-two were from the department of Psychology and 
the remaining 20 from the School of Industrial and 
Business Studies (S. I. B. S. ). There were 12 and 15 males 
in the two groups respectively. 
Two rater-judges were employed, the experimenter 
and one other postgraduate psychology student. 
Procedure 
All of the experiment was conducted on a Nascom 3 
microcomputer, from the random allocation to groups 
through the giving of instructions to the administration 
of the EPI. Subjects received information from the 
Visual Display Unit (VDU) and responded using the 
keyboard or by writing down items on a pad of paper 
provided, as appropriate. The computer programme 
incorporated "error trapping" and other techniques to 
minimise the problems that a novice to computing might 
experience. The contact between the experimenter and 
the subjects before the experiment was thus limited to 
the brief introduction to the laboratory when the 
subject arrived thus minimising the possibility of 
experimenter effects (Rosenthal 1976). 
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Task 
Firstly, subjects were told that the experiment was 
designed to investigate how people form impressions of 
others. Next they were told that the person they were 
WW 
going to be asked to think about A the chairperson of 
their department. The computer programme then randomly 
allocated them to either the extravert hypothesis or 
the introvert hypothesis condition and substituted in 
the name of their respective head of department to the 
instructional text. 
In the extravert hypothesis condition the subjects 
were asked to decide how extraverted the stimulus 
individual was. They were then instructed to think in 
terms of concrete information about the way in which the 
stimulus individual actually thinks, feels and acts. 
Next they were presented with a description of a typical 
extravert to "help them decide how much of an extra- 
vert" the stimulus individual was (this was the same 
personality profile as used in chapters 4 to 7, ibid). 
The subjects were then told to write down from six 
to twelve facts about the stimulus individual that would 
help them decide whether he was an extravert. They were 
given two examples to help them: 
"(stimulus individual's name) is usually quiet if 
he doesn't know the people he is with. 
and 
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"(stimulus individual's name) is the sort of 
person who always talks to people on trains or in 
queues" 
When the subject had finished writing these items 
on the pad of paper provided, they rated the stimulus 
individual on ten 11-point (0-10) bipolar scales. These 
were the same scales as used in chapters 4 and 5, but 
scored in a different way because of their machine 
presentation. The scales were again summated to give a 
score between -50 and +50, higher scores indicating 
higher perceived extraversion. 
Finally the subjects filled in a version of 
Eysenck's Personality Inventory (EPI) that asked them 
about the stimulus individual's extraversion. The 
questions were changed from the second to the third 
person, for example "Does he like going out a lot? ". 
Scores on this scale could vary between 0 and 24, higher 
scores again indication higher perceived extraversion. 
This scale was used again because the results from 
chapters 4 and 5 showed it to be more effective at 
accounting for variance than the summated scales (a more 
conventional way of measuring ratings of others). 
The subjects were debriefed at length, and asked 
not to talk about it with other members of their 
department before all of the subjects had been run. 
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The task for the subjects in the introvert 
hypothesis condition was identical, except that the word 
introvert was substituted for the word extravert 
throughout the instructions, and a description of a 
typical introvert was given rather than a description of 
a typical extravert. 
Rater-judges 
Two judges independently read the examples written 
down by the subjects. Each statement was allocated to 
one of three previously agreed categories: - 
1/ Evidence of Extraversion 
2/ Evidence of Introversion 
and 
3/ Evidence irrelevant to introversion 
or extraversion 
(neutral). 
To remove the possibility of experimenter effects, 
the judges were kept naive as to the hypothesis 
conditions of the individual subjects. 
The number of questions in each of these three 
categories plus the two measures of perceived 
extraversion made five dependent variables in total. 
All were analysed using a2 (introverted hypothesis vs 
extraverted hypothesis) x2 (Dept. of Psychology Vs 
S. I. B. S. ) design. 
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T-I----l 4-- 
For the sake of simplicity the results will be 
divided up into two sectionsp firstly the incidents 
reported by the subjects and secondly the the subjects' 
final perceptions of the stimulus individuals on the 
and summated scales. 
The subjects' reported incidents 
The first stage in the analysis of the types of 
incidents that the subjects reported was to check that 
there was sufficient consensus between the two judged. 
It was found that the judges agreed on the categor- 
isation of 76% of the items. Cohen's Kappa was 
calculated to be 0.64, confirming that this was well 
above the level that would be expected from a chance- 
guessing model, p<0.001. The scores from the two 
judges were thus averaged to give one score for each 
subject on each of the three dependent measures, the 
numbers of extraverted, introverted and neutral 
incidents reported. Tables 8.1,8.2 and 8.3 show the 
mean numbers of extraverted, introverted and neutral 
incidents in the four cells of the 2 (introvert vs 
extravert hypotheses) X2 (Dept. of Psychology vs 
S. I. B. S. ) breakdown. 
These tables were analysed using three 2X2 
ANOVAs- This is different from the analysis performed 
by Snyder & Cantor, who treated introverted and 
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extraverted items as a repeated measure in the analysis 
of variance. Their method, however, makes the 
assumption that the number of items reported in each 
category were statistically independent, and an 
exploratory analysis of the present data showed that 
they were clearly dependent. 
More extravert statements were made in the 
extravert hypothesis condition (M=3.2) than in the 
introvert hypothesis condition (M=2.2), F(1947)1=3.87, 
p=0.026, one-tailed. 
Similarly, more introverted incidents were reported 
in the introvert hypothesis condition (M=1.9) than in 
the extravert hypothesis condition (M=1.1), F(1,4'1)= 
3.37, p=0.028, one-tailed. There were no significant 
effects for stimulus individuals or stimulus individual 
by hypothesis for either of the introvert or the 
extravert incidents. 
There was no significant difference between 
hypothesis conditions with respect to the neutral 
incidents. The only significant effect was between 
stimulus individuals, but this is difficult to interpret 
because it confounds department of undergraduates with 
stimulus individual. Anyhow, the effect is of no 
relevance to the purposes of this experiment. 
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The Subjects' final Perceptions 
of the stimulus individual. 
Tables 8.4 and 8.5 give the EPI and summated 
scales scores respectively of the subjects' final 
perceptions of the stimulus individuals. There were 
significant main effects for the hypothesis manipulation 
using both measures. The stimulus individuals were seen 
as more extraverted in the extravert hypothesis 
condition on the EPI (M=12.4) and the summated scales 
(M=14.1) than in the introverted hypothesis condition, 
JEOPLI (M=10.1) and Summated scales (M=7.8), EPI 
F(1,48)=3.41, p=0.035, and Summated scales 
F(1,48)=4.46, p=0.02, both one-tailed. 
The EPI did display a significant difference 
between stimulus persons, showing that the head of the 
Psychology department was perceived to be more 
extraverted than the head of S. I. B. S.. There were no 
other significant main effects or interactions. 
The proportion of variance accounted for by the 
hypothesis manipulation was also calculated using the 
procedure outlined by Vaughan and Corballis 
(1969). The 
W2 statistic was found to be 0.06 and 
0.04 for the 
summated scales and the EPI respectively, meaning 
that 
the hypothesis manipulation only accounted 
for 6% or 4% 
of the total variance in the subjects' perception 
of the 
stimulus individual. When compared 
to the variance 
found to be attributable to the targets' stable 
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disposition in Chapter 4 (between 26% and 42%), this 
effect is almost an order of magnitude smaller. So 
while the effect is statistically reliable, it may still 
not be an important process in person perception. 
1. The incidents reported by one subject were lost, thus the loss of one 
degree of freedom in these analyses. 
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Discussion 
The two hypotheses tested in this experiment 
received unequivocal support. When asked to test a 
hypothesis about an acquaintance, subjects reported more 
hypothesis-consistent data than hypothesis-inconsistent 
data. Following this, subjects were clearly biased by 
the hypothesis that they were testing when making 
judgements about the veracity of the hypotheses; 
subjects reported that the stimulus individual was more 
extravert when testing an extravert hypothesis rather 
than an introvert hypothesis. This confirmatory bias 
was apparent using both of the measures employed, the 
EPI and the Summated scales; not only did the subjects 
rate the stimulus individuals differently on bipolar 
adjective scales, but they also answered the EPI 
questions differently for them on a wide variety of 
topics (unfortunately, because the EPI scale was 
scored automatically by the computer, scores to 
individual questions are not available and thus it is 
not possible to determine exactly which particular 
questions were primarily responsible for this effect). 
At last a true self-confirming hypothesis seems to 
have been demonstrated, and without having to resort to 
obviously artificial experimental methods. 
Individuals 
have come to perceive others, previously 
known to them, 
to be consistent with a hypothesis that 
they were given 
to test - 
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Four points of interest come out of these findings; 
the possible mechanisms for the effect: a comparison 
with experimental findings from other research into the 
effects of hypothesis testing and expectations on recall 
from memory: an important statistical point to arise 
from the methodology used: and finally the relevence of 
the effect demonstrated here to everyday person 
perception. These points will be discussed in that 
order. 
The mechanisms for the effect. 
Before considering how and why the hypothesis 
manipulation caused a bias in memory recall or 
inferences from that recall, a reference to the accounts 
given by the subjects will be useful. Each subject was 
carefully debriefed, both before and after the 
experimental hypothesis was explained to them. One 
common sentiment expressed was that subjects thought 
themselves to be guessing, and they went to some length 
to point out that they considered some of their 
responses to be almost totally lacking in evidence to 
support them. In particular some subjects singled out 
questions from the EPI and said that from their 
limited knowledge of the stimulus individuals (mainly 
from watching them lecture), they had almost no way of 
knowing how to answer items such as "Would he do almost 
anything for a dare? " or "does he suddenly 
feel shy 
when he wants to talk to an attractive stranger? 
". if 
there had been a don't know response category it would 
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almost certainly have been used frequently. 
An examination of the incidents that the subjects 
had written down also showed that they often had 
difficulty in generating the six to twelve items 
requested. From behind the two-way mirror in the 
laboratory it could be seen that subjects were spending 
a long time on, and agonising over, this particular 
stage of the experiment. Talking with the subjects 
confirmed this. When asked about some of the incidents 
that subjects had reported, it was clear that they were 
almost pure guesses, often derived very obviously from 
the personality profiles that were presented. For 
instance, when one subject was asked why he had reported 
a particular item "I would expect him to enjoy a quiet 
drinklmeal with close friends rather than a boisterous 
party", the subject responded "I hardly know him -- I 
thought that was the sort of thing you wanted". This 
almost total and deliberate fabrication of evidence was 
only amarent for a very small minority of the subjects, 71- 
but it does highlight the problem of demand character- 
istics. This effect may be similar to the one noticed 
by Rush, Thomas & Lord (1977). They found that the 
validity of questionnaire responses is threatened when 
subjects have little real information to go on and use 
their "implicit theories" to provide plausible 
responses. 
In addition, it suggests a point that may be of 
theoretical interest. The subjects seemed to have even 
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more difficulty in reporting the specific evidence upon 
which their evidence was based than in making the 
personality judgmentsq suggesting that Snyder & Cantor's 
"archival library" (p. 331) model of memory may be a 
poor characterisation of the actual processes involved. 
Do we really select evidence, assimilate it, then make 
an inference in that order? 
There is some evidence that deciding first then 
rationalising why we decided that way is a better 
representation of human epistemic processes. Zajonc 
(1980) has argued that simple affective preferences can 
be made before any cognitive processing has occurred. 
While Zajonc's cognitive verses affective distinction 
may not be the same as Snyder & Cantor's "remember then 
decide" model, it does call into question any over- 
simplistic models of cognitive processes. Most models 
of memory suggest that concepts are stored hierarch- 
ically with specific behaviours nearer the bottom and 
generalised traits further up. If this is the case then 
individuals may be able to access the traits directly, 
without having to re-process the behaviours each time. 
The way the task was organised for the subjects may have 
forced them to use their inference in a manner different 
from their normal procedures. Other considerations of 
models of human memory may also be of assistance 
in 
trying to understand the hypothesis testing process. 
One such model is the network model. Human memory 
is hypothesised to consist of a network of inter- 
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connected nodes. The nodes represent concepts and the 
connections represent relationships between concepts. 
When an individual is exposed to a stimulus, concept 
nodes directly associated with that stimulus are 
activated. When nodes are activated, the excitation 
spreads to other nodes closely connected by the 
relational pathways. When enough excitation accumulates 
at these secondary nodes, they too become activated (see 
Chapter 3 in Wyer & Carlston (1979), for a detailed 
description of this model). One of the benefits of this 
model is that it leads to a number of specific 
hypotheses that can be tested. Many of these relate to 
ff priming effects", the effects of the inferences madefr, -, %-, 
an earlier stimulus on later information processing. 
This is caused by residual excitation making some nodes 
much more predisposed to becoming excited again. 
Of specific interest here is Wyer & Carlston's 
(1979) discussion of what happens when individuals are 
asked to decide whether a particular entity is a member 
of a given category. This is similar to the task facing 
subjects here as they attempt to decide whether their 
stimulus individual is a member of a category (ie. the 
category of extraverts or the category of introverts). 
By firstly activating one category (ie. the extravert or 
introvert hypothesis and associated personality profile) 
the concept nodes associated with that category will be 
activated. Some of this excitation may not have decayed 
completely when the entity is considered soon after- 
wards. Any nodes that are excited by the entity and 
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already posess some residual excitation are much more 
likely to attain their activity threshold, and thus 
become excited again. In other words, any concepts that 
may be linked to both the entity and the category are 
much more likely to be activated than entities linked to 
one but not the other. The first of these categories 
corresponds to hypothesis-confirming information, the 
second to hypothesis-disconfirming information. 
One fundamental difference between this mechanism 
and the one proposed by Snyder & Cantor is the level of 
control that the subject has over his or her own 
epistemic processes. Snyder & Cantor talk about these 
processes as being predominantly under the control of 
the individual, who occasionally, for whatever reason, 
displayýshortcomings in those processes. Wyer & 
Carls on's network model, by contrast, characterises the 
individual as being forever and inextricably handicapped 
by the very structure of his or her mind. If one long- 
term goal of this research is to know how to train 
people to think in a more rational manner then it is 
essential to understand the level at which the bias 
displayed in this experiment operates. 
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A comparison with other person memory experiments. 
There is a considerable socal psychological 
literature on the way in which individuals encode and 
retrieve information about others. This literature is 
full of apparently inconsistent and opposing findings. 
Before attempting to compare the present results with 
other findings, that literature will be reviewed, albeit 
very briefly. 
The typical experiment on encoding and recall 
biases is concerned with the effects of expectations of 
groups or individuals. Typically the information 
available to the subjects about the stimulus material is 
manipulated (eg by the use of stereotypes) so different 
groups of subjects have different expectations. To 
attempt to distinguish between biases arising during 
encoding from those occurring at the retrieval stage, 
the time at which the expectation is created is often 
also manipulated. If the expectation is created before 
the stimulus material is presented, then encoding and 
retrieval processes are both liable to be affected by 
it, but if the expectation is created between the 
presentation and recall stages of the experiment, then 
any biases found can only have occurred at the retrieval 
stage. 
Some studies have found evidence of bias at the 
recall stage. For instance Snyder & 
Uranowitz (1978) 
presented biographical material about a woman, 
then 
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later told the subjects that she was involved in either 
a hetýrosexual or homosexual relationship. On recall, 
the woman's past was 11 reconstructed" in line with the 
stereotypes of heterosexuals and homosexuals. Other 
research has only found such biases when the expectation 
was created before the presentation of the material, and 
thus concluded that expectations can only affect encod- 
ing, not recall (eg Rothbart, Evans & Fullero, 1979). 
Even the direction of the effect has not been entirely 
predictable -- Hastie & Kumar (1979) found that expect- 
ation-inconsistent information was more likely to be 
remembered than information consistent with the inform- 
ation. It seems as if the differences in the procedures 
employed by different experimenters could potentially be 
the causes of these inconsistencies. For instance, in 
some experiments the subjects were explicitly told that 
it was a memory task, whilst in others the subjects were 
prevented from attempting to memorise the stimulus 
material. The complexity of the material varied greatly 
between the experiments, as did the relati-,, -e frequency 
of the consistent and inconsistent items. In some 
experiments there was a gap of several days between the 
presentation and the recall stages, in others they 
followed each other almost immediately. Sometimes the 
stimulus material was presented at the level of traits, 
in others the it raw it behaviours were presented. Some 
experiments used a free recall procedure, others used 
specific or multi-choice questions. To datep the 
relative contributions of these factors can only 
be 
guessed at (Berman, Read & Kenny, 1983). 
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Given all of these complexities, it is impossible 
to say whether the results of this experiment are 
compatible with those from other studies. In addition 
to all of the differences between studies listed above, 
there is a further important way in which the experiment 
presented here is different from all of the others. In 
chapters 1 to 3 (ibid) it was argued that hypotheses 
and expectations were conceptually different, and the 
conclusions from a study of one cannot be generalised to 
the study of others. The same holds true for hypothesis 
testing from memory. The experiment presented here was 
concerned with the effects of hypotheses and not expect- 
ations, and therefore the mechanisms of information 
encoding, storage and retrival being studied could be 
very different from studies where expectancies are 
manipulated. It should come as no surprise, however, 
that the two types of experiment are often talked about 
interchangably (eg. see Berman, Read & Kenny, 1983). 
Another difference between the present experiment 
and those reported in the "person memory" literature 
involves the task of the subjects. In most of the 
person-memory experiments subjects were simply told to 
recall as much of the material that was presented as 
possible (a notable exception to this is Hamilton & 
Gifford, 1976). By contrastt the subjects in the 
experiment presented here not only had to remember as 
many details as possible, they were also required to 
assimilate the material and make inferences from it. 
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This may again require a different process; remembering 
an impression may be very different from remembering the 
reasons for that impression. 
While there have been no other experiments in the 
literature explicitly about hypothesis testing from 
memory, many of the questions that have been asked about 
the effects of expectations on memory could also 
profitably be asked of hypothesis testing. For 
instance, what happens if the hypothesis is given to a 
subject before the encoding of the memories? In some 
ways this would be a similar situation to the "hypo- 
thesis testing in social interaction" one, but without 
the opportunity to intervene and manipulate the target 
directly, only to interpret and encode the target's 
behaviour selectively. The cross-fertilisation could 
occur in the other direction too; most of the person- 
memory experiments would be much more realistic if they 
used a methodology more similar to the one in this 
experiment, with real people as the stimulus individuals 
rather than "paper people" or lists of traits and 
behaviours. 
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A statistical consideration. 
Before going on to discuss the generality of this 
finding, a weakness of the present design and other 
designs used in research on person perception will be 
discussed. 
One of the fundamental points about inferential 
statistics is that they allow the generalisation of the 
effects from the specific subjects used in the 
experiment to the population from which they were 
selected. In other words, the confirmatory bias 
demonstrated in this experiment dop5not just apply to the 
52 subjects who happen to have been selected to take 
I part, but it is possible to say that the effect would be 
the same with any similarly selected group of university 
undergraduates. 
Things are often more complicated than this in 
person perception because experimental trials often 
involve more than one subject (eg a perceiver and a 
target) rather than just one. This is best handled by 
treating both of the categories of subjects as a single 
random factor, as was done in the experiments in chap- 
ters 4 and 5 (ibid). This involves having a different 
pair of subjects for each trial, andq statistically 
speaking, is no different from the normal 
"single 
subject" design. Another situation often used 
in social 
psychological experiments is to have 
just one subject 
per trial, but to use deception to create 
the illusion 
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of another subject (as was done in chapters 6 and T, 
ibid). Again, this is straightforward, and needs no 
special statistical consideration; the actual and 
imaginary subject are both different for each trial, the 
imaginary subject only existing in the mind of the real 
subject. 
Problems arise, however, when the stimulus 
individual in these types of experiments is specified, 
as in Snyder & Cantor's experiment. While the subjects 
are a true random factor, the stimulus individual (Jane) 
is the same for all trials. This means that, while any 
significant effects can be generalised to all 
perceivers, they cannot be generalised to any other 
stimulus individual but the imaginary Jane (not even to 
other "paper people"). Whilst we can predict that, when 
testing the real estate salesperson hypothesis any 
subject would tend to remember more extraverted things 
about Jane, it is technically incorrect to infer 
anything about the situation when they test a hypothesis 
about any person except Jane. If we want to make this 
inference, it is not a statistical inference but instead 
we must fall back on our knowledge as psychologists and 
argue that the effect is not specific to any one 
stimulus individual, but will be the same for all 
stimulus individuals. Clearly in some situations we 
would not be prepared to generalise from one individual 
to the population, in other situations we might. 
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The experiment reported here is slightly more 
complex in as much as there are two stimulus individ- 
uals. Now it would be possible to treat both the 
perceivers and the stimulus individuals as random 
factors, instead of treating the stimulus as a fixed 
factor as was done here. 
The new error term for the F ratios would become 
the mean square of the interaction between the 
hypothesis factor and the stimulus individual factor. 
The problem with this is that it would cause a 
devastating loss of power. With only one degree of 
freedom for the error term, an effect would have to be 
enormous to be statisticallly significant. To overcome 
this problem the number of stimulus individuals would 
have to be increased, preferably to about the same as 
the number of subjects. 
Alternatively, the data could have been considered 
as two separate experiments. This, however, would not 
overcome the problem of generalising to the population 
of stimulus individuals, it would only have allowed 
inferences about the way Psychology and S. I. B. S. 
students test hypotheses about their respective heads of 
departments. 
A much neater solution to this problem would have 
been to have a different stimulus individual for each 
subject. When designing the experiment this solution 
was rejected for two reasons. Firstly, it would 
Chapter 8. Discussion. page 264 
probably have reduced the power of the experiment 
markedly because differences in "actual" extraversion of 
the stimulus individuals could not have been disen- 
tangled from the confirmatory effect, so would have had 
to be included in the error term. Secondly, it would 
have been difficult to instruct the subjects to choose 
stimulus individuals that were equally well known. 
Perhaps, though, with hindsight, this alternative 
solution would have been preferable. The subjects could 
have been asked to test hypotheses about, for instance, 
the head teachers at their school before they came to 
university. 
But let it not be forgotten that, while these 
reservations are being expressed, the methodology used 
here is still almost certainly better than in virtually 
all of the other person-memory experiments. What it 
comes down to is where we as psychologists feel most 
comfortable making generalisations. Is it better to 
generalise from a written description to real people 
(ie. Snyder & Candor, 1979)j or from descriptions like 
"Robert was rated highly on the trait friendly" to 
real people (ie. Berman, Read & Kenny, 1983), or from a 
series of trait descriptions and sentences to real 
people (ie. Hastie & Kumar, 1979) or from two real 
people to other real people? I think that most 
psychologists would agree that people are more similar 
to other people than imaginary profiles are to people. 
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Hypothesis testing in the real world. 
As well as the theoretical interest in a bias 
affecting the inferences we make about other people, the 
effect demonstrated here should have important 
implications for the real world. In this section the 
power and pervasiveness of the phenomenon will be 
discussed. Firstly, how powerful an effect is this 
confirmatory bias on testing hypotheses from memory? 
Power 
The w2 statistic showed that only four to six 
percent of the variance in perceived extraversion was 
attributable to the manipulation of the hypothesis 
(using the EPI and summated scales respectively). It 
is not possible to compare the present results directly 
with the data from the experiments in previous chapters, 
but as a yardstick remember the variance attributable to 
it genuine" differences in the extraversion of the targets 
when the EPI was used to divide them into two groups 
in chapter 4. In that experiment the target's 
extraversion accounted for 41% of variance in the 
interviewer's ratings using the EPI, or 25% using the 
summated scales. Thus the bias looks as if it may be of 
only theoretical interest being "drowned out" by other 
more important factors. But would the power of the 
effect be larger or smaller in more naturalistic 
situations? 
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Theories have been put forward to argue this both 
ways. On the one hand, it could be said that the 
subjects were trying to be "on their best behaviour" 
in the laboratory, when they knew that they were being 
studied. Prehaps in the real world hypotheses are 
tested in a more haphazard and less structured way, an 
environment where biases may flourish better than in the 
laboratory. 
On the other hand it could be argued that the 
laboratory situation has been set up with the express 
purpose of finding a confirmatory bias. The hypothesis 
was presented in such a way, with the personality 
profile and no mention of the alternative hypothesis, 
that should maximise any such bias. In addition the 
stimulus individuals were chosen to be of just the right eD 
familiarity with the subjects to create the right 
ambiguity for the effect to work. 
Clearly, more experiments are required to find the 
environmental facilitators of the effect, and to 
determine under what conditions it might be strong. 
Pervasiveness 
In the present study the experimental instructions 
lead the subjects through a hypothesis testing task. If 
the findings are to be of applied importance, then it is 
also important to know when individuals actually 
test 
hypotheses in this way. Perhaps the most straight- 
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forward occasion when this may occur is when someone 
asks our opinion of a third party. If I were to ask you 
"Do you think that John is an extravert? " or "Do you 
think that Jane would make a good research librarian? " 
then I am explicitly asking you to test a hypothesis. 
The other situation in which hypotheses may be 
tested is when we set ourselves hypotheses to test. For 
whatever reason, I may suddenly wonder whether a new 
friend is, in fact, rather shy, or I may wonder whether 
the fact that an old friend has not been in touch for a 
long time means that she does not like me any more. 
Which of these two situations is similar to the 
present experiment? The answer is probably that we do 
not know, but it could be argued that the experiment is 
different in important respects from both of these 
situations. Consider the latter example. When people 
set themselves hypotheses to test, how are they framed? 
Do people test hypotheses in the same way as in this 
experiment, or do they generate several alternative 
hypotheses and test between them? Perhaps when we ask 
ourselves questions they are in the form "Why hasn't 
Mary been in touch with me recently? Is it because she 
doesn't like me any more or because she is involved with 
a new boyfriend or is it because it is my turn to write 
to her? ". If hypothesis testing tasks were set in this 
way then the testing process may be different. 
There is 
little evidence in the literature on the way people set 
themselves hypotheses to test. In Chapter 6 (ibid), 
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though, it will be remembered that subjects, in testing 
hypotheses with their own questions, overwhelmingly 
asked questions that seemed to be testing between two 
hypotheses (eg. "Do you prefer reading books or talking 
to people? ") or that would provide a response useful for 
comparing between two hypotheses (eg. "What do you do in 
your spare time? "). If the questions that people 
spontaneously generate to ask other people are of the 
same sort that they generate to ask of themselves, then 
the process demonstrated in this experiment may be very 
different to the way in which people spontaneously test 
hypotheses themselves. Furthermore some evidence was 
also found in chapter 6 that presenting both sides of a 
hypothesis made subjects even more likely to search 
equally for both confirmatory and disconfirmatory 
evidence. 
And what of the other example of when we might test 
hypotheses, when someone askSus specific questions about 
another person? On the surface it seems much more 
likely that the processes involved there mirror the 
present experiment more closely. But asking questions 
of others is not a simple "question - process - 
respond" chain, particularly when the question is 
fairly complex (like here). It seems much more likely 
that these types of situation will involve dialogue, and 
(as was demonstrated in Chapter 4), dialogue can 
have a 
marked effect on information search and 
hypothesis 
testingg diverting individuals away from a confirmatory 
strategy. 
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The outcome of this discussion leads to the 
conclusion that we know little about the pervasiveness 
of the confirmatory bias. In fact it is possible that 
the hypothesis testing process that subjects went 
through in this experiment is unlike any process that 
they normally use, and therefore may tell us little 
about everyday person perception. Before firm 
conclusions can be made about when exactly the effect 
found in this experiment will bias people's perceptions 
of others it will be necessary to find out more about 
the way in which hypotheses are set and framed in their 
everyday lives. 
Conclusions 
1/ In this experiment individuals were asked to 
test hypotheses about individuals they already knew. It 
was found that they would tend to search for evidence 
supportive of the hypotheses and then conclude that 
their hypotheses had been confirmed. This seems to be a 
genuine bias in person perception, made all the more 
impressive by the use of real stimulus individuals and 
without the confounding of hypotheses and expectations 
that marred Snyder & Cantor's experiment. 
2/ Several possible criticism of the present 
experiment were considered. It seemed as 
if the demand 
characteristics placed on the subjects may 
have been 
partly responsible for the subject's responses. 
The 
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effect may also have been enhanced by the way in which 
the hypotheses were presented to the subjects. More 
research is needed to explore these factors. 
3/ The results of this experiment are compared to 
other findings in the person-memory literature. The 
present findings are comparable with the dominant models 
of memory, but there are so many inconsistencies in the 
findings from person-memory experiments that it is 
difficult to draw specific conclusions. Besides, this 
experiment was investigating the effects of hypotheses 
on recall, other experiments have been primarily 
concerned with expectations. 
4/ The various ways in which experiments involving 
pairs of subjects (eg perceivers and stimulus individ- 
uals) are handled statistically in Social 
Psychology 
were discussed. It was concluded that the best way to 
handle this is to treat both as random factors, and that 
this is most easily achieved by having a different 
stimulus individual for each perceiver. The technique 
of using just one (usually fictifious) stimulus person 
is the least satisfactory solution. The method used 
in 
this experiment of having a small number of real 
stimulus individuals, while not 
being perfect, probably 
provides a good balance between generalisability and 
power. 
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Further consideration of the relevence of these 
experimental findings, along with a discussion of wider 
issues such as rationality and normatively correct ways 
of testing hypotheses will follow in the next chapter. 
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Table 8.1. Mean Number of Extravert incidents 
reported 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
I B. S. 
Stimulus 
Individual 
Psychology 
M= 3.4 M= 2.1 
SD= 2.1 SD= 1.4 
n= 10 n 9 
M= 3.1 M 2.3 
SD= 2.0 SD= 1.9 
n= 16 n= 16 
3.2 2.2 
2.8 
2.7 
Table 8.2. Mean Number of Introvert incidents 
reported 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
I. B. S. 
Stimulus 
Individual 
Psychology 
M 0.6 M 1.6 
SD= 0.6 SD= 1.7 
n= 10 n= 9 
M= 1.4 M= 2.1 
SD= 1. SD= 1.7 
n= 16 n= 16 
1.9 
M 1.1 
1.8 
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Table 8.3. Mean Number of Neutral incidents 
reported 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
S. I. B. S. 
Stimulus 
Individual 
Psychology 
M= 3.2 M= 3.1 
SD= 1.7 SD= 1.7 
n= 10 n= 9 
M= 1.3 M= 1.7 
SD= 0.8 SD= 1.1 
n= 16 n= 16 
2.1 M=2.2 
3.2 
1.5 
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Table 8.4. EPI ratings of the two stimulus 
individuals 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
I. B. S. 
Stimulus 
Individual 
Psychology 
M= 12 M= 7.4 
SD= 2.9 SD= 3.4 
n= 10 n= 10 
M= 12.8 M= 12.7 
SD= 5.2 SD= 2.9 
n 16 n 16 
12.4 NJ = 10.1 
9.6 
M =12.8 
Table 8.5. Summated Scales ratings of the two 
stimulus individuals 
Hypothesis 
Extravert Introvert 
I. B. S. 
Stimulus 
Individual 
Psychology 
M 18.5 ýj 7.7 
SD= 6.6 SD= 11.4 
n= 10 n= 10 
M= 9.6 M= 7.9 
SD= 11.0 SD= 10.3 
n= 16 n= 16 
14.1 7 .8 
M =13.1 
8.8 
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Introduction 
Taken together, the picture of the testing of 
hypotheses painted by the five experiments presented in 
this thesis is very different to the one portrayed in 
the existing literature. In this chapter other 
literatures from Psychology that have a direct bearing 
on hypothesis testing in the social world will be 
considered. 
This will start with a consideration of works that 
explore the issue of diagnosticity and use a Bayesian 
framework to evaluate subjects' performance. Then the 
attribution research paradigm will be compared and 
contrasted to the hypothesis testing one. Following 
this the results obtained in this thesis will be 
considered in the light of the literature on 
rationality, and the issues of biases, errors and 
optimal performance will be considered. Then other 
experiments are suggested that would contribute to a 
continuing advancement of knowledge in the fields of 
hypothesis testing and of self-fulfilling prophecies and 
conclusions will be drawn, not only about the narrower 
issues considered in this thesis, but also the wider 
issues concerning the way in which research is conducted 
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and reported that led to such an erroneous understanding 
of hypothesis testing processes. It will be suggested 
that this paradigm may not be alone in having painted 
such too bleak a picture of human rationality, and that 
the methods of enquiry employed in much social cognition 
research needs to be reviewed. 
Bayesian Analyses and Diagnosticity in 
Hypothesis Testing. 
There is another set of experiments in the social 
cognition literature that, instead of being only 
concerned with a possible confirmation bias, is also 
concerned with the efficiency of information search. In 
searching for information with which to test hypotheses, 
some information will be better than others. That is, 
some information will allow the hypothesis tester to 
become much more knowledgable about the veracity of the 
hypothesis, whereas other information might be of little 
or no use in that respect. Take, for example, the 
following two questions "Do you prefer reading books or 
talking to people? " and "Do you prefer reading books or 
having a quiet night in watching television? ". In 
structure they are identical, giving the target a choice 
between two alternatives. In the information they are 
likely to yield pertinent to testing a hypothesis about 
extraversion, though, they are very different. The first 
of the questions is good because one would expect 
different answers from an extravert and an introvertt and 
therefore a preference for reading books can be taken as 
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evidence for introversion and a preference for meeting 
people can be taken as a evidence of extraversion. 
Judged by the same criteria the second is poor, because 
there is probably no difference between introverts and 
extraverts in their likely response to the question, and 
thus the inquirer is left no wiser about the target's 
personality after asking the question. In this respect 
the first question can be called diagnostic, and the 
second non-diagnostic. 
Several experiments have looked explicitly at the 
question of diagnosticity in information search behav- 
iour. One set of experiments that explicitly tested 
whether subjects were primarily concerned with 
confirming their hypotheses (as Snyder & Swann, 1978, 
found) or with obtaining diagnostic information was 
published in 1982 by Trope & Bassok. 
In a series of experiments Trope & Bassok's 
subjects were instructed to test the hypothesis that 
another person possessed certain personality traits, 
whether they were intuitive thinkers or analytic 
thinkers. Subjects were told that it is possible to tell 
which of these a person is from their handwriting. They 
were given a booklet that contained the results of a 
survey by graphologists of handwriting among these two 
personality types. The data wee broken down by eight 
different features of handwriting, such as variability in 
writing angle and margin. The proportion of individuals 
in the two groups with each particular feature was given 
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in a graphical form. For instance, a bar graph may ha%, e 
indicated that 20% of analytical thinkers showed 
variability in margin, compared to 78% of the intuiti,,, e 
thinkers. 
The data about each of the eight features of 
handwriting w-ari- presented in a seperate bar graph. Under 
each graph there was a rating scale on which the subjects 
indicated how interested they were in each bit of 
information, on an 11-point scale from "not at all 
interested" (0) to "very interested" (10). 
Two factors were manipulated orthogonally, the 
diagnosticity of the criteria and the probability of the 
feature being present under the hypothesis. If subjects 
follow a confirmatory hypothesis testing strategy, they 
would rate as interesting those features of handwriting 
that are most likely to be present under the hypothesis 
being present. If, however, subjects follow a diagnostic 
strategy, they will prefer those criteria where there is 
a large difference between the probability of the feature 
being present under the hypothesis compared to the 
alternative hypothesis (Trope & Bassok's definition of 
diagnosticity is, in fact, slightly more complicated than 
this, but the exact definition and formulae are not 
important to the present discussion). 
The results of the experiments demonstrate that, 
while there was a significant confirmation strategy, the 
effect was exceedingly small compared to the subjects' 
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preference for diagnostic information. 
In a follow-up to this study, Trope & Bassok (1983) 
used a question-selecting paradigm to demonstrate that 
diagnosticity is still the most important feature of a 
question, and again the preference for confirmatory 
information was found to be weak by comparason. In 
addition, they explored how the exact way in which a 
hypothesis is set affects the types of questions that are 
asked. They point out that in Snyder's hypothesis 
testing experiments, the hypotheses were always phrased 
in terms of what an extreme extravert or an extreme 
introvert is like. It is then ambiguous whether testing, 
say, the extravert hypothesis the task is to judge 
whether the target is an extreme extravert or not, or 
whether he or she is simply more of an extravert than an 
introvert. 
When Trope & Bassok set the task in terms of 
discriminating between intermediate positions rather than 
extremes, the confirmation bias disappeared. Not only 
was the diagnosticity of the questions a more important 
factor under all conditions, but subjects even showed 
that they were able to appreciate that different 
questions were more or less suitable depending on the 
hypothesis "boundary", that is whether they were testing 
between extreme extraverts and not extreme extraverts 
or between extraverts and introverts. An additional, 
welcome feature of their experiments was that they also 
varied the trait that they were using, and showed that 
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the effect replicated not only for the well-worn 
introversion-extraversion dimension but also on a 
polite-impolite scale. 
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Bayes Theorem 
Some other experiments have also drawn upon aspects 
of Bayes theorem as a normatively correct framework for 
hypothesis testing. To understand these experiments, 
though, it is neccesary to understand the theorem in 
more detail. It willp therefore, be described briefly 
before the contributions of these other experiments are 
evaluated. 
P% 
Bayes theorem is so named after the Revere 
,, 
A Thomas 
Bayes who first derived the formula and published it in 
1763. The formula shows how probabilities should be 
updated given new information. In its simplest 
formulation it can be expressed thus: 
P(H/D) P(D/H) 
P(R/D) P(D/ý) 
(A) 
P (H) 
p (R) 
(C) (B) 
where H is the hypothesis, and D is a new datum 
gained from an observation. R represents the the 
alternative hypothesis. P(H) means the probability of 
the hypothesis being true, and P(H/D) means the 
probability of H being true given that D is true. 
The three components. of the formula can be read as 
follows. C is the prior oddso the probability of the 
initial hypothesis being true divided by the probability 
of that hypothesis being false. B is the likelihood 
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ratio, the amount by which the the prior odds is 
updated given the new datum. A represents the poster- 
ior odds, the new, updated, odds of the hypothesis 
being true. In person perception experiments, the prior 
odds can often correspond to expectancies that a 
perceiver has about a target. The likelihood ratio 
would then correspond to the amount of updating of the 
hypothesis after new information is learned by, for 
instance, observing or asking questions of the target. 
When the preceiver is asked for his or her final 
evaluation of the target after the new information, this 
corresponds to the posterior odds. 
An example will show how the Bayesian formula 
should be used to modify probabilities. Imagine a woman 
moves into the house next to mine, and I want to know 
what her politics are, whether she votes Conservative or 
not. Before I collect any more information I may 
already be able to make an informed guess from what I 
know about her. If I knew that she was a self-employed 
businesswoman I might guess that the chances are, say, 
60% (or 0.6) that she votes Conservative (ie, P(H)=0.6, 
so P(fi)=0.4). The prior odds of her voting Conservative 
are thus 0.6/0.4=1.5. 
The next day I may be out in my garden, and 
have 
the opportunity to talk to her. It is soon after 
the 
Libyan raid, so I say over the fence 
"What do you think 
of the bombing of Libya then? ", knowing 
that 25% of 
Conservative voters were favourably disposed to 
it 
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compared to only 10% of the rest of the population. 
Suppose that she responds by showing her disappro-val of 
the raid. The likelihood ratio is now the chance of 
this datum (disagreeing with the raid) occuring under 
the hypothesis (75%) compared to the likelihood of it 
occurring under the alternative hypothesis (90%), 
0.75/0.9=0.83. Multiplying this by the prior odds, we 
get 1.5 X 0.83 = 1.25, the posterior odds. This means 
that my new best estimate is that the chance of her 
being a Conservative has dropped to 56% (0.56/0.44= 
1.25). This makes intuitive sense, she is less likely 
than before to be a Conservative, but not by all that 
much since Conservative voters were not that dissimilar 
to the rest of the population in respect to their view 
of the raid on Libya. If, instead, I asked her whether 
she thought that Mrs Thatcher was doing a good job 
(knowing that 90% of Conservative voters think she is 
compared to 10% of the rest, say) and the neighbour said 
no, then the chance of her being a Conservati,., -e voter 
would now drop from 60% to 14%, a much bigger fall. 
This represents the diagnosticity issue put forward 
by the Trope & Bassok nicely. The first of my questions 
was low on diagnosticity since my perception of the 
target was hardly different after collecting the 
information than before it. The second question was 
highly diagnostic because I learned a lot about the 
target, as displayed by the large change between the 
prior and posterior odds. In this respect the highly 
diagnostic questions are better than those with low 
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diagnosticity, and Trope & Bassok demonstrated that 
individuals prefer those questions likely to produce 
highly diagnostic answers. 
The results from the hypothesis testing in social 
interaction experiments reported in this thesis can also 
be interpreted as supporting the view that individuals 
are good intuitive Bayesians. 
It will be recalled that in the first two 
experiments the interviewers were quite accurate in 
their assessments of the targets' "actual" extraversion 
as measured by the w2 statistic, regardless of the 
hypothesis that they were testing. If they had been 
collecting information in an entirely undiagnostic 
manner, however, they would not have been able to assess 
it so accurately. 
The avoidance of "biased" questions and the 
preference for "neutral" questions found in chapter 6 is 
also suggestive of a correct Bayesian approach. 
"Neutral" questions, those that give the target free 
reign to answer in an manner indicative of their true 
personality, are probably the most diagnostiep whereas 
questions that constrain all targets to respond in a 
similar manner, like the "biased" questions, are the 
least diagnostic. 
But the debriefing of subjects in Chapter 7 
revealed that individuals may be much more subtle 
in 
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their approach than Trope & Bassok's experiments allowed 
for. The "Irrelevant" category of questions would 
presumably have been classified as completel3- undiag- 
nostic by Trope & Bassok (1983), but this would have 
completely ignored the richness of social interaction 
and the sophistication with which individuals might 
manipulate it. The strategies revealed in the choosing 
of questions, such as asking questions to "bring people 
out of their shell" or "put them on the spot" demon- 
strate that the optimal strategy in the social world is 
not necessarily the one that conforms to simple math- 
ematical rules. Trope & Bassok's modeling of social 
interaction processes (1982,1983) is even more removed 
from reality than Snyder & Swann's (1978) in this 
respect. 
In contrast to Trope & Bassok's and these experi- 
ments, others have demonstrated severe shortcomings in 
the layperson's use of information to update expect- 
ancies. For instance, Doherty, Mynatt, Tweney & Schiavo 
(1979) and Beyth-Marom and Fischhoff (in press) have 
found that, under some circumstances, subjects collect 
and utilise the wrong information to perform a proper 
Bayesian analysis, an effect they call pseudodiagnost- 
! city. More specifically, they found that, when 
subjects had to request information to assertain the 
likelihood ratio, they would first collect p(D/H) but 
then neglect to request P(D/R). In the example given 
above, this would be equivalent to asking the question 
about the raid on Lybia, knowing the proportion of 
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Conservatives who supported the action but being 
ignorant of the probability that a non-Conservative 
would support the action. Since the likelihood ratio 
cannot be calculated without P(D/R), the information 
that was collected is totally non-diagnostic, or 
useless. 
It is also possible to see the under-utilisation of 
base-rate information (eg. Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) as 
another deviation from normative, Bayesian principles; 
base rates are, after all, simply prior odds. 
The research comparing human performance to the 
principles of Bayes theorem seems to provide mixed 
conclusions. In some experiments the subjects conform 
well to the correct procedures as determined by the 
formula (eg. Trope & Bassok, 1982,1983), in other 
experiments the subjects are shown up as almost 
incapable of testing a hypothesis (Doherty et al, 1979). 
Why this discrepancy? 
While no conclusive answers to this question are 
available, a tentative suggestion can be proposed. 
It is apparent that sometimes only minor changes in the 
wording of questions can have significant effects on the 
subjects' judgments of the relevance of information. 
The way in which performance can be raised and lowered 
so simply with logically equivalent tasks is remenicent 
of another set of rules sometimes obeyed and somt--times 
contravened by individuals -- the if ... then propos- 
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ition. In that case ais-d the present, a normative model 
for thinkii-. a seems to be on the threshold of lay 
understC. nding. When presented in concrete terms (eg. 
Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Sonino Legrenzils, (19-12) 
deductive reasoning task with first and second class 
stamps or finding out about other people in social 
interaction as in this thesis) then subjects perform 
well. By contrast, when the problems are set in terms 
not familiar to the subjects (eg. Wason & Johnson- 
Laird's (1972) card-turning task or Doherty et al's 
(1979) characteristics of archaEýaogical finds from 
hypothetical islands) subjects perform badly as if they 
completely misunderstand the logic of the task. 
As well as generating new experiments to test 
different aspects of hypothesis testing, Bayes theorem 
can also be used to clarify our understanding of Snyder 
Swann's experiments. 
discussed next. 
Two aspects of this will be 
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What is a Confirmation Bias in 
information search? 
Snyder & Swann's principal conclusion from their 
experiments on hypothesis testing was that subjects ask 
questions that search for evidence supportive of the 
hypothesis under scrutiny. Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom 
(1983), however, point out that from a Bayesian 
perspective, it is far from clear exactly how this is 
possible by simply asking questions. 
According to Snyder & Swann, 21 of the 26 questions 
on their list were of the "biased" sort, which already 
assume that the target is either an introvert or an 
extravert. Since the subjects had to choose 12 
questions, they were forced to ask a majority of these 
unsuitable questions. Now consider what happens when a 
subject asks one of Snyder & Swann's b-iased extravert 
questions. The assumption is that when a question like 
"What would you do if you wanted to liven things up at 
a party" are asked, most individuals, regardless of 
their actual extraversion or introversion, will give 
similar answers, talking about behaviours typical of an 
extravert. If the answers of subjects are the same 
whether the hypothesis is true or false, then that is 
the same as saying that P(D/H) and P(D/TI) have the same 
value, making the likelihood ratio equal to 1. 
This is not to say that it would be impossible for 
the interviewers to conclude that their hypotheses had 
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been confirmed; rather, (as Fischhoff & Beyth-. Narom 
argue) it means that any bias that is present is 
occurring at the stage of data interpretation rather 
than data collection. Subjects may, for instance, ask 
questions where a particular response iS probable 
whether the hypothesis is true or false. If subjects 
then ignore or under-utilise the denominator in the 
likelihood ratio, P(D/9) (as was found in the 
pseudodiagnosticity studies) they may thus falsely 
infer that the hypothesis has been supported. Fischhoff 
& Beyth-Marom's point is that this is an error in 
information processing, not in information search. 
Since Snyder & Swann's interviewers were not asked 
to process the responses to their questions (see Chapter 
ibid) it is wrong of Snyder & Swann to conclude that 
a confirmation bias had occurred. Furthermore, if they 
had asked their interviewers to interpret the tagets' 
responses, the evidence from Chapter 5 (ibid) 
demonstrates that they probably would not have made any 
such error. 
Klayman & Ha (1986) also argue that the term 
"confirmation bias" has been misused in referring to 
phenomena like Snyder & Swann's question selection task. 
They argue that it is better described as a "positive 
test" strategy or heuristic, which is not necessarily 
dysfunctional as the term "bias" implies. They claim 
that in many situations it is a good heuristic to look 
for positive instances, but in the question-asking 
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situation it can lead to one important oversight -- that 
many questions that search for positive instances may be 
nondiagnostic, particularly when forced to choose from a 
list of biased questions. 
Hypotheses and Expectations 
Another issue that can be seen very clearly with 
Bayes' theorem is the distinction between hypotheses and 
expectations, and the normatively correct utilisation of 
expectancies in judgments. 
As described earlier, an expectation corresponds 
exactly with the prior odds in the formula. It is clear 
from the formula that the prior odds should have an 
effect on the posterior odds, except when the likeli- 
hood ratio is either zero or infinity, (that is, when a 
datum is conclusive proof of the truth or falsehood of 
the hypothesis, which rarely occurs in the ambiguous 
social world). So, the mere fact that in Snyder, Tanke 
& Berscheid's experiment (1977) or Swann's Ph. D. thesis 
(1978) the perceivers still held their expectations 
after the interactions is not in itself evidence of a 
bias in information processing. Whereas Swann refers to 
the use of initial impressions in the final judgment 
rather derogatively as "parroting back", it is in fact 
entirely consistent with the rules of logical inform- 
ation processing as decreed by Bayes' theorem -- not to 
do so would clearly be wrong. 
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What would constitute a bias is over- or under- 
utilisation of the prior odds. Unfortunately, though, 
it is rarely possible to put exact values on any of the 
terms in the formula when studying social interaction, 
because of the lack of objectivity in interpreting the 
exact meaning of social behaviour. The advantage of 
using other materials, such as the category membership 
data expressed in percentages in Doherty et al's (19-19) 
or Beyth-Marom & Fischhoff's (1982) studies is that it 
allows the correct answer to be specified exactly. In 
studies of truly social phenomena, the only time a 
deviation from the theorem can be proven is if subjects 
modify their beliefs or expectations in the wrong 
direction. For instance, Bayes' theorem dictates that 
any difference in prior odds between two perceivers 
should be moderated by the presentation of similar data. 
The easiest way, therefore, to demonstrate the 
existance of a bias is to show that different 
interpretations of similar data cause subjects' 
posterior odds to be more divergent than their prior 
odds. In Chapter one it was demonstrated that this has 
yet to be done. 
The hypothesis under scrutiny, by contrast, should 
not ;: ýffect the posterior odds (Burchell, 1984). The 
easiest way do demonstrate this is by seeing what 
happens when the hypothesis and the alternative 
hypothesis are interchanged. This is equivalent to 
testing the introvert hypothesis rather than the 
extravert hypothesis. The effect on the formula is to 
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swap H for H, which simply turns the whole hypothesis 
upside-down, but the formula retains exactly the same 
form, notably: 
P(H/D) P(D/H) P(H) 
P(H/D) P(D/H) P(H) 
It can also be seen from the formula how hypotheses 
can be tested even if their probability is very low -- 
for instance a routine cancer checkup on a healthy 
patient could be seen as a hypothesis test with a very 
low prior odds. 
It can be seen from these discussions that Bayes' 
theorem provides a clear framework for research into 
hypothesis testing. It is not being argued that great 
new insights can be gained from the theorem that cannot 
be argued from "common sense" (as was done in Chapters 
one to three), but it is being proposed that Bayes' 
theorem provides a convenient and concise way of 
formulating research into information search and 
hypothesis testing issues, and of interpreting the 
results obtained. This analysis suggests that if Snyder 
and his collegues had used a Bayesian framework to 
conceptualise the logic behind their experiment they 
would not have made so many errors in designing their 
experiments or in interpretating of their results. 
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Attribution Theory and the_ Testing of Hypotheses 
Since attribution theory is the dominant framework 
for research in person perception, it is perhaps 
surprising that it has all but been ignored in the 
information search and hypothesis testing literature. 
Why should this be? 
In this section differences in emphasis and focus 
between attribution theory and hyp esis testing will be 
discussed. Not only will this highlight differences 
between the two approaches but, more interestingly, it 
will allow some of the criticisms that have been 
levelled at attribution research to be addressed to the 
hypothesis testing literature. 
The similarities and differences between making 
attributions and testing Hypothes-s. 
Attribution research is primarily interested in the 
process by which behaviour is explained by the lay- 
person. The raw data is behaviour, and the explanations 
are usually in terms of personal dispositions (cf "from 
acts to dispositions... ", Jones & Davis, 1965). The 
hypothesis testing literature, is also concerned with 
the link between behaviour and dispositions. It takes 
as its starting point a task being given to the subject, 
who has to decide which behaviours should be recalled or 
sought to test the hypothesis as set (in terms of 
traits). Thus while attribution research is concerned 
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with why things happened, and hypothesis testing is 
concerned with the veracity of traits, which in turn can 
be seen as generalised causes of behaviours, Given this 
similarity between the two fields, it is all the more 
surprising that there has been so little cross- 
fertilisation of findings and ideas. 
From a functionalist perspective there is also a 
lot of similarity between the two fields. The primary 
aim of subjects when testing hypotheses and making 
attributions is seen as prediction and control in line 
with the "man as scientist" role. Furthermore, the 
maintainance of self-esteem has been studied in both 
attributional (eg Greenwald, 1980) and hypothesis 
testing (Swann & Hill, 1982b) terms, another possible 
goal of the two processes. 
Perhaps one of the biggest contrasts between the 
fields of attribution theory and the "judgement under 
uncertainty" literature (including hypothesis testing) 
was the competence attributed to the individual. Early 
attribution theory in particular (eg. Kelley, 1967) 
represented people as using elaborate statistical models 
to arrive at their judgements. By contrast in the 
classic research on judgement under uncertainty the 
subjects frequently show themselves as incapable of 
making even the simplest of decisions (T,., ersky & 
Kahneman, 1974; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Reading the two 
different accounts one might have even found it hard to 
believe the two camps of research were using the same 
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species in their experiments! 
This difference was probably caused by the early 
attribution researchers asking the question ''What do 
people do" and the judgement under uncertainty 
researchers asking "what do people do wrong3". More 
recently, however, there has been a convergence of the 
two fields as attribution theorists have become 
interested in biases in the attribution process which 
has lead to some very productive research (steming from 
Ross, 1977 and others). 
Criticisms of Attribution Theory ar)l. )Llf---d to 
hypothesis testing. 
While it beyond the scope of this thesis to present 
a comprehensive critical evaluation of attribution 
theory, there are several lessons that can be learned 
from past research within the attribution paradigm that 
can be constructively applied to the hypothesis testing 
paradigm. 
One of the major areas of uncertainty in the models 
of human thought proposed by attribution theories is 
when exactly individuals frame their thought processes 
in line with the classic attributional models (Eiser, 
1983). There is now an abundance of evidence from 
experiments that, when given the appropriate 
information to process, subjects integrate the 
information in a way that is byc%nA large consistent with 
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these models. For instance, McArthur (1972) gave 
subjects distiýtiveness, consensus and consistency 
information and asked them to explain an act in terms of 
the person, entity, circumstance or some combination of 
these three, which they, with some notable exceptions, 
managed to do. 
But, to demonstrate that individuals can use 
information in this way is completely different from 
demonstrating that people do use information in this way 
in their everyday lives. One of the problems that 
researchers have consistently found when trying to use 
the findings of attribution research in naturalistic or 
applied settings is that individuals only sometimes seem 
to spontaneously express their interpretation of events 
in the categories deemed suitable by attribution 
researchers. For instance Antaki (1982) found that 
ordinary language expla nations often bore little 
resemblanoe to the dependent measures in experiments 
such as McArthur's. Other research has found that 
individuals only give " Why" answers to questions in 
certain particular circumstances. For instance, Wong & 
Weiner (1981) studied spontaneous information search and 
explanations in a variety of contexts. They concluded 
that, while people do engage in attributional search 
without prompting, this tendency is greater 
in some 
situations than others, namely unexpected events or 
failures. It could even be argued in this case that, 
by 
asking subjects to find causes of events, 
Wong & 
Weiner had already suggested that "attributional" 
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information was to be sought rather than any other type 
of information (Eiser, 1983). 
The parallels of these criticisms with the 
hypothesis testing paradigm are clear. When do 
individuals spontaneously use social interactions to 
test hypotheses? When they do test hypotheses in social 
interactions, how do they frame those hypotheses? There 
has been hardly any attempt to address either of these 
questions to date. The only exception is a brief 
discussion on the pervasiveness of hypothesis testing in 
an article by Snyder & Gangestad (1981). They point out 
that the notion of man as hypothesis tester has been 
prevalent in many areas of psychology such as cognition 
and perception. Furthermore, Snyder & Gangestad draw 
upon the arguments of philosophers of science who have 
argued strongly that all thinking must be guided and 
preceeded by hypotheses, that "blind induction" is not 
possible. 
Even if this is true, the questions of what sort of 
hypotheses and how those hypotheses are selected to test 
remain. It has already been argued in Chapter 8 that 
hypothesis testing from memory may not necessarily be 
framed in the same way as Snyder & Cantor (1979) assumed 
that it was. The arguments are, if anything, even more 
forceful when hypothesis testing in social interaction 
is considered. 
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Throughout all of his work on hypothesis testing 
Snyder assumes one model of the philosophy of science, 
and infers that lay epistomology works on the same 
principles. His model is similar (though not identical) 
to Popper's falsificationist view. Snyder assumes that 
individuals should hold one hypothesis and test it by 
seeking both evidence that is supportive of the 
hypothesis and evidence that is inconsistent with the 
hypothesis. Presumably, were this hypothesis to be 
rejected, the individual can then find another 
hypothesis to test, and so on. Thus unlike Popper, 
Snyder does not see falsification as the main aim of 
hypothesis testing. In fact, Snyder never makes it 
explicit what strategy a subject should use, except to 
point out that verificationist, falsificationist and 
"equal opportunities" strategies could all lead to 
errors. 
Snyder never makes it clear why individuals might 
use this "single hypothesis" approach in their quest for 
knowledge. In tapping lay epistemological processes, 
Popper's prescription for science is probably a poor 
starting place. In considering the falsification 
strategy, Popper was not describing the "natural" way to 
go about testing hypotheses, but rather advocating a 
method that scientists should use, and saying that the 
progress of science has been hampered in the past by the 
failure on the part of scientists to clearly articulate 
their theories before testing them. There is clearly no 
justification for Snyder's implicit assumption that what 
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scientists should do is what lay people do do. 
This is an important point. If subjects are being 
put through a wholly artificial procedure in following 
the experimental task, then the findings of those 
experiments, while possibly of theoretical interest, 
have no direct implications for the real world, making 
all of the applications of Snyder & Swann's research by 
themselves and others completely unfounded and 
misleading. 
How else, then, might individuals frame hypotheses? 
There is no direct evidence that allows an answer to 
this question, but it is quite plaus; ble that there are 
completely different ways in which individuals might use 
hypotheses to structure their thinking. One possibility 
is that individuals start their thinking process by 
generating multiple hypotheses, and then collecting 
evidence that eliminates these hypotheses successively, 
and perhaps suggesting others, until they are left with 
only one. This process was proposed as a model of the 
tv efficient" sciences based on historical observation 
rather than on logical grounds by Platt in 1964, who 
called it "strong inference". Why, then, did Snyder 
use this particular model of hypothesis testing without 
questioning its suitability as a model of processes in 
the social world? The answer to this question can 
perhaps be found in the early cognitive experiments on 
hypothesis testing. It will be argued, however, that 
hyopthesis testing in the physical world and hypothesis 
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testing in the social world are sufficiently different 
as to make any direct inferences from one process to the 
other of dubious credibility. 
This "multiple hypothesis" approach as a model of 
human thought is inconsistent with the findings of early 
cognitive experiments on hypothesis testing. For 
instance, the hypothesis testing task in which subjects 
had to discover the rule governing the series of numbers 
starting with 2,4,6 ... led Wason (1960) to conclude 
that the failure to be able to eliminate old hypotheses 
and move on to new ones was a severe shortcoming in 
human cognition. 
In a later study Mynatt, Doherty & Tweney (191-7) 
did find some evidence that at least some subjects could 
use a multiple hypothesis strategy as suggested by 
Platt. In this experiment subjects were put into a 
computer-simulated research environment where they were 
instructed to discover the rules governing that 
environment. Mynatt et al deduced from their subjects' 
responses during the task that only about half of the 
subjects seemed to formulate alternative hypotheses. 
Furthermore, the way in which the hypothesis or 
hypotheses were framed was important in determining the 
success of the subjects on the task; subjects who 
started with hypotheses that at least mentioned the 
important variables were much more likely to be 
successful in their task than the others whose initial 
hypothesis was totally incorrect. Thus these two 
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studies both concluded that human hypothesis testing was 
characterised by a failure to reject old hypotheses and 
to move onto new ones; instead subjects kept trying to 
find new evidence for their existing hypotheses. 
There may, however, be an important difference 
between the types of hypotheses in these experiments 
dealing with the asocial material and the types of 
hypotheses tested about other people. In trying to 
discover the laws governing a physical environment there 
are a very large number of possible hypotheses that have 
to be processed. The problem is not so much in testing 
the accuracy of a hypothesis once specified, but rather 
in the generating of the correct hypothesis. It is thus 
a creative task, to generate better hypotheses than the 
ones rejected. It was not unusual for subjects in 
Wason's task to know that their current hypothesis was 
wrong, but be unable to think of a better one to replace 
it. Similarly, in scientific research often the faults, 
shortcomings and inaccuracies of a current theory r--e- 
known long before a better one is proposed to dislodge 
it. 
The nature of hypothesis testing in Snyder's social 
interaction experiments is very differentý-omthis. The 
number of hypotheses is very limited -- either the 
target is or is not an extravert. The task involves 
evaluating a given specific hypothesisq not going 
through a series of hypothesis generation and rejection 
stages to eventually arrive at the correct answer. 
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This all points to the fact that Snyder's 
characterisation of the way in which individuals test 
hypotheses about each other may be totally different 
from any actual naturally occuring hypothesis testing 
processes. Individuals may, for example frame their 
hypotheses in terms of competing hypotheses, such as "I 
wonder whether he is an extravert or an introvert? ". 
While this is only a speculation, it is no less 
plausible than Snyder's speculation which, it is argued, 
not only draws invalid parallels between social and 
asocial hypothesis testing, but also misrepresents the 
possible ways in which hypotheses may be tested in the 
physical world. Furthermore, there is evidence in an 
unpublished paper that when hypotheses are presented in 
this "equal opportunity" way the "confirmation bias" 
is eliminated (Cooper, 1982). 
A further consideration about the way in which 
individuals test hypotheses in the social world concerns 
the genesis of those hypotheses. In Snyder's discuss- 
ions of the relevance of hypothesis testing to everyday 
social interactions he gives examples of situations 
in 
which individuals might test hypotheses (these are 
described in more detail in Chapter 2, ibid). Most of 
his examples take the form of a perceiver receiving some 
new expectation upon which he or she 
forms an impression 
of another individual, and then proceeds to test 
this 
expectation as a hypothesis. For instance 
I may hear 
that a new lecturer is an extravert, so test 
for 
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e'x-traversion when I next meet her. This type of process 
has one main weakness. It again confounds hypotheses 
and expectations, and ignores the fact that people may 
test hypotheses with low prior odds. This is partic- 
ularly odd since Snyder demonstrated that not only are 
people capable of testing hypotheses with low prior 
odds, but also that they still look for confirmation 
under those circumstances (Snyder & Swann, 19-78, 
investigation 3). 
A second situation in which hypothesis testing may 
take place is when, for some reason, there is a new need 
to know certain information. For instance, if I were to 
consider going on holiday with an old friend, I may 
think that the last person I would like to go on holiday 
with would be someone who is not good at meeting new 
people. I may therefore decide that I have to test the 
hypothesis that this new friend is good at meeting new 
people. In this situation, the circumstance has brought 
about the need to test a hypothesis. 
But both of these situations are ones that 
attribution theory (eg Kelley, 1972) suggests would 
elicit very different processes to Snyder's question 
asking. Is it possible that there is some chance of a 
reconciliation here? 
Kelley postulates that different attributional 
processes will occur depending upon the amount of 
information about the target available to the perceiver. 
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If the perceiver has a lot of information readily 
available, he or she will use Kelley's ANOVA model. By 
contrast, if perceivers are working from limited data, 
they will use causal schemata. These are theories that 
individuals hold about the likely causes of particuiar 
events. I may, for instance, have several causal 
schemata to account for students failing exams, such as 
lack of effort, general lack of ability, poor exam 
technique, etc. Instead of a full inducti,., -ist search 
for all of the possible causes of the event when a 
student fails an exam using Kelley's consensus, 
distinctiveness and consistency information, I may 
simply test - w4ýA WIT limited range of likely 
causes. Shaklee & Fischhoff (1982) looked at the 
situation in which subjects had to test between several 
different potential causes of an event. For instance, 
they were told "Tim advertised for a room-mate to share 
his apartment" and were given three possible causes, 
financial, lo 1 ness or fear of crime. Shaklee & 
Fischhoff found, when given the opportunity to find out 
more information to determine the cause(s), that 
subjects would spend much more time looking for further 
details about a cause that they thought more probable. 
For instance, in the example above, if they were told 
that Tim's scholarship had been cut, they would be more 
likely to ask for further informtion about his rent but 
if they were told that his long-term relationship had 
recently broken up they would search for more 
information about his possible Ion iness. 
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Shaklee & Fischhoff also found that the subjects 
search patterns were of the "limited truncated" type. 
Thus, instead of simultaneously exploring all possible 
causes they would concentrate on them one at a time, and 
finish when they had satisfied themselves that they had 
found a sufficient cause, even if they had not fully 
explored all the other possible causes. This process, 
they argued, could cause individuals to erroneously 
conclude the expected causes were the only causes of an 
act, even when there may be other necessary or 
contributory causes as well. 
The strengths of this type of hypothesis testing 
paradigm over Snyder's is that it integrates well into 
the rest of the person perception literature, whereas it 
is difficult to fit Snyder's account into either the 
rest of the person perception literature , or the 
unconstrained natural environment. 
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Attribution Theory and "Mindlessness". 
Another criticism of attribution theory focuses on 
the way in which it assumes that indi-viduals invest a 
lot of cognitive effort into the processing of 
information. Langer (1978) argued that everyday actions 
are often not as well thought out and planned as 
attribution theory assumes. 
To support this assertion, Langer conducted several 
experiments to show that people were not processing the 
information content of messages so much as simply react- 
ing to their structure. For instance, she demonstrated 
that important changes to the content of a message (eg a 
legitimate or illegitimate request to jump a queue) did 
not effect compliance with the request, but the addition 
of completely redundant information (eg. explaining that 
one needs to make copies, when in a queue for a photo- 
copier) could affect compliance. Langer argues that 
individuals simply do not have enough processing power 
to utilise the models of thought proposed by attribution 
theory. Instead, they probably follow "scripts" 
(Abelson, 1976) for most of their well-learned social 
environments. While there have been criticisms of 
Langer's empirical methods and the generality of her 
conclusions, (Harris & Harvey, 1981) there 
is still a 
lot of validity in her warning not to presume 
too much 
mental activity in people's everyday 
lives. 
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The same criticisms are equally appropriate to 
experiments on hypothesis testing. According to 
Snyder's accounts of the hypothesis testing process 
several stageS of carefully planned thought are 
involved. Firstly individuals have to formulate a 
hypothesis, then they have to generate questions to test 
that hypothesis, before even interacting with the 
target. It is perhaps more plausible that the stages of 
finding out specific things about other people are 
rather more "mindless" than this. 
Like the previous point about the way in which 
hypotheses are framed, it is very difficult to discover 
the cognitive processes that occur in everyday 
interaction, yet social cognition researchers seem to 
make such assumptions implicitly all the time. Because 
they are assumptions they are often above the level of 
testable propositions, and thus can be very enduring. 
The danger is that the processes being studied in social 
cognition bear little relationship to the processes that 
occur in our everyday social lives. 
Hopefully the findings of the experiments in this 
thesis have shown how unrealistic and misleading some of 
Snyder & Swann's (1978) assumptions were, but even in 
the experiments presented here the hypothesis testing 
process may be much more explicit than the everyda-. v 
occurrences that they are trying to emulate. 
0 
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The Rationality Issue. 
So far in this thesis some of the main points about 
the rationality of the subjects in experiments and of 
possible strategies for hypothesis testing have been 
deliberately side-stepped. Far from being the simple 
issue that it first appears to be, such words as 
"irrational" and "biased" have become the topic of 
debates, and often heated debates at that (eg. see 
Cohen, 1981, including peer commentaries). Several key 
arguments from the literature on human rationality and 
Snyder's own arguments concerning biases and errors will 
both be reviewed before attempting to draw conclusions 
about "rational strategies" for hypothesis testing. 
Abelson (1976) argues that social psychology's 
cautious use of the term "irrational" can be traced back 
to the studies of authoritarianism in the 1950's. To 
call a system of values, beliefs and goals irrational 
can take the "objectivity" away from ýocial 
Psychology, 
and open them to the accusation of political bias. 
The use of the term "rational" in that sense is 
very different, though, from the normal use of the term 
in social cognition. In that example, to say that 
someone is irrational is to mean that their picture of 
reality is distorted. While it may often 
be tempting to 
label people with deviant political or religous views as 
irrational, there we are referring to the assumptions 
upon which their reasoning is based, not 
the actual 
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reasoning itself. The type of rationality that is 
relevant to social cognition is concerned with processes 
of thought, not with beliefs. 
Baron (1985) makes a similar point, but put rather 
differently, by saying that rationality can be consider- 
ed hierarchically. At the highest level is the choice 
of a rational life plan, taking into account personal 
and moral interests. Below this level there are medium 
level policies that individuals choose, and at the 
lowest level are individual decisions. The upper levels 
of the hierarchy determine the goals and utilities of 
the lower levels, but otherwise the processes involved 
are very different. According to this model it is only 
the lower levels of the hierarchy that are the concern 
of this thesis. 
It has been pointed out that psychology's model of 
man varies greatly over time with the amount of 
rationality ascribed to it. Sometimes man is portrayed 
as being capable of even very complex logical and 
statistical deductions and inferences (egg. Peterson & 
Beech, 1967). At other times man has been seen as 
statistically and logically incompetent, unable to judge 
the simplest of probabilities or test the most straight- 
forward of propositions (eg. Wason & Johnson-laird, 
1965; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 
1982). The trend in social psychology during the 1970's 
was towards latter of these positions, perhaps even to a 
ridiculous extreme; Nisbett & Ross point out 
that one 
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of their collegues, upon reading an early draft of their 
book, commented "If we're so dumb, how come we made i 
to the moon" (1980, p. 249). Similarly Edwards (1975) 
pointed out that unless individuals were able to assess 
probabilities with a certain degree of accuracy they 
would be unable to drive a car! 
Cohen published a provocative article that again 
tried to turn the tide on the model of rational man. 
states that "Earlier decades, in an era of greater 
optimism, may well have overestimated the natural 
reasoning abilities of human beings. But there seems 
now to be a risk of underestimating them. " (1981, 
p317) . 
Cohen goes on to show how he can categorise all 
experiments that claim to have demonstrated human 
reasoning to be invalid into one of four categories: 
it cognitive illusions", "tests of intelligence or 
education", "misapplication of appropriate normative 
criteria" and "applications of inappropriate normative 
criteria". Only the first two of these categories 
relate to cases where mistakes in reasoning have 
actually occurred, in the other two categories the 
mistake is on the part of the experimenters. 
He 
The categories of interest for current purposes are 
the first and third of these, cognitive illusions and 
misapplications of appropriate normative theories', but 
the others will be described first. What Cohen calls 
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"tests of intelligence or reasoning" refers to 
situations where subjects are found to be ignorant of 
correct rules and procedures, such as Bayes theorem or 
sampling theory. There is clearly no reason to expect 
subjects to know and understand these laws; after all 
they were only discovered by "great thinkers" relatively 
recently in the history of the human race. What is 
being tested for is a lack of education, leading to 
ignorance of the rule, or of the intelligence to apply a 
known rule to artificial subject matter. Cohen includes 
in this category those instances where an individual has 
insufficient knowledge of the mechanisms of the human 
mind and its failings -- for instance overconfidence in 
second-order estimates of accuracy of primary evidence. 
It is just as unreasonable to expect laypeopie to be 
aware of the law of large numbers as it is to expect 
them to be be aware of the latest psychological findings 
on the mechanisms and error patterns of the mind. Cohen 
argues that, while failings in human reasoning that fall 
into this category are genuine failings that may require 
attention or attempts at remedy, they cannot be called 
irrationality, any more than ignorance of Greek 
mythology is irrational! 
Cohen's final two categories concern errors on the 
part of experimenters who mistakenly claim to 
have 
discovered errors in their subjects' reasoning where 
none exists. Cohen gives examples of when 
this may 
occur, for instance because subjects are using 
the 
implicit rules of natural language and conversation 
but 
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experimenters are using logical statementsq which have 
different meanings. This is an example of the experi- 
menter misapplying normatively correct rules. Cohen's 
final category deals with situations where claims that 
experimenters are using rules in inappropriate ways. 
For example, he argues that there are times when prior 
odds should not be used in probability judgments. Some 
of his -claims in this respect are controversial, and 
have attracted much criticism in peer commentary from 
the experimenters involved. 
"Cognitive Illusions" 
The category that some of Snyder & Swann's "con- 
firmation bias" would best fit is that of cognitive 
illusions. Cohen describes these as situations in which 
the individual has made an error in reasoning, but an 
error that could be corrected with "a few moments' 
prompted reflection" (p 323). Cohen draws a metaphor 
between these "cognitive illusions and visual illus- 
ions. Both of these give evidence about underlying 
information-processing mechanisms, but in both 
situations individuals can easily be made to see why 
they have been tricked, and can then improve their 
performance. 
Cognitive illusions usually occur with rules that 
individuals are very competent at using 
in familiar 
situations, but fail to see 
that another, unfamiliar 
situation requires the same rules. 
For instance, the 
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ability to eliminate one hypothesis before moving onto 
another is clearly common sense in the case of "if the 
soap is not in the basin it must be in the bath" , but 
subjects have great difficulty with it in other 
situations such as Mynatt, Doherty & Tweney's experiment 
(described earlier in this chapter). 
Cohen points to another contributory factor that 
accounts for subjects making errors in these experi- 
ments. He accuses experimenters of deliberately 
contriving the situation so as to maximise the chance of 
errors. This is done by introducing time pressures, 
unfamiliar experimental materials and so on, in the same 
way that a conjurer relies on sleight of hand at the 
crucial moment to fool the audience. He concludes that, 
while these shortcomings in human reasoning may occur 
outside of the laboratory, they are probably the 
exception rather than the rule. 
In the light of what was learned from the experi- 
ments in this thesis this description of cognitive 
illusions certainly seems to fit Snyder & Swann's 
paradigm. The list containing predominantly biased 
questions, the one-sided framing of the hypothesis, the 
audio-only communication, the judges hearing only the 
responses and not the questions all point to a 
deliberate attempt on the part of the experimenters to 
force the subjects into making errors in a way that 
would be almost impossible to occur outside of 
the 
laboratory. 
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Misapplication of appropriate normative criteria. 
_ 
Snyder & Swann implicitly assume that the asking of 
unequal numbers of confirmation-seeking and disconfirm- 
ation-seeking questions is an inappropriate strategy. 
The preceeding section concerning Bayes' theorem earlier 
in this chapter, however, argued that there is no such 
thing as a confirmation bias in information search, only 
in the interpretation of information. The important 
thing about collecting information is that it should be 
diagnostic. Not only did Snyder & Swann (wrongly) 
assume that asking biased questions automatically leads 
to confirmation of the hypothesis, they also completely 
ignore the issues of diagnosticity and accuracy. Thus 
they were not only inferring that biases had occurred 
where this was not necessarily the case, but they were 
also (by providing a list of biased, and thus probably 
low-diagnosticity, questions) forcing sub-optimal 
behaviour on the subjects. 
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Cohen's paper generated a lot of heat from the 
experimenters whomhe was criticising, but not much 
consensus. Perhaps the reason for this was best summed 
up in one of those peer commentaries, by Evans & Pollard 
(1981). They point out that Cohen's central argument, 
that neither the existing literature nor any possible 
experiment into deductive or probablistic reasoning can 
ever establish faulty competence, is an irrefutable 
philosophical stance "of little practical relevance to 
the scientific study of human reasoning" (p. 335). If 
rationality is defined in such a way that no adult human 
being can ever be irrational (as Cohen clearly does), 
then the definition of rationality is most unhelpful. 
Baron's book entitled "Rationality and Intell- 
igence 1? (1985) manages to avoid these philosophical 
problems by defining rationality differently, in a way 
that is more useful for evaluating human cognitive 
performance. In Chapter 1 of his book Baron e%pLains 
that rationality is a property of thinking that may be 
present or absent in varying proportion. Rational 
thinking is defined as the following of a good model of 
decision making or belief formation. The model is good 
if it maximises the chance of conforming to the 
normatively correct model. It is not necessarily the 
same as the normatively correct model, 
because it takes 
into account constraints such as the amount of time and 
effort to be invested in thinking. A rational process 
for thinking is thus the one that is most 111(ely to lead 
to the desired outcome within the constraints on the 
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decision-making process. While it is still possible to 
arrive at the optimal decision with an irrational 
strategy (for instance, through luck) and possible to 
arrive at a bad outcome after a rational decision (for 
instance through unforseeable circumstances), the 
rational decision process is the one that is most likely 
to succeed. 
Baron also argues that it is inadequate to consider 
rationality in isolation, but that it needs to be 
considered in the context of intelligence, effective- 
ness, goals and so on. Thus Baron does not limit his 
definition of rationality to systematic biases, but also 
to non-systematic errors. Furthermore, it can be 
inferred from Baron's position that if two decision- 
making strategies were equally likely to lead to the 
correct answer, but one method took more time and 
effort, then that strategy would be less i-ational than 
the other. Perfect rationalitY is thus almost never 
achieved, but serves as a criterioo against which human 
performance can be measured. 
One other notable approach to the question of 
errors and biases is Kruglanski's theory of lay 
epistomology (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Kruglanski, 
Baldwin & Towson, 1983). In its implications, 
Kruglanski's theory is entirely compatible with Baron's, 
that biases and errors are a necessary and unavoidable 
consequence of the shortcuts we need to take in our 
thinking process. 
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Kruglanski sees lay epistomology to be the unifying 
principle involved in many disparate areas of social 
psychology from cognitive consistency through attrib- 
ution theory to judgment under uncertainty. The lay 
epistemic process consists of testing hypotheses with a 
series of "only if x then y" deductions. New hypoth- 
eses are generated when a deduction does not support the 
old hypothesis, and so the process continues. 
Kruglanski also points out that any finite set of 
observations is consistent with an infinite set of 
hypotheses. Therefore we can never fully finish the 
epistemic process when the belief is held with absolute 
certainty. At some point it has to be decided that the 
process will be "frozen". The process may then be 
It unfrozen" at a later point in time for any one of a 
number of reasons, for instance a stronger motivation to 
be accurate or because new information becomes 
available. 
While both Kr(Aglanski and Baron share the view that 
biases and errors are inevitable, they also both believe 
that people's thinking can be made more accurate by 
educational intervention. For instance, by alerting 
people to the availability heuristic or regression to 
the mean, people will be better able to avoid falling 
prey to some of the worst errors. 
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A different and novel approach to the rationalit-, - 
issue is to look at all the sorts of tasks that people 
are required to make and divide them into those that 
people are good at and those where the,., - are outperformed 
by computers (Topmiller, 1979). Interestingly, in an 
analysis of this sort, computers would probably be 
judged far superior to subjects according to the rules 
of Snyder & Swann's paradigm or the Bayesian and 
diagnosticity experiments, but the evidence in this 
thesis points to the fact that in actual social 
interactions present-day computer programmes would be 
totally outperformed by people. 
Biases and Errors 
It is worth, at this point, defining exactly what 
is meant by the terms error and bias, as theý, are often 
used interchangably in the literature. An error is a 
deviation between an actual value and the predicted or 
estimated value. Its direction is not predictable. A 
bias also implies an error, but one that is "system- 
atic, consistent and predictable" (Schneider, Hastorf 
& Ellsworth, p-226,1979). For instanceg when 
assessing the personality of others, if I was often 
completely wrong (for example calling extra-verts 
introverted and neurotics stable) then my judgments 
would include much error. If, though, there was some 
pattern to these errors then they could be called 
biases. If, for instance, I rated e-veryone as more 
extraverted than they actually were then I would iiave an 
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ft extravert bias" Similarly if I rated everyone as 
conforming to the hypothesis I was testing, then I would 
have a "confirmation bias". While this is the most 
common use of the term bias in social cognition, see 
Schneider, Hastorf & Ellsworth, (1979, pp 225-226) for 
other uses of the term. 
Hypothesis testing and errors and biases 
Which of the behaviours and judgments observed in 
the hypothesis testing experiments presented here and 
elsewhere are evidence of irrational information search 
and processing on the part of subjects? 
Snyder makes his position on errors and biases 
explicit in two separate articles (Snyder, 1981; Snyder 
& Gangestad, 1981). He argues that nothing observed in 
his experiments can be called an error or a bias. His 
argument goes as follows. As it happened, subjects 
chose to look for confirmatory evidence, and found it, 
which led them to conclude that their hypotheses were 
valid. If, though, they had chosen to search for 
disconfirmatory evidence, they would no doubt have found 
it, and concluded that their initial hypotheses were 
invalid. The other option open to subjects would have 
been to use an "equal opportunities" strategy, searching 
for confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence in equal 
proportion. And if they had done this, they would 
have 
concluded that anyone they interviewed was 
half 
intro-vert and half extraverted. Since, of these three 
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possible strategies, not one of them is any better than 
any other, it would be wrong to call any or all of them 
irrational or biased. This, says Snyder, shows the 
difference between the social and the physical world. 
Any interactive hypothesis testing strategy in the 
social world is reactive, and thus no strategy is better 
than any other. 
Snyder & Gangestad take this argument further and 
say that even in the "historical" hypothesis testing 
experiment (Snyder & Cantor, 1979) it would be incorrect 
to call the automatic confirming of hypotheses an error. 
After all, they say, we know that people are changed by 
the expectations and beliefs others have of them 
(Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid, 1977). So, even if an 
introverted person was taken on for a job which required 
anbutgoing sort of person, that person might soon 
become outgoing, at least in their working lives. 
It will be argued here that this argument is flawed 
and untenable. It is tantamount to saying that there is 
no social reality, that there are no enduring differ- 
ences between people except in the way that others see 
them. Taken to its logical extreme, Snyder's argument 
would suggest that job interviews are completely 
redmidant as a way of selecting people suitable for a 
job, as are clinical psychologists who attempt to 
diagnose personality disorders. Even personality 
questionnaires like the EPI or the AIMPI are 
totally 
useless, because if the questions 
had been phrased in a 
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different way, then everyone could have been an 
introvert, an extravert or half way between! Surely not 
even the most radical situationalist would go that far! 
The first two experiments presented in this thesis 
were able to show that the interviewers, even asking, 
Snyder's "biased" questions could determine quite 
accurately the extraversion of the targets, as measured 
by the EPI. 
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Bias in Information Search 
Firstly, consider the information search stage of 
the hypothesis testing process. To what extent can the 
asking of only Snyder's confirmation-seeking questions be- 
said to be biased or sub-optimal as a strategy' It has 
already been argued that there is no such thing as 
biased information search (Fischhoff & Beyth-Marom, 
1983), only biased interpretation of that evidence. So, 
it is perhaps misleading to call the type of questions 
used by Snyder biased, but it is meant to demonstrate 
that they tend to elicit an unrepresentative (non- 
random) set of information. There are three things that 
subjects could do having asked a series of, say, biased 
extravert questions: 
1/ They could realise that the information they had 
collected was unrepresentative, and thus ignore it 
completely. 
2/ They could realise that the information thay had 
collected was unrepresentative and attempt to take this 
into account when interpreting that informationp working 
out to what extent the information collected is evidence 
of the target's extraverted disposition and to what 
extent it is representative of the questions asked. 
or 
3/ They could ignore the fact that the information 
that they had collected was unrepresentative and treat 
it as if it were a fair representation of the target's 
disposition. 
Chapter 9. page 323 
What of errors and biases in these three 
situations? In the first situation, the subject has 
wasted his or her time, because the information 
collected was not used in the judgment. Because of 
this, his judgments about the target are likely to be 
inaccurate, since there will be little or no remaining 
evidence to base them upon. Therefore, the judgment 
will be high in error, but not biased, in general. The 
decision-making process would have been inefficient, but 
in the case of experiments which used only Snyder's type 
of biased questions, the subject would probably have 
been justified in feeling that the inefficiency had been 
forced upon them by the experimental materials. 
In the second situation, any bias in the assessment 
of the target's personality would be at the stage of the 
interpretation of the informationg not at the stage of 
collection. However, the task of interpreting the 
information may have been made needlessly complex; if c& 
representative set of data had been collected the 
interpretation would have been more straightforward. 
This being the case, while the method of information 
search could not be said to be the sole cause of biases 
and errors, it might be a contributory 
factor. 
Similarly, if the question that they had asked had been 
low in diagnosticity because they sought out only 
confirmatory evidence, then this could also 
have led to 
inaccuracies (Klayman & Ha, 1986). 
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In the third possibility the interviewers' 
perceptions of the target will clearly be in error, 
having failed to take into consideration a relevant 
factor in the interpretation of the data, the unrep- 
resentativeness of that data. 
From this analysis it would seem that any 
inaccuracies that might affect subjects' judgments, 
would at least in part be caused by the rather odd set 
of questions used in the experiments, but this is not 
inevitable. In order for there to be a confirmation 
bias, it needs to occur at the information processing 
stage, not the information search stage. While this 
discussion is somewhat irrelevant given that subjects do 
not ask biased questions anyway, it serves to make the 
more general point that even when inferences are made 
from an unrepresentative set of data, those inferences 
need not be biased. it is possible for the unrep- 
resentativeness of the information to be recognised and 
taken into account. While there is plenty of evidence 
to suggest that the representativeness of samples is 
often ignored in human reasoning (particularly when the 
availability heuristic is used) it is not always the 
case. 
This discussion, as well as accepting Snyder's 
assumptions about the types of questions asked, also 
accepts Snyder's model of the way in which people 
collect and interpret information. Trope & Bassok 
(1982,1983) also assume that the primary information of 
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interest to the interviewer is the content of the 
target's response. Yet the debriefing of subjects in 
the experiments reported in chapters 6 and -1 clearl-. - 
showed that the hypothesis testers considered that style 
was at least as important. When asked why thev wanted 
to ask questions such as "IsIhat is your opinion of 
marriage? " they readily justified them with statements 
like "It will get her talking" or "I'd start with 
that one to open him up even if he is ver, i- shý-". This 
concentration on the non-verbal or more subtle aspects 
of conversation are even more likely in face to face 
interactions than in paper and pencil or audio-only 
situations (Short, Williams & Christie, 1976). Thus, 
even questions that generate unrepresentative answers 
with respect to content may still generate a stý-le more 
representative of the target's normal behaviour. While 
the subjects' claiming that these things were important 
to them does not necessarily mean that they are the 
important variables in the subjects decision making 
process (Nisbett & Wilson, 1971 '1 ) it is certainly a point 
that should considered further before going on to build 
increasingly elaborate models of hypothesis testing 
processes. 
Random Error 
Whereas Snyder claims that the concept of 
bias is 
meaningless in testing hypotheses using social 
knowledge, he does not consider the possibility and 
implications of error. It is possible that, even 
if 
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there were no systematic confirmatory deviations in 
hypothesis testers' judgments, they mia- , ht still be 
wildly inaccurate due to random error. This is 'in 
important omission in any full understanding of social 
hypothesis testing. The experiments in chapters 3 and 4 
of this thesis go some of the way towards answering this 
question by comparing the interviewers' perceptions of 
the targets with the actual targets' dispositions 
measured using standard psychological tests (and, 
incidentally, finding a high correspondence). Trope & 
Bassok's experiments also address the question of error. 
The issue of diagnosticity is inextricably linked with 
error in this instance. The greater the diagnosticity 
of the questions asked, the smaller the error is likely 
to be in the final judgment (or, put another way, the 
nearer the subjective posterior odds are likely to be to 
the objective truth). 
"Praotical Rationality" 
There is another way in which rational consider- 
ations could affect the choice of questions. The 
rationality of a decision or action can only be judged 
in the light of the goals of the individual. So far it 
has been assumed that the interviewers in these 
experiments had only one goal, to determine the validit.,, 
of the hypothesis. This is undoubtably an over- 
simplification of the interviewers' role. They were 
also probably trying to simultaneously be polite to the 
target, please the experimenter, satisfy their own 
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curiosity, manage the impression that the target formed 
of them and so on. 
These considerations are what Mortimore cails 
.. practica rationalit. v" as opposed to "epistemic 
rationality" (Abelson, 1976), and can account for some 
of the other phenomena noticed in question selection 
such as the avoidance of the introvert questions, 
especially when testing for extraversion. This points 
to another way in which experimenters may mis-interpret 
the behaviour of subjects, by failing to identify their 
goals properly. While it is important not to take this 
approach too far and try to interpret all behaviour as 
rational by re-specifying the subjects' goals with the 
benefit of hindsight (Fischhoff, 1982), it would be 
over-simplistic to treat subjects in conversation as 
being interested only in finding out about the other 
person. 
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Suggestions for further research on Hypothesis 
Testing in Social Interaction 
Despite the failure to find any substantiai 
evidence of a predisposition to use interactions to 
confirm hypotheses on the part of subjects, it would be 
wrong to conclude that these effects cannot occur. As 
Fischhoff (1982) points out, it can be just as 
misleading to paint too rosy a picture of human 
rationality. What is clear, however, is that if the 
self-confirming hypothesis phenomenon is to occur in 
social interaction, it is not going to be in the way 
suggested by Snyder & Swann (1978). 
There is evidence from other paradigms that the 
type of questions are asked can have a marked effect on 
the answers received, and perhaps these could be pursued 
to see if they can be applied to social interaction. 
For instance, there is good evidence that asking 
different sorts of questions to elicit eyewitness 
testomonies can have marked effects on recall of facts 
and impressions (Loftus, 1975; Lipton, 19-1-17 ; Marshall, 
Marquis & Oscamp, 1971). Another related phenomenon of 
interest is the finding that subtle changes in the 
wording of questions in attitude 
inventories (Rois ar, 
1974) or public opinion polls (Orenstein 
& Phillips, 
1978)can also have a marked effect on 
the responses to 
those questions. 
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The arguments presented so far in the thesis carr-, - 
several implications about the way in which research 
into hypothesis testing in social interaction should 
proceed. These suggestions will probably apply equally 
to other research that may be conducted into hypothesis 
testing processes in social interaction using method- 
ologies very different to Snyder & Swann's. These 
suggestions will be discussed in turn. 
Artificiality 
It is clear from the arguments presented in this 
thesis that several of the techniques used in Sn. -, -der & 
Swann's "paradigm setting" experiments were so 
artif ioial (and needlessly so) as to give them no 
external validity or generalisability. Examples of this 
were the choice of questions, the audio-only communicat- 
ion, the use of naive judges instead of the interviewers 
themselves, the selection of questions during rather 
than before the experiment, and so on. It is not being 
argued here that virtually all laboratory experiments 
are so artificial as to be incapable of leading to an 
understanding of human cognition and human behaviour (as 
Harre' & Secord (1972) do at times). There is nothing in 
the present thesis to suggest that laboratory experi- 
ments per se cannot be of use in the scientific study 
of Social 
Psychology. Rather, it is argued here that 
when the procedures used in experiments are so removed 
from those normally employed in natural environments, 
their generalisability will be very low. There is no 
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need to use artificial Procedures just because a hia-, h 
degree of control is required; The experimenL in 
chapter 8 of this thesis and the experimenTs by Forgas 
into person perception in real groups (1916,1978, 
1981(a&b), 1982ý 1983) are good examples of this, arid 
there are plenty of others. All that is requIred is 
some additional, and perhaps creative, thinking, by the 
experimenter, and maybe also some observation of real 
people in the situation that one wants to generalise to. 
Reading Snyder & Swann's experiment one could be 
forgiven for thinking that neither of them had actually 
seen two people talking to each other, let alone a job 
interview or any other situation where hypotheses might 
be being tested! 
The framing of a task 
Earlier in this chapter it has already been argued 
that Snyder's way of framing hypotheses for subjects may 
be completely different from the way in which subjects 
set themselves hypotheses to test. In order to invest- 
igate the errors and biases that subjects are prone to 
in testing their hypotheses, it is essential to study a 
similar process to that which one is generalising to. 
In this case it will require some further work in order 
to investigate the way in which hypotheses are naturallý- 
framed. 
This is not as simple as it may sound, and no 
simple observation or experiment is being recommended 
here. Perhaps it will require listening to natural 
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speech as people ask each other questions. Perhaps i,, 
will require asking subjects questions like "Suppose 
you were to tell someone how to intervieýv- people for the 
job of salesperson. What would you tell them to do: "'. 
It is difficult problem for future research to tap, but 
it will be necessary if lay hypothesis testing is to be 
investigated further. It will not suffice to continue 
with the current assumptions about how people test 
hypotheses; not are they only assumptions but, it is 
argued here, implausible assumptions to boot. 
Replication 
It is often said that to be sure of an effect in 
the social sciences one must make sure that it can be 
replicated, preferably by a different experimenter and 
with slightly different experimental materials. There 
have been too many effects reported that have failed to 
replicate (See, for instance, Morley, 1978 or Amir & 
Sharon, 1984). Not only might an effect be a type one 
error, but it also may have been an artefact of the 
particular subjects used, the particular characteritics 
of the experimenter, numerical errors, fraud or any one 
of a multitude of other pitfalls of experiments (See 
Barber, 1976 for a full discussion). Replication is 
particularly true of experiments that try to generalise 
from one sample to another, in this case 
from under- 
graduates to job interviewers and other professionals. 
Yet, a large and still growing part of 
the 
literature in social cognition has rested on a 
few very 
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weak links in the chain of events in hypothesis testing 
such as Swann's PhD thesis and the judging of the 
targets' responses in Snyder & Swann's second invest- 
igation (1978). Other links in the chain have been 
replicated over and over many times, such as the 
question selection task. Given that a chain is only as 
strong as its weakest link, this is a very inefficient 
way to do research. In this case (as this thesis has 
demonstrated) those weak links have caused the whole 
chain to break! 
The whole is not the sum of the Darts 
Snyder's approach to hypothesis testing, and aiso 
to self-fulfilling prophecies, has been that they are 
causal chains made up of many links that can be studied 
seperately. While this is a good way to get a good 
understanding of each of those stagesp demonstrating 
that a bias can occur at a particular stage is not the 
same as demonstrating that the same bias will occur when 
embedded in the whole process. There have been se,. -eral 
demonstrations to show that the shortcomings in judgment 
may be observed in one situation but not in another 
similar situation. There is nothing all-pervasive 
about, for instance, the availability heuristic or the 
under-utilisation of base rates. As Kruglanski and 
others ha-ve shown (Kruglanski & Aizen, 1983; Ajzen, 
1977) the biases can easily be manipulated bý- small 
changes in the situation. So, a general 
knowledge that, 
for instance, individuals tend to underestimate the 
Chapter 9. page 333 
influence of situational forces in determining the 
behaviour of others does not mean that individuals will 
fall prey to this bias in all situations. Snvd (-, r 
continually makes inferences of this sort, inferrin, -f 
that because judges perceived confirmation in the 
target's behaviour, the interviewers would also 
interpret that behaviour as evidence conf irminc, the 
hypothesis, or inferring that, because intervip-ýsers tend 
to conclude that their hypotheses are confirmed in one 
situation (Swann, 1978) they will also confirm their 
hypotheses in another, completely different situation 
(Snyder & Swann, 1978). 
Dynamic or static process? 
Snyder's treatment of hypothesis testing is as if 
it were a completely static process. The hypothesis 
tester recei-ves the hypothesis, selects questions to 
ask, asks those questions and then interprets the 
responses. Hypothesis testing is thus characterised as 
a uni-directional linear progression of stages, each one 
leading to the next. 
Person perception is rarely like this. Individuals 
may set hypotheses, then get some evidence, which 
prompts them to either change the 
hypothesis or search 
for a different set of information. 
The first 
experiment (Chapter 4) demonstrated 
this nicely, that 
people modify their search for 
information as they 
proceed through the task. To use a metaphor, 
if Snyder 
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has represented hypothesis testing as being like the 
firing of a bullet in a specific direction, real life 
person perception can be seen as more like the flight of 
a guided missile. By making continual changes as the 
target is approached, much greater accuracv is po-, sible 
that a "one off" aim and fire. 
Hogarth (1981) has made a similar point. Because 
most research has focused on discrete incidents, he 
argues that the role of feedback in decision makin, -r,, has 
been virtually ignored. 
As well as designing experiments to allow for 
feedback and a modifying of strategy, other changes 
would be desirable to better understand the processes 
involved. If the interviewer's perception of the target 
is to be seen as continually in flux, but presumably 
"homing in" on a more stable perception of the target, 
then it would be very informative to follow the progress 
of that representation over the duration of the 
interaction (or, even better, interactions). 
The most obvious way to do this would be to stop 
the interaction at, say, two minute intervals and each 
time measure the interviewer's impression of the target. 
This, however, may have the problem of interfer ing with 
the natural course of the interaction. Experimenters 
may then have to settle for a slightly less powerful and 
revealing design. Many interactions could be set up 
using the same expectations, hypotheses and conditions. 
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Some would be stopped after two minutes, some after 
four, some after six, and so on. The changes in 
accuracy and bias could still be measureJat several 
points in time, but it would not be truly longitudinal 
as the first one would. 
Decisions taken socially. not individually 
After reading the research presented here and 
elsewhere on the testing of hypotheses about other 
people it is perhaps appropriate to conclude that it is 
too early to start making inferences from it to the real 
world. There is, though, one important conclusion that 
would merit further research. 
The literatures on self-fulfilling prophecies and 
self-confirming hypotheses both point to the power of 
expectations and hypotheses to perpetuate erroneous 
stereotypes and prejudices about other people. The 
experiments and analyses presented here suggest that 
these effects might be very unlikely to occur when there 
is social interaction between perceivers and targets, 
but much more likely when there is no direct contact 
during the decision-making (as in the experiment in 
Chapter 8). The conclusion that interaction between 
stereotyped groups will often be counter-productive may 
have been over emphasised in 
Social Fsychologý-; so(-ial 
processes may be the factor that pre-,, -ent individuals 
from falling prey to the limitations of their 
individual 
information-processing systems. If this is the case 
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then Social Psychology will need to develop methods of 
studying judgment under uncertainty as a social not an 
individual phenomenon. 
Belief Perseverance 
One f inding in social cognition is that individuals 
will continue to hold a belief, even when all of the 
evidence that lead to that belief is completely 
discredited in as vivid a manner as possible (Ross, 
Lepper & Hubbard, 1975). Snyder & Swann's work on 
hypothesis testing in social interaction may have 
developed an equivalent inertia in the social cognition 
literature itself, perhaps because the initial findings 
were so plaus, ble, partioularly if one doesn't look too 
closely at the methods they used. This is, perhaps, the 
reason why Snyder's work on hypothesis testirig 
continues to be an accepted part of the wisdom of 5ocial 
Psychology 
even after all of the contrary eý, -idence that 
has been published, a fraction of which is enough to 
discredit it completely. Take, for example, Fiske & 
Taylor who, after reviewing some of the literature 
critical of Snyder & Swann, state (referrin, -. 1 to social 
interaction) that "There seems little doubt that 
confirmatory hypothesis testing occurs, but 
hoTý, robust 
it is remains an issue. " ( 1984, p. 387). E,., en 
in 1986 
Snyder & Swann's initial experiment is still cited 
uncritically in prestigeous books and 
journals such as 
the Annual Review of Psychology (,,, Iillei- 
& Turnbull) . 
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I have rarely seen a better demonstration of belief 
perseverance, but have yet to be shown a convincing 
demonstration of self-confirming hypotheses in social 
interaction! And no doubt even when social psychol- 
ogists themselves have managed to resolve this issue, 
the ghost of the self-confirming hypothesis will 
continue to haunt applied psychology for a good maný- 
more years. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
1/ This chapter started by considering several 
experiments on hypothesis testing that used a Bayesian 
conceptual framework (eg Trope & Bassok, 1982,1983). 
it was concluded that the findings of the experiment-s in 
chapters four to seven (ibid) complemented their 
overall conclusions thatt when it comes to social 
interaction, individuals are fairly good intuitive 
Bayesians. However, like Snyder & Swann's experiments, 
those experiments also used a very simplistic model of 
social interaction which the experiments presented in 
this thesis demonstrated is probably inadequate when 
investigating hypothesis testing processes. Neverthe- 
less, Bayesý Theorem provides a very clear conceptual 
framework for analysing hypothesis testing and if, for 
instance, Snyder & Swann had used it in constructing 
their experiments they could have avoided some of their 
conceptual errors and been better able to understand the 
contribution of both information search and information 
processing to confirmation lases. 
The Hypothesis-testing paradigm was then 
compared and contrasted to the attribution theory 
paradigm. It was argued that these two paradigms shared 
a lot in common, but for some reason they 
had tended to 
co-exist rather than support each other. 
It was then 
argued that a lot could be gained 
by considering the 
similarities and differences between 
these two fieids. 
Several criticisms of attribution theory i,; (-re shown 
to 
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be very relevant to the hypothesis testing paradi-,, rm. 
For instance, in order to understand hypothesis testing 
processes in everyday life it will be necessar. -, - to 
understand the way in which indi%'iduals frame hý, - pothes's 
testing tasks. In addition, the hý-pothesis testing 
paradigm (Like the attribution paradigm) assumes a hifh 
level of information processing in ev-eryday inter- 
actions; this may be misleading. 
3/ The behaviour of the "interviewers" in 
hypothesis testing experiments was evaluated in the 
light of the literature on human rationality. It ý, as 
concluded that some of the decisions such as the choice 
of questions that had been labeled by some researchers 
as biased could, in fact, have been entirely consistent 
with a normatively correct strategy. Where real biases 
may have occurred they were probably forced upon the 
subjects by the artificiality of the experimental 
materials rather than being symptomatic of some 
underlying flaw in human reasoning. 
4/ Snyder's position (1981; Snyder & Gangestad, 
1981) that it is not possible to call a decision based 
on social as opposed to physical reality biased or 
inaccurate was argued to be wrong. It is tantamount to 
saying that there are no real differences between 
people. 
5/ It was concluded that, ýý, hile attempts to 
find 
experimental evidence of a confirmation 
bias in testing 
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hypotheses using social interaction had not been 
successful in this thesisp this was not to say -ý. hat they 
could not exist. Suggestions were made for future 
research into hypothesis testing and other studies of 
the social interaction processes. It was argued that a 
better understanding of the social interaction process 
is needed before imposing constraints on experimental 
subjects, that the research should be more "wholistic'' 
rather than dividing processes up into all of their 
constituent parts, that important effects should be 
tested for replication and that social interaction 
should be considered as a dynamic process with feedback 
rather than a static one-off decision. It was also 
suggested that decisions taken in social interactions 
may be less prone to error than judgments made 
individually. The individualistic emphasis of the 
judgment under uncertaint. y literature may contribute 
to the bleak picture it paints of human rationality. 
Finally concern was expressed that, while the 
evidence that led to our knowledge of a confirmation 
bias in hypothesis testing has been completely 
discredited, the effect is still accepted uncritically 
in the ps-ychology literature. most of the empirical and 
conceptual evidence in this thesis points to the fact 
that social interactions (as opposed to individual 
cognitive processes) cause erroneous hypotheses and 
expectations to be rejected rather than perpetuated. 
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TOPTC OFT-: -, COVý"-" BY TNT- 
Below is the list of items *'roTr which you should se1ect ýhe 9 2, 'D'j to ask during the conversation. Circlrý the number o-ý" c., --ch item y, -u decide to use. Feel free to change the wording of ! -.. ny questi, -ýr-i if you 
can do so without changino its meanine. 
Think about times when you felt lonely. What events brotg7ht on these fpelings? 
2. What events make you feel no-ular with people? 
3. What activities do you ieally excel in? 
In what situations do you wi, ---h you could be more outgoing? 
Tell me about some time when you felt left out from some social 
group. How did you handle thesp feelings? 
What kind of events make you feel like being , lone? 
7. What factors make it hard for you to really open up to people? 
I -.. 6. What social activities (e. g. clubs, groups. ) 
have you been active in over the years? 
9. What do you like about living situations in which there are always 
lots of people around? 
10. What kind of situations do you seek out if you want to meet new people? 
Describe to me a type of social situation that invariably makes you 
feel ill at ease and awkward. What is it about such situations that 
makes you uncomfortrible? 
12. Think about times when your shyness in social situations has made you 
come across as beinff aloof. Give me an example. 
13. What things do you dislike about loud parties? 
14. Think about times you have engaged in a lively spirited debate , vith 
someone. 1,11hat are some typical things you like to debate? 
15 In what situations are you most talkative? What is it about these 
situations that makes you like to talk? 
16. Think about a time when you really wanted to talk to someone, 
but 
Wh at ty-_D just couldn't bring yourself to initiate conversation. es of 
situations are most likely to make you feel this way? 
17. Vibat do you like to do when you are feeliný-- re2lly enerfre-ýic? 
E 
18. What would you do if you wanted to liven thinr-s up at a -, )7irty? 
,N ip x-i c--l j- 3c: 
The Question list given to subjects in 
the experiment reported in Chapter 7 
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360 
QUESTIONS USED IN INTERVIEWS 
What social activities (eg. clubs, groups) etc) have you been active in over the years? 
T 
2 Wou Id you cons i der yourse 1fa shy pe rson? 
Do you like loud parties? 
4 How long have you known your oldest friend' 
5 Thi nk about t ime s you feItI one Iy. Wha t event sb rought abo it these feelings? 
N 
6 Do you like reading books more than you like going to 
parties? 
1ý1 7 When you are put in with a group of people which you must 
get on with (eg. beginning a new job) do you make conversation or 
do you wait for others? 
8 In what situations do you wish you could be more outgoing7 
9 Do you live in the city or the country? 
I 
10 Do you find social gatherings awkward? 
F- 
in what organisations do you play a leading part? 
E 
12 Do you "go out" frequently? 
T 
13 Do you have difficulty making new friends, meeting people, 
etc 
14 What would you do if you wanted to liven things up at 
party? 
1 "5 What sort of music do you enjoy? 
i6 Te II me about sometime when you felt left oUtf rom SOM( 
social group. How did you handle these feelings? 
Pi 
would you try to ge 17 In a party where you knew few people, 
to know someone or would you sit in a corner and wait for them t( 
come to you? 
1ýý 
is Would you describe yourself as sociable? 
I"9 Do you prefer t0 go to wi Id part i es or sedate 
d inne 
parties? 
ýT long serious discussiens with clos, 20 Do you often have 
friends? 
I 
Wha t factors ma- ke it really hai: d foi you to o penuPtC., 
peopIe? 
21 Do you consider yours elf to have had a upbringi ng with a 
strong emphasis on di sc ipl in e and conf ormi ty 
2 3' In what situations are you most talkative? What is it at)cu* 
these situations that makes you like to talk') 
9 Fer-L 24 When in a social situat ion with other people, do you relaxed 
and confident or on-edge and uncomfortable? A 
F il 
2! 5 What things do you disl ike about loud parties? 
26 Are you nervous about interviews where you have to make A 
good impression' 
27 What do you like about living in situations where there ir 
a lot of people around you? 
28 Do you like to feel tha t other people' s attention is focuser- 
on y0u? 
29 What is your opinion of marriage? 
30 Do you adjust to new env i ronments quickIy ma ki ng new 
friends etc.? 
91 
31 Describe to me a type of social situation that invariably 
makes you feel ill at ease and awkward. What is it about these 
situations that makes you fe el uncomfortable? 
j 
32 How do you find that others view you in regard to your 
temperament etc? 
33 What do you like to do when you are feeling rea11yenerg- 
etiC? 
i'4 What do you think of Margaret Thatcher' 
35 Have you ever been accused of talking too much or dominat i n- 
conve r sa ti ons 
iý: -, - 36 Think about times when your shyness in social situaticns has 
made you come across as being aloof Give me an example. 
37 How do you see the future of the world? 
3-6 Do unfamiliar situations and occurmnces make y0UfeeI 
uneasy? 
39 As far as you can tell does your entheusiasm rub off on 
those around you? 
Iýj 40 Do you prefer to spend free time in the company oi o 
the r 
alone, or a mixture of the two" 
2 
1ý 
41 In company do you enjoy bragging about your exploits' 
2 
42 Wou 1. d you say tha t you enj oyed spend i ng t ime on your own? 
C k;, 
43 Do you believe in your own destiny, or do you think tha' 
others are controlling it2 
4 4' Think about times when you have engaged in aIiveIy and 
spirited debate with people. What are some typical things you 
like to debate? 
Would you like to become famous? 
46 Do you find it hard to make conversation with stvangers? 
ýj 
47 Do you prefer having many aquaintances rather than few but 
special friends? 
48 Think about a time when you really wanted to talk to someone 
but just couldn't bring yourself to initiate conversation. What 
types of situations are most likely to make you feel this way? 
